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Abstract 
The inspiration for this thesis comes from a recognition of the problems in 
prosecuting financial crime in the modern day. In exploring how fraud was 
prosecuted from 1760 to 1820, this thesis seeks to contextualise modern 
prosecutorial failings into a longer history of the struggles to define and address 
fraud and deceptive practices. It also seeks to contribute to existing research into 
historical financial crime by providing a detailed history of fraud offences and the 
settings in which these offences had been previously enforced.  
This thesis will answer three central questions: what offences made up ‘fraud’ by the 
early nineteenth century? – Who was prosecuting these offences? – and, how was 
fraud being prosecuted at this time? The first of these questions seeks, for the first 
time in the literature, to identify and trace fraud offences to the nineteenth century. 
This thesis will then identify who was prosecuting fraud, and then how they 
prosecuted fraud in order to explain how fraud offences were shaped through 
enforcement and how this impacted upon the development of fraud offences. In 
asking these three central questions, this thesis will provide a lens through which to 
explain how, and for whom, the criminal justice system operated in the eighteenth 
century. 
This thesis explores and categorises all fraud trials heard at the Old Bailey between 
1760 and 1820 and builds on these records by using a range of greater and lesser 
known sources including City of London officials’ notes, government financial 
records, and more obscure materials of contemporary practitioners. By tracing the 
prosecution of fraud from the lowest to the highest criminal courts in London, this 
thesis provides an holistic overview of the choices available to prosecutors of fraud, 
and explains why so many fraud trials were heard within the senior courts rather 
than the summary courts. This explanation is made possible by the application of 
structuralist theories which explain why particular social and economic groups 
prosecuted fraud offences at such a high level, and how the criminal justice system 
operated to assist such prosecutions.  
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Glossary of Terms 
Aldermen The City of London elected officials who sat as Magistrates, and from 
whom one was chosen each year to serve as Lord Mayor of the City.  
 
Assize Court The most senior criminal court for trials of first instance. The assize 
court heard mostly felonies but some misdemeanours. In London, see 
Old Bailey 
 
Crown Court 
Reserved 
The appellant court within which sat the Twelve Judges. See the 
Twelve Judges.  
 
Felony The most serious category of criminal offence, some felonies were 
capital. Historically, a conviction for felony resulted in the forfeiture 
of all goods. By the eighteenth century the main procedural 
characteristic was the denial by right of defence counsel in matters of 
felony.  
 
Guildhall Where the Aldermen of the City of London held Summary Court 
Sessions, see Summary Courts.  
 
King’s Bench A common law court which heard both criminal and civil matters. 
Criminal cases could be removed from ordinary criminal courts using 
a writ of Certiorari. 
 
Magistrates 
Court 
See Summary Courts  
 
 
                                                                  Prosecuting Fraud in the Metropolis, 1760-1820 
 
vii 
 
Mansion House Where the Lord Mayor of London held Summary Court Sessions, see 
Summary Courts.  
 
Metropolis 
(London) 
London was made up of the City of London, Middlesex, and 
Westminster. The Metropolis in the eighteenth century covered the 
central and northern parts of modern London; south of the river 
Thames was Southwark which formed part of London but which fell 
under the jurisdiction of Surrey. See Image 7.1 
 
Misdemeanour The least serious category of criminal offence, some misdemeanours 
could result in seven years transportation. By right, a prisoner was 
entitled to counsel in matters of misdemeanour.  
 
Old Bailey The assize court for the entire Metropolis of London but which sat 
within the walls of the City of London.  
 
Petty Sessions Another term for a Summary Court 
 
Quarter 
Sessions 
The second highest criminal court in England in which could be heard 
felonies or misdemeanours but which heard primarily 
misdemeanours. Quarter Sessions sat four times a year and were 
sometimes referred to as ‘Sessions’ for short-hand. 
 
Sessions This can refer to Petty Sessions or Quarter Sessions depending on the 
context of the usage.  
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Star Chamber Established in the fifteenth century as a court (ostensibly) hearing 
prosecutions and litigation against socially and economically powerful 
persons. Decisions of the Star Chamber are contentious as it is well 
recognised that the court abused its position to pursue political 
opponents. 
Summary 
Courts 
The lowest criminal court which heard mostly criminal matters and 
often acted as the first court to which a criminal complaint was made. 
Presided over by Magistrates. The work of these courts would largely 
be transferred to the Police Courts in the nineteenth century. See 
Magistrates’ Court and Petty Sessions 
 
Twelve Judges The senior professional twelve judges in England who decided on 
matters of law appealed to the Crown Court Reserved. These judges 
also sat within courts of first instance such as the assize courts, 
including the Old Bailey.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
The prosecution of fraud in twenty-first century England and Wales entails a tangle 
of separate organisations, treading on one another’s toes, and wrangling for high-
profile cases. There are many organisations that can prosecute different forms of 
fraud in England including, but not limited to: The Serious Fraud Office, The Financial 
Conduct Authority, The Competitions and Markets Authority, and the Specialist 
Fraud Division of the Crown Prosecution Service.1 The remit of these organisations 
are by no means clearly delineated. The result of this quagmire of prosecutors, with 
their separate expertise and agendas, is a chaotic legal system that seemingly 
prioritises certain forms of crime and financial misconduct over others, in an 
ostensibly arbitrary manner. The 2000s saw an attempt to improve the chaos of 
financial misconduct regulation through a series of measures including the 
establishment of The Financial Services Authority2 and the codification of common 
fraud.3 However, recent high-profile prosecutions such as the Libor scandal reflect a 
continuing lack of clarity regarding which organisation should prosecute many cases. 
How did regulation and enforcement of financial crime become so disorganised and 
ineffectual? Is this a modern phenomenon, or have such crimes and behaviours 
always plagued the country? This thesis will provide context to contemporary 
experiences of the prosecution of fraud by looking back through the history of fraud 
prosecution in England to locate both the laws of fraud, and the ways in which they 
have historically been enforced. This thesis will reveal similar difficulties to the 
modern day in the defining of fraud, but it will also uncover how socio-political, and 
economic motives lie behind the failures in the effective enforcement of fraud laws, 
both in the eighteenth century and today.  
                                                          
1 For more detail see: https://www.sfo.gov.uk/; https://www.fca.org.uk/; 
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/competition-and-markets-authority; 
https://www.cps.gov.uk/your_cps/our_organisation/sfd.html  
2 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
3 For a critique of this legislation see: Gary Wilson and Sarah Wilson ‘Can the general fraud offence 
‘get the law right’?: some perspectives on the ‘problem’ of financial crime. Journal of Criminal 
Law (2006-2007). 
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As shall be detailed below, this thesis has relevance to a wide range of disciplines.4 
The tracing of the black letter laws surrounding fraud contributes to discussions 
surrounding the history of criminal and contract law. Similarly, the use of fraud as a 
lens through which to explore and critique the eighteenth century criminal justice 
system will be of interest to legal and crime historians. Economic and business 
historians are rightly drawn to the pivotal changes of the nineteenth century5 and 
this thesis provides further contextualisation for the exploration of the development 
of company and banking law prior to this period. By exploring the prosecution of 
fraud prior to the birth of the modern company, this thesis can provide a backdrop 
for the nineteenth century changes and in particular, challenge perceptions that the 
legal playing field for fraud started in 1826. 
This thesis does not speak only to historians. Researchers of contemporary financial 
crime may also draw parallels and material from this research. In particular, 
researchers of modern financial crime who are interested in definitional and 
ontological debates around financial crime may find the development of black-letter 
fraud offences relevant in that it reflects how some definitions of fraud are ingrained 
in English law whereas others, particularly the mens rea6 of fraud offences are a 
relatively new development7. Criminologists with an interest in financial crime and 
crimes of the middle-classes may also be interested to see the types of fraud, and the 
types of people prosecuted for certain types of fraud in the eighteenth century. For 
instance, there is little evidence that sophisticated or complex fraud was prosecuted 
at the Old Bailey during this period.8  
                                                          
4 Consequently, the level of detail given throughout this thesis is with a multiple audience in mind as 
advised by Morton Horwitz see Morton Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-
1860 (Harvard University press, 1969) p.xi 
5 In particular the 1826 legislation which allowed for joint-stock banking and the rapid increase in the 
scope and breadth of the stock market. See for example Timothy L Alborn, Conceiving 
Companies. Joint-stock Politics in Victorian England (Routledge, 1998); P.L Cottrell, Industrial 
Finance 1830-1914, (Methuen & Co Ltd, 1980); S. Evelyn Thomas. The Rise and Growth of Joint 
Stock Banking (Sir Isaac Pitman and Sons, Ltd, 1934) 
6 This refers to the mental element of an offence, such as intent, recklessness, or dishonesty 
7 For further discussion, see Chapter 3 
8 See Chapter 5 for a breakdown of the types of fraud heard at the Old Bailey during this period. 
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Researchers of the prosecution and enforcement of modern financial crime 
regulations will see clear parallels between the conclusions of this thesis and 
contemporary discussions surrounding fraud. In particular, the use of discretion in 
the prosecution, or not, of financial crime. A key conclusion at the heart of this thesis 
is that fraud prosecutions were used in the eighteenth century to uphold the 
necessary commercial conditions which allowed for the development of capitalism. 
By the nineteenth century this prosecutorial discretion shifted to prevent 
prosecution of banking and corporate fraud, again to uphold the conditions required 
for commercialism. In the present day, particularly post-2008, discussion around the 
use of prosecutions in the face of deeply controversial financial activity have 
continued the long tradition of recognising the relevance of prosecutorial discretion 
in which actors or activities are defined as fraudulent or otherwise.  
The Project: An Overview 
The prosecution of fraud in the eighteenth century is not a story of high-level, 
sophisticated financial crime. Nor is it a story of fat-cat bankers or grasping clerks, 
manipulating complex account and financial structures to fund lavish and debauched 
lifestyles. A more accurate understanding of fraud in the eighteenth century is 
grounded far more in the every-day and commonplace. However, whilst a 
commonplace group of offences, these offences threatened to unravel the emerging 
threads of capitalism before they could be knitted together. By impacting upon 
everyday activities, simple contracts, and economic relationships such as purchasing 
goods, fraud impacted upon most social strata and relationships from creditor and 
debtor, to master and servant.  
This thesis will dispel some preconceptions regarding fraud, namely that fraud 
offences are the preserve of the middle-classes or that fraud offences are 
predominantly committed through a breach of trust.9 This thesis will also provide, for 
                                                          
9 This perception of fraud is partly derived from nineteenth century legislation which shall be further 
discussed below and partly from twentieth and twenty-first scholarship on financial crime which 
has followed Edwin Sutherland’s pioneering research which realigned fraud as a middle-class 
offence. The works of Sutherland shall be discussed later in this chapter.  
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the first time in the literature of crime and legal history, a comprehensive outline and 
critique of the offences making up the category of ‘fraud’10, the most commonly 
being the obtaining of goods by false pretences or by false personation.11  ‘Fraud’ is 
arguably one of the most difficult categories of criminal law to define. This umbrella 
term is used to define a variety of behaviours that can be rather narrow or wide. A 
wide and general definition of fraudulent offences, such as more modern definitions 
of fraud could be any behaviour which utilises some deceptive practice or dishonestly 
to achieve a benefit for oneself or another or to cause or a loss to another.12 This 
twenty first century approach to fraud partly clarifies the law but when applied to 
categorising eighteenth and nineteenth understandings of fraud, it becomes too 
vague to be of use. Consequently, the definition of fraud is problematized yet further 
and is derived through a process of archival research. Definitions of fraud offences 
are located through a combination of traditional legal history methods – tracing 
statute and case law for precedent – and also how these laws were enforced within 
the courts. 
The three central questions of this thesis are:  what offences made up ‘fraud’ by the 
early nineteenth century? – Who was prosecuting these offences? – and, how was 
fraud being prosecuted at this time?  
The first of these questions seeks to trace, identify, and critique the development of 
the offences collectively identified as ‘fraud’. Partly, this is to provide a background 
to the fraud offences which has not previously existed. This question also challenges 
some preconceptions of fraud, including that fraud offences were an extension of 
forgery13, and that fraud required the breaching of some trust or prior relationship 
                                                          
10 ‘Fraud’ refers to a category of offences rather than one cohesive offence. 
11 A detailed analysis of these laws can be found in Chapter 3 
12 Fraud Act 2006 
13 Many crime historians conflate fraud with forgery. In particular see: Peter King, ‘Making Crime 
News: newspapers, violent crime and the selective reporting of the Old Bailey trials in the late 
eighteenth century’ Crime, History and Society, vol.13 no.1 (2009) p.91-116 p.97; David Philips, 
Crime and Authority in Victorian England (Croom Helm Ltd, 1977); Jim Sharpe, Crime, Order and 
Historical Change in The Problem of Crime,  eds. John Muncie and Eugene McLaughlin (Sage 
Publications Ltd, 2002) 
                                                                  Prosecuting Fraud in the Metropolis, 1760-1820 
 
5 
 
to be exploited.14 This thesis introduces an original framework to understand fraud 
offences in the form of five central doctrines (a sixth is added with regard to felonious 
fraud). This thesis does not merely seek to identify the statutes and case law which 
made up fraud offences, but also seeks to provide an understanding for the doctrinal 
framework within which such laws developed. Such a framework refers to the 
underlying values, priorities, and agendas within which such laws were shaped by 
both Parliament and the courts. This doctrinal approach is not limited to the criminal 
law but rather, applies to how the underlying definitions and terminologies of 
fraudulent behaviour, both for criminal and contractual application, were applied 
and altered by the higher courts. In identifying this doctrinal framework this thesis 
can explain how fraud offences were constructed, and the ways in which they 
developed from Tudor times to the end of the eighteenth century. The doctrinal 
approach imposed on the eighteenth century in this thesis can equally be applied to 
the first half of the nineteenth century, before the enforcement of fraud offence laws 
which were concerned more with the breach of a trust15.  
Having established the underlying framework through which fraud laws developed, 
this thesis will provide further definitions of fraud based upon how the black-letter 
law was applied and enforced. By exploring the relationship between how the law 
was defined and how it was enforced, this thesis will paint a more accurate picture 
of fraud in the courts during this period. By defining and tracing fraud offences to the 
early nineteenth century, this thesis will also reveal how frauds were both 
misdemeanours and felonies and will shine a light upon how these different 
categories of fraud offences were disposed of within the criminal justice system. In 
taking an approach which uses as its starting point the fraud cases which were heard 
at the Old Bailey, this thesis has revealed a previously ignored form of fraud that 
being the fraudulent obtaining of naval prize monies 
                                                          
14 Randall McGowen, ‘From Pillory to Gallows: the Punishment of Forgery in the Age of the Financial 
Revolution’ Past & Present no.165 (Nov.1999) pp.107-140. 
15 20 & 21 Vict. This nineteenth century shift in underlying perceptions and definitions of fraud will 
be returned to throughout this in thesis, particularly later in this chapter.  
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The second research question - who was prosecuting fraud? -  will further develop 
understanding of the history of fraud offences and in particular, how the prosecution 
of fraud resulted in laws developing in the way they did. It shall be argued that the 
development of the law depends upon how it is enforced and, in the case of 
eighteenth century criminal law, who was willing and able to prosecute fraud. This 
thesis reveals there were two main prosecutors of fraud offences at the Old Bailey, 
tradespeople and the Navy. The significance of tradespeople as prosecutors lies at 
the heart of the theoretical underpinnings of this thesis, that fraud is the perfect 
example of an offence which was prosecuted in order to support and promote 
commercial activity and bolster the early development of Capitalism.  
The presence of the Navy and its agents as prosecutors of fraud is a significant finding 
as it demonstrates how state actors were systematically leading prosecutions over a 
hundred years before the establishment of a Director of Public Prosecutions and 
decades before organisations such as the Bank of England began to act as a 
professional prosecuting body.16 The presence of naval agents bringing fraud 
prosecutions is an early example of the state developing a central role as the 
prosecutor of fraud against a public authority. Arguably, this places the advent of the 
state as prosecutor not in the nineteenth, but in the eighteenth century. This finding 
is particularly significant as it demonstrates how state institutions were undertaking 
activities more associated with the modern state. Certainly these early state-actor 
prosecutions are demonstrating an active role of public authorities in fraud 
prosecutions which historians of company, business, and banking law would 
associate with late-nineteenth century criminal justice.17 
The final research question at the heart of the thesis, how was fraud being 
prosecuted, will allow for the in-depth exploration of the eighteenth century 
prosecution process from complaint to conviction. The most utilised archive in this 
thesis is the Old Bailey Proceedings (The ‘Proceedings’), from which all fraud 
indictments between 1760 and 1820 have been extracted, and from which a 
                                                          
16 Randall McGowen’s work on the Bank of England is discussed in detail in Chapter 5 
17 Martin J, Wiener, Reconstructing the Criminal, Culture, Law and Policy in England 1830-1914. 
(Cambridge University Press, 1990) 
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database of information has been generated. The question of how fraud was 
prosecuted is further answered throughout this thesis by asking the supplementary 
questions of why these cases were being heard at the assize level rather than in a 
lower court18 and how fraud prosecution decisions proceeded. 
This thesis tells the first half of the story of the prosecution of fraud, defining the 
offence, identifying the prosecutors, and asking when and how these prosecutions 
were brought to the Old Bailey. This thesis does not directly engage with questions 
surrounding those accused of fraud, the prisoners appearing at the Old Bailey, the 
sentencing of those convicted of fraud offences, and their experiences of the criminal 
justice system. These issues do however emerge through the exploration of the 
prosecution of fraud, particularly in terms of the typologies of fraud which are 
defined according to the mechanisms through which these offences were 
committed19. Likewise, conviction rates and the use of counsel by prisoners are also 
assessed, albeit with the focus upon prosecutors. This thesis engages less with the 
story of the prisoner for two reasons. First, the prosecution process deserves in-
depth attention and had the prisoner’s tale also been considered, this would have 
necessitated less attention upon the prosecution. The second reason for less focus 
being given to the prisoner is more practical. As shall be outlined in Chapter 2, the 
Proceedings give very little information regarding the prisoner and even the official 
court records such as the recognizances contain very little detail of the accused. The 
nineteenth century sees a great change in the manner and the extent to which 
information relating to prisoners was collected20. Prior to this interest in prisoner 
data collection, the criminal justice system was far more concerned with the 
information of the prosecutor21 and it is upon this information this thesis will focus.  
Having outlined the central questions of this research, the main parameters of this 
thesis will now be briefly outlined. These areas of focus include the jurisdictional 
                                                          
18 An overview of the litigation choices available is given is Chapter 4, and an exploration of the 
lower courts is given in Chapters 6 and 7.  
19 See Chapter 5 
20 It is this raft of information such as prisoner biometrics and sentencing records which form the basis 
of the website of the AHRC funded project, Digital Panopticon: The Global Impact of London 
Punishments, 1780-1925:  https://www.digitalpanopticon.org/ 
21 This will be discussed further in Chapter 2 
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parameters of the research, the chosen time period, and the theoretical analysis 
through which the archival records will be assessed.  
Fraud: an offence-based approach 
Definitions and understandings of fraud are integral to the study of any financial 
crime whether the focus is contemporary or historical. Fraud encapsulates a range of 
offences and much has been written on the nature and ontology of types of fraud22. 
One of the aims of this thesis is to challenge perceptions and preconceptions of fraud, 
and to examine the offences which made up fraud prosecutions, and explore the 
conditions within which these offences were committed and then prosecuted. As 
shall be discussed below when addressing the current literature on financial crime, 
both historical and, to a lesser extent, modern, this thesis is trying to demonstrate 
that fraud prosecutions in the eighteenth century did not correspond with the more 
central conceptions of fraud, particularly white-collar crime. This will be illustrated 
by taking a data-led approach, using the archival sources as a starting point to 
uncover what types of fraud were being prosecuted during the period, 1760-1820; 
definitions of fraud will be derived from the archival sources used, both black-letter 
and the offences prosecuted as reflected in court records. 
This thesis is taking an offence-based approach in that the definitions of fraud which 
are used in this thesis are derived from contemporary sources, most significantly 
statute and case law of the era alongside court records23. Whilst twentieth-century 
definitions of financial crime will be discussed in this chapter, the purpose of this 
thesis is not to prove whether these definitions are sound24 but rather, to use 
eighteenth century evidence to expose the types of fraud being prosecuted at that 
time. Having explored these prosecutions, conclusions will be drawn regarding what 
this tells us about the development of fraud through to the present day 
                                                          
22 See below the discussion on white collar-crime 
23 The choice of sources will be discussed in Chapter 2 
24 The perils of anachronistic analysis will be returned to throughout this thesis. 
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Twentieth century definitions of fraud have largely engaged with Sutherland’s 
excellent work on definitions and understandings of white-collar crime25. 
Sutherland contended that crimes traditionally associated with business ought to 
be considered alongside more traditional theories of criminal behaviour26. 
Sutherland went on to define what constituted white-collar crime but his initial 
clarion call to consider the crimes of the wealthy has been hugely influential. 
However, Sutherland’s approach and his view of white-collar crime is not wholly 
unproblematic. For example, Aubert argued that attempts to define white-collar 
crime were a ‘futile terminological dispute’27. Putting criticism aside, this thesis will 
not automatically be defining fraud as white-collar crime because one of the 
objectives of the thesis is to understand eighteenth century fraud using 
contemporary data. The objective is not to use eighteenth century records to prove 
any particular twenty or twenty-first century definition of financial crime more 
accurate than any other.  
The concept of white-collar crime as a category of offence is a powerful one and one 
to which Sutherland was right to draw attention.28 The crimes of the middle and 
upper classes are often overlooked by a range of groups and researchers from 
criminologists to prosecutors. Trying to form a coherent view of crime without 
considering middle and upper class criminals would be misleading. However, we 
must be careful not to conflate too many aspects of financial crime in order to 
produce a neat definition of fraud. Sutherland’s definition of white-collar crime 
answers two very important questions: ‘what offence did a person commit?’ and 
‘what type of person committed the offence?’29  
                                                          
25 See in particular E.H Sutherland, White Collar Crime (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc, 1949) and 
E.D. Sutherland, Is ”White Collar Crime” Crime? American Sociological Review Vol.10 no.2 (1944) 
pp.132-139. 
26 Sutherland, American Sociological Review p.132 
27 Cited in W.G.Carson, White-Collar Crime and the Enforcement of Factory Legislation. 10 British 
Journal of Criminology 383 (1970) p. 383 
28 See in particular E.H Sutherland, White Collar Crime (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc, 1949) and 
E.D. Sutherland, Is ”White Collar Crime” Crime? American Sociological Review Vol.10 no.2 (1944) 
pp.132-139. 
29 See in particular S.P Shapiro, Collaring the Crime, not the Criminal: Reconstructing the Concept of 
White-Collar Crime. American Sociological Review, Vol.55, No.3 (Jun 1990) pp.346-365. p.347 
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We must be careful not to confuse white-collar crime with fraud; it could be argued 
that all white-collar crime is fraud, but not all fraud is white-collar crime. By labelling 
all fraud-related offences ‘white-collar’ there is no space for discussion of occasions 
when lower class offenders commit financial crime and why they may be the target 
for enforcement over others. ‘White-collar crime’ is often theorized as being 
committed through a breach of trust.30 This is a fairly modern understanding of fraud, 
drawing on nineteenth century developments in deceptive crimes.31 The purpose of 
this thesis is to problematize the circumstances within which fraud was committed 
in the eighteenth century, and not to impose a twentieth century understanding of 
financial crime retrospectively to a time with a very different legal landscape. 
As shall be demonstrated below, pre-existing research in this field has often focused 
upon financial crime committed by the middle-classes. There is often a logical and 
not unfounded assumption that certain forms of financial crime are more likely to be 
committed by the middle or upper classes.32 As already identified, the laws around 
fraud offences changed in the middle of the nineteenth century so as to define most 
frauds as being a breach of trust. In order to be in a position of trust, one often had 
to be of a particular class such as the lower-middle class clerk33, or the upper-class 
banker.34 Crimes committed by the middle classes are certainly an under-researched 
area, by taking an approach which uses court data as a central source, this will allow 
for a broader understanding of fraud, not linked primarily to class or job status.  
In taking an approach which uses the offence prosecuted as a starting point, this 
thesis will separate the two questions of the types of fraud prosecuted, and who was 
prosecuted for fraud. Because of this separation of offender from offence, it would 
be counter-intuitive to begin this research with a definition of fraud which conflated 
                                                          
30 Sutherland, White Collar Crime 
31 20 & 21 Vict 
32 Rob Sindall, Middle Class Crime in Nineteenth-Century England. Criminal Justice History (1983) 
pp.23-40 
33 Gregory Anderson, Victorian Clerks, (Manchester University Press, 1976) 
34 James Taylor, ‘Commercial fraud and public men in Victorian Britain’, Historical Research, Vol.78 
No.200 (May 2005); James Taylor, Company fraud in Victorian Britain: The Royal British Bank 
Scandal of 1856. English Historical Review, Vol.CXXII no. 497 (2007); Sarah Wilson, The Origins of 
Modern Financial Crime. Historical foundations and current problems in Britain (Routledge, 
2014); 
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the two. Moreover, given the pivotal shift in legal definitions of fraud in the middle 
of the nineteenth century, it would be anachronistic to apply such definitions of fraud 
to the eighteenth century. Consequently, this thesis will not directly apply the 
concept of white-collar crime35. However, in exploring the legal landscape of fraud 
prior to the changes of the nineteenth century, this thesis will illuminate the setting 
within which such alterations occurred. In particular, by exposing how the criminal 
justice system operated with regard to fraud prior to the changes of the mid-
nineteenth century, this thesis provides a longer narrative for how fraud offences 
have been defined and enforced.36 
The Metropolis and the Criminal Justice System 
London has long been the legal, economic, and political centre of England, a 
metropole from which knowledge, wealth, and power spread across the country.  As 
shall be discussed in detail in Chapter 2, London has often formed the basis of 
research into assize-level courts due to the fortunate existence of the Old Bailey 
Proceedings (the ‘Proceedings’), an archive that provides fascinating detail of the 
business of the Old Bailey over a number of centuries. This thesis will draw heavily 
upon the Proceedings thereby making the Old Bailey a focus of the study. These 
Proceedings were contemporaneously read across the country through their 
reproduction in regional media and thereby shaped the prosecution and perception 
of crime from London, across the nation.37 
This thesis will explore in detail the prosecution of fraud through all tiers of the 
eighteenth century criminal justice system, an undertaking never before attempted 
for any form of offence. By tracing fraud offences from summary to appellant court, 
this study reveals insight into the operation and mechanics of the criminal justice 
system not previously appreciated. Magistrates’ courts in London were at the 
                                                          
35 Particularly as the types of fraud being prosecuted at this time, as evidenced in Chapter 5, did not 
reflect a breach of trust but rather, an abuse of knowledge.  
36 The reasons for choosing this time period will be given in detail later in this chapter.  
37 For in-depth discussion of the Proceedings, see Chapter 2.  
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vanguard of criminal justice administration.38 By analysing the workings of the 
magistrates’ courts across London, greater insight into the development of the 
summary court system is revealed, in particular, the wider motivations for disposal 
of cases.39  
A further original contribution of this thesis comes from analysis of fraud 
prosecutions across the Metropolis, and not solely in one jurisdiction within London. 
Some excellent studies have been made of the summary and quarter sessions courts 
in the City of London, or in Middlesex and Westminster.40 This thesis is original 
however in that never before has research into both of these jurisdictions been 
united in one study and in relation to one particular offence, thereby providing 
comparable analysis of one group of offences across the entire capital.  
The Reign of George III: 1760-1820 
The period under study rather neatly coincides with the reign of George III. However, 
this is not why these dates have been chosen. The period has been chosen for three 
reasons. First, because there is a clear gap in the literature regarding the laws and 
prosecution of fraud prior to the mid-nineteenth century. Second, and not entirely 
exclusive of the first reason, this period has been chosen because this thesis is 
seeking to explore the prosecution of fraud at a time before the great changes of the 
nineteenth century. As shall be discussed in more detail later in this chapter, there 
has understandably been great interest in the development of the modern company 
in the nineteenth century and the impact this had upon financial crime. Moreover, 
the nineteenth century saw great changes to the criminal justice system such as the 
development of evidence law, the increased role of the police, the increased 
                                                          
38 Greg T. Smith, Summary Justice in the City. A selection of cases heard at the Guildhall Justice 
Room, 1752-1781 (London Record Society, The Boydell Press, 2013) p.xi 
39 In particular, see Chapter 7 of this thesis. 
40 See for example: Ruth Paley ‘Justice in Eighteenth-Century Hackney: The Justicing Notebook of 
Henry Norris and the Hackney Petty Sessions Book (London Records Society, 1991); Norma 
Landau, The Justices of the Peace, 1679-1760 (University of California Press, 1984); Smith, 
Summary Justice; Drew D Gray, Crime, Prosecution and Social Relations: The Summary Courts of 
the City of London in the Late Eighteenth Century (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). For an 
excellent overview of the Surrey court system see, John Beattie, Crime and the Courts in England, 
1660-1800 (Oxford University Press, 1986) 
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presence of counsel in trials, and the creation of the Director of Public Prosecutions. 
This thesis picks up the narrative of the history of fraud before the pivotal changes of 
the nineteenth century, particularly the changes to joint-stock banking which 
occurred in 1826.41 These developments in investments and the market certainly 
demands attention and has a lot to offer modern-day understandings of financial 
crime.42 The literature around banking fraud in the nineteenth century has often 
queried whether there existed sufficient laws to prosecute the developing forms of 
fraud being committed post-1826. This thesis will demonstrate that yes, there were 
sufficient laws to criminalise banking and newer forms of fraud in the nineteenth 
century. Further, and in keeping with James Taylor’s claim that the law was enforced 
or not depending upon political motivations, this thesis will demonstrate that fraud 
offences were prosecuted in the eighteenth century in such a way as to support 
commercial activity; frauds which threatened commercial dealings were prosecuted 
at the highest level. This is in contrast to the nineteenth century when a dearth of 
fraud prosecutions reflects a similar motivation, to maintain faith in systems of 
banking and investments43; had all banking or investment fraud been prosecuted this 
may have resulted in a loss of faith in commercial investment and resulted in a 
collapse of the banking system. This is not to say that a high level of fraud 
prosecutions in the eighteenth century bolstered faith in commercial activity or that 
a lack of public exposure of banking fraud led to increased faith in the investments 
market, only that the actors within the criminal justice systems at this time believed 
this to be the case.  
                                                          
41 See in particular Shannon, H.A ‘The Limited Companies of 1866-1883’, The Economic History 
Review, Vol.4 No.3 (Oct 1933) pp.290-316; James Taylor, Boardroom Scandal (Oxford University 
Press, 2013); James Taylor ‘Watchdogs or apologists? Financial journalism and company fraud in 
early Victorian Britain’, Historical Research Vo.85, no.230 (November 2012); James Taylor, 
‘Commercial fraud and public men in Victorian Britain’, Historical Research, Vol.78 no.200 (May 
2005); James Taylor, Company fraud in Victorian Britain: The Royal British Bank Scandal of 1856. 
English Historical Review, Vol.CXXII no. 497 (2007); James Taylor, ‘Creating Capitalism: Joint-stock 
enterprise in British politics and culture, 1800-1870’. The Royal Historical Society, (2006); Mark 
Freeman, Robin Pearson and James Taylor. ‘Law, politics and the governance of English and 
Scottish joint-stock companies, 1600-1850’. Business History, 2013. Vol.15, No.4 pp633-649. 
42 See in particular Wilson, Origins; Sarah Wilson, ‘Fraud and white-collar crime: 1850 to the present’ 
in Histories of Crime: Britain 1600-2000. Eds Anne-Marie Kildar and David Nash (Basingstoke, 
Palgrave, 2010) 
43 Taylor, Boardroom Scandal 
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This thesis aims to situate the changes of the nineteenth century by exploring both 
the laws of fraud prior to this time, and also how the criminal justice system 
responded to fraud offences in the newly emerging mode of economic development. 
In providing this context, researchers of the nineteenth century company and the 
consequences of modern corporate law can situate their research within a longer 
history of fraud. 
The third reason 1760-1820 has been chosen as the basis of this thesis is because this 
time period has inherent significance for the development of fraud laws and 
prosecutions. As shall be returned to throughout this thesis, the eighteenth century 
saw a great change, both socially and economically44. The population became far 
more mobile and the nature of economic markets became larger and more 
complex45. It shall be demonstrated that these factors created greater opportunity 
for fraud which resulted in frauds, particularly those which threatened commercial 
relationships, being prosecuted at the highest level. These opportunities to commit 
fraud came at a time just before the Industrial Revolution, at a time of proto-
capitalism when economic markets and the conditions for capitalism were 
expanding. It was these developments which directly created the conditions for many 
frauds. Just as researchers of nineteenth century company-related fraud highlight 
the significance of joint-stock banking and company law developments to the change 
in financial crime, so too does this thesis highlight the economic and social changes 
of the eighteenth century and this impact upon fraud and fraud prosecution.  
A final consideration in the choice of time period for this thesis is a practical one. An 
in-depth reading of all fraud indictments heard at the Old Bailey during a certain 
period is preferable to the sampling of cases and gives an accurate overview of the 
indictments whether of one particular form of fraud or another. Had a longer time 
period been selected, the number of indictments would have been too great to read 
in-depth and to extract the range of significant data this thesis has covered.  
                                                          
44 See in particular discussion in Chapter 7. 
45 Craig Muldrew, ‘Interpreting the Market: The Ethics of Credit and Community Relations in Early 
Modern England’ Social History, Vol.18, No.2 (May, 1993) pp.163-183 p.174 
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Theoretical underpinnings 
This thesis will engage with theoretical explanations of how and why fraud was 
prosecuted in certain ways during this period. 1760 to 1820 marks out a time which 
is on the cusp of the Industrial Revolution, and which experiences what this thesis is 
referring to as the establishment of ‘proto-Capitalism’. This concept will be explored 
in detail in Chapter 2, wherein this thesis will re-engage with the works of, amongst 
others, E. P Thompson and Douglas Hay. Such theorists seek to understand the 
operation of the law through structural, holistic lenses which situate subject matter 
in a wider socio-economic context.  Adopting such an approach to explore the 
prosecution of fraud, will explain the changes to the prosecution of fraud using a 
structural framework and will seek to understand the criminal justice system in terms 
of the promotion of the interests of certain powerful social groups. Such theories 
have largely been side-lined in recent years as crime historians and legal historians 
have moved away from structural understandings of crime, the trial, and the law as 
a whole to individual lived experience of the justice system.46  This methodological 
individualism produces excellent research, but does not seek to answer broader 
questions of how the law operated within a socio-economic context. This thesis will 
reconnect with structural theories, such as those of Thompson, in order to 
understand the prosecution of fraud within a wider context of the overall criminal 
justice system and beyond. 
These theories will not be engaged with uncritically. The relevance of the law is often 
overlooked by Marxist historians who focus instead upon economic, political, and 
social relationships. This thesis will argue that law does not exist as a separate entity, 
distinct from the economic and the social. Rather, the law and its internal logic and 
application has an equally significant influence upon the structure of social and 
economic relations.47 Edward Thompson was rightly scathing of historical and 
criminological approaches in which ‘theory takes precedence over the historical 
                                                          
46 This will be analysed in depth in Chapter 5 but scholars such as John Langbein have vociferously 
critiqued attempts at understanding the law in any terms of structure or systems of power. 
47 Peter King ‘Decision-makers and Decision-making in the English Criminal Law, 1750-1800’ The 
Historical Journal, Vol.27, No.1 (Mar, 1984) pp.25-58. p.58 
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evidence which it is intended to theorize’.48 It is for this reason that a detailed 
methodology is given in Chapter 2, which will demonstrate the approaches and 
methods of this thesis, and the ways in which theory can help to understand the 
archival material.  
In exploring the prosecution of one collection of offences, in this case fraud, this 
thesis is allowing for a wider exploration of the purpose and the utilisation of the 
criminal justice system in this period. By engaging with the works of Thompson, Hay, 
and others, this thesis is challenging a perception of the criminal law that has been 
perceived as a process of ‘taking out the rubbish’,49 or an exercise in 
bureaucratisation. Perceptions of the criminal justice system as serving a narrow 
role, controlling unruly behaviour of the least wealthy in society, have been prevalent 
in legal and crime history.50  
The argument propounded in this thesis will challenge this view. The criminal justice 
system played a far-wider and more significant socio-political role. The criminal law, 
along with all other areas of law, formed a coherent whole that acted to protect 
particular social and commercial values. Hay asserts that the criminal law acted to 
protect and bolster a system which protected property and favoured property over 
the individual.51 This thesis will demonstrate this by exploring which groups’ 
economic and proprietary interests were being protected by the criminal justice 
system during this period. To this end, fraud laws and how they were enforced, will 
be assessed in order to evaluate the extent to which the criminal law was used as a 
tool to define and enforce social and commercial values.  
 
                                                          
48 E.P Thompson ‘Eighteenth-Century English Society: Class Struggle without Class?’ Social History, 
Vol.3 No.2 (May, 1978) pp.133-165, p.147 
49 John Langbein cited in King The Historical Journal, p.57 
50 In particular see the deeply influential works of John Langbein as cited throughout this thesis. 
51 D. Hay, ‘Property, Authority and Criminal Law’ published in Albion’s Fatal Tree, Crime and Society 
in Eighteenth Century England. Ed. Hey, Linebaugh et al. (Allen lane, 1975). See also Alan Norrie, 
Crime, Reason and History. A Critical Introduction to Criminal Law, 2nd edition (Cambridge 
University Press, 2001) 
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Pre-Existing Literature in the Field 
As with all research topics, this thesis has both narrow and more wide-reaching 
questions. The central three questions relate directly to the definitions and 
enforcement of fraud and the mechanisms by which these offences were prosecuted 
in London between 1760 and 1820. But the wider issues addressed in this thesis 
include more critical and theoretical questions of who was using the criminal justice 
system and how certain forms of financial misconduct were treated within the law. 
Because of these wider questions, the literature in the field might be expected to be 
extensive. However, fraud and the criminalisation of certain financial behaviour is a 
greatly under-researched subject amongst lawyers and historians.52 Sociologists have 
dedicated more research to the field, particularly the ground-breaking work of Edwin 
Sutherland. However, Sutherland’s work is rooted in the twentieth century and relies 
upon a definition of fraud that rests upon the perpetrator of fraud and the 
circumstances within which the crime was committed. As discussed above, this thesis 
is taking a different approach, and is focused upon the offence, rather than the 
offender.  
Sutherland’s work has formed the basis of further research in white-collar crime and 
financial crime, committed by the middle classes or through a breach of trust.53 
Whilst fascinating, this research only applies to the post-nineteenth century.54 There 
have been ripples of academic interest in white-collar crime during the twentieth 
century, notably since the 1970s and 1980s.55 However, these works were often 
inspired by a resurgence in contemporary financial fraud and make fleeting reference 
to the origins and developments of wider definitions of fraud, and the history of fraud 
and financial misconduct. Likewise there has been some excellent contemporary 
research into particular forms of financial misconduct and the challenges of the 
                                                          
52 George Robb, White-Collar Crime in Modern England. Financial Fraud and Business Morality, 1845-
1929. (Cambridge University Press, 1992) p.6 
53 Sutherland, White Collar Crime  
54 In particular, post 1857, (20 & 21 Vict) when legislation was introduced which defined fraud in 
terms of breach of a fiduciary obligation.  
55 Robb,  White-Collar Crime p.6 and see in particular Sindall, Criminal Justice History 
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twenty-first century,56 although it tells us nothing of the definition and prosecution 
of fraud offences prior to the early nineteenth century.  
The 1990s saw a smattering of interest in Victorian company law crime but again, the 
focus was predominantly on the development of the joint-stock company and the 
lack of regulation of companies and protection for shareholders.57 In recent years, 
academics such as James Taylor and Sarah Wilson have been producing excellent 
research on nineteenth century corporate fraud and banking and joint-stock 
companies.58 Both Taylor and Wilson frame their analysis around the opportunities 
created by the joint-stock company.59 This approach provides a rarely before 
considered insight into the financial crime of the ‘upper world’. Wilson has taken this 
research further in that she situates the developments of Victorian corporate fraud 
in a longer timeframe, making clear parallels with contemporary financial crime and 
providing direct lessons between the Victorian and the contemporary.60 
Rob Sindall wrote a much cited article on crime committed by the middle-classes in 
the nineteenth century.61 This was an innovative article in that few social or crime 
historians had considered crime from a middle-class perspective. The approach of 
crime historians had previously focused upon the working classes.62 Sindall’s focus 
was upon the overall amount of crime committed by the middle classes in relation to 
national crime statistics and the types of offences most likely to be committed by the 
middle-classes. Sindall’s research question is very different to the approach of this 
thesis. Sindall did not directly engage with the prevalence of fraud, and this was 
because the question related to the crimes of the middle-classes, not who was 
committing financial crime. In fact, Sindall’s findings did not reflect fraud as a 
                                                          
56 Examples include: Roman Tomasic, "The financial crisis and the haphazard pursuit of financial 
crime", Journal of Financial Crime, (Vol. 18 Issue: 1, 2011) pp.7-31; the collective works of 
Michael Levi including: Michael Levi, Regulating fraud: white-collar crime and the criminal 
process. (Tavistock Publications, 1987). 
57 See for example: Foreman-Peck, J, ‘Sleaze and the Victorian Businessman’, History Today, Vol. 45, 
No.8 1995.  
58 See above for a selection of these works 
59 Wilson, Sarah, ’Law, Morality and Regulation: Victorian Experience of Financial Crime’ British 
Journal of Criminology (2006) 46 pp1073-1090; Taylor, The Royal Historical Society  
60 Wilson, Origins 
61 Sindall, Criminal Justice History  
62 Ibid p.23 
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prevalent crime for the middle classes which explains why his work does not engage 
with fraud. This finding would certainly align with the findings of this thesis, that 
fraud offences were not sophisticated organised crime but rather, every day and low-
level misdemeanours.  
Sindall’s work was however rare in that few researchers have addressed the crimes 
of the middle-classes. As shall be discussed in depth in Chapter 2, since the first wave 
of crime history, the sub-discipline has been preoccupied with crime from below, 
focusing upon the history of social strata previously ignored more generally by 
historians. This focus on the working and lower classes has not extended to the study 
of fraud. This may be largely due to the preconception that fraud is a middle class 
crime, committed by social groups which are already considered by economic and 
business historians.63 There have been some isolated exceptions where crime 
historians have examined the prosecution of fraud. These studies rarely involve in-
depth analysis of court records, or problematize definitions of fraud.64  Heather 
Shore’s research into organised crime in the long eighteenth century includes some 
work on organised financial crime, in particular ‘long-firm’ frauds in the mid-
nineteenth century65. Shore argued that long-firm frauds66 were particularly insidious 
as they were a non-traditional crime and involved non-traditional criminals.67 This 
thesis will directly challenge such claims by shining a light on fraud trials appearing 
across the criminal justice system. This analysis will reveal the every-day nature of 
fraud during the eighteenth century, thereby allowing for a more nuanced and 
evidenced analysis of the types of fraud being heard during this period. This will be 
achieved through the imposition of an original typology of fraud, constructed 
through a close-reading of all fraud indictments heard before the Old Bailey between 
1760 and 1820.  
                                                          
63 G.R, Searle, Morality and the Market in Victorian Britain (Clarendon Press, 1998) 
64 Wiener, Reconstructing the Criminal 
65 H. Shore, London's Criminal Underworlds, c. 1720 - c. 1930: A Social and Cultural History (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2015) Ch.6 
66 Fraud committed by establishing and running a seemingly genuine business, establishing systems 
of credit before closing the business overnight, absconding with the goods and monies owed to 
creditors.  
67 Shore, Underworlds  
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Chapter Outline 
The following chapter of this thesis will outline the methodology by which the above 
research questions with be answered. It is still uncommon for scholars of the law to 
engage with methods beyond traditional legal methods68 but as an interdisciplinary 
piece of research, this thesis will provide a long-overdue critique of interdisciplinary 
research uniting legal and historical studies.  
The first central research question of this thesis concerns definitions of fraud. 
Chapter 3 identifies the most common forms of fraud offence and traces their 
development from Tudor times to the early nineteenth century. The position of 
fraud, existing between the criminal and the civil law will be assessed in order to 
better situate the prosecution of fraud within the entire legal system. The purpose 
of this chapter is to provide the reader with a clear understanding of the law in this 
area, before moving on to consider how this law was utilised. Chapter 4 will outline 
the choices available to those falling foul of fraud. This chapter in particular seeks to 
question why certain courts were used to pursue fraud, and follows on from Chapter 
3 in that it questions why particular forms of fraud would be pursued in higher, rather 
than lower courts.  
Chapter 5 further questions the definitions of fraud during this period by considering 
how the law was enforced. This chapter also acts as a bridge between the first two 
central research questions of what was fraud, and who was prosecuting fraud. 
Chapter 5 identifies the prosecutors of fraud at the Old Bailey by their occupation, 
and situates their complaints and the types of frauds being pursued by the imposition 
of a typology of fraud. This chapter asks not only who was prosecuting fraud at the 
Old Bailey, but what types of fraud, and in what circumstances were such frauds 
committed.  
                                                          
68 Sir John Baker, Reflections on ‘doing’ legal history, in Anthony Musson and Chantal Stebbings eds, 
Making Legal History: Approaches and Methodologies (Cambridge University Press, 2015); 
Anthony Musson and Chantal Stebbings, Introduction, in Musson and Stebbings Approaches and 
Methodologies  
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Chapter 6 and 7 address the third of the research questions, the ways in which fraud 
was being prosecuted. In particular, how prosecutors used and negotiated the 
criminal justice system from the magistrates’ courts to the Old Bailey. The interaction 
between the prosecutor and some of the central actors within the criminal justice 
system will be examined. These actors include magistrates, court clerks, the legal 
profession, and juries.  
The question of how fraud was prosecuted acts to further explain the second 
question of who was prosecuting, by exploring the ways in which prosecutors of 
fraud at the Old Bailey. Chapter 7 explores which juries heard fraud complaints at the 
Old Bailey and brings the thesis full-circle back to how these cases found their way 
into the Old Bailey at all. This is carried out through a detailed analysis of fraud 
disposal within the magistrates’ courts of the Metropolis. The thesis concludes with 
a final question regarding the use of specialist juries within the Old Bailey and some 
final thoughts regarding future research in the field.  
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Chapter 2 Methods and Methodology 
The questions at the heart of this thesis – what was fraud during the period, who was 
prosecuting this fraud, and how fraud was prosecuted – will be answered using a 
range of archives which shall be discussed in detail in this chapter, as well as 
throughout the rest of the thesis. Attention will be paid to the inter-disciplinary 
nature of the thesis, particularly the differing, and sometimes conflicting approaches 
adopted by legal historians and crime historians. Methods and methodology in the 
discipline of history revolve around the archives used and the pitfalls or advantages 
these archives pose to the researcher.69 This thesis will go beyond these parameters 
to critically engage with disciplinary approaches, and also to utilise analytical tools 
more commonly found in the sciences such as Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences (SPSS).70  Finally, the methods of analysis shall be explored, paying 
particularly attention to the theoretical underpinning of the overall thesis, and the 
manner in which primary data was categorised and analysed to answer the central 
research questions. Particular consideration will be paid to the Old Bailey Sessions 
Papers (the Proceedings) and how these documents have been digitised.71 These 
archives form the basis of the data used throughout the thesis and as such, this 
source will be paid particular attention.  
Alongside the Proceedings, other sources will be examined such as official court 
records of the quarter sessions, working documents of the summary courts, official 
government documents from such departments as the Treasury, legal practitioner 
texts, and many others. The reasons for the selection of these documents, alongside 
any methodological considerations which these archives present, will be considered 
as they arise. Whereas other archives and sources referred to in the thesis are used 
to answer particular research questions and appear in limited chapters, the Old 
                                                          
69 Barry Godfrey, Historical and Archival Research Methods. In D. Gadd, S. Karstedt, & S. Mesner 
(Eds.), The Handbook on Criminology Research Methods (New York, Sage, 2011) p.158 
70 A statistical software tool which allows for more complex quantitative analysis.  
71 It was from these digitised archives which data has been collected.  
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Bailey Proceedings form the evidential basis of all chapters. For this reason, this 
source requires and deserves in-depth consideration.  
The Old Bailey Sessions Papers: Use as an Historical Source 
In considering the prosecution of fraud during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, the most detailed surviving source of criminal trials is the Old Bailey 
Sessions Papers (‘the Proceedings’). These Proceedings are the best accounts we 
have of the administration of criminal justice in England before the mid-nineteenth 
century72 and as such, any research surrounding criminal trials during this period 
must have at its bedrock, the Proceedings. However, the Proceedings are not without 
their limitations and undertaking any legal or criminal history research, based solely 
upon the Proceedings is to be avoided.73 In so heavily utilising the Proceedings, a 
large amount of criminal and legal historical research looking at the seventeenth to 
nineteenth centuries has focused upon London, which certainly raises some 
questions about representativeness of research. Notwithstanding this limitation, 
when considering the criminal category of fraud, a focus upon London, Westminster 
and Middlesex – the jurisdiction of the Proceedings – is desirable. London was by far 
the biggest population centre in England at this time, containing a tenth of all people 
in England.74 More significantly, ‘[London had] widespread economic, social, and 
political influence on the rest of the country. At least one person in six had lived there 
at some time in their lives...75’ London was of a similar social composition to other 
cities but was seen as the principal city in the country.76 As the foremost city, London 
in its entirety, was a template for the rest of the country and it is in the prosecution 
of fraud within London that innovations and changes to these offences are revealed.  
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The Old Bailey Sessions Papers 
The Proceedings are a written report of trials heard in the Old Bailey between 1676 
and 1913. They were written eight times a year, one issue for each sitting of the Old 
Bailey.77 Supposedly, barring two brief periods of time, absolutely all cases appear 
within the Proceedings.78 These two exceptions are the first ten years of the life of 
the Proceedings when not all cases were covered79, and second, between 1790 and 
1793 when only cases which resulted in conviction were reported.80 However, 
research carried out for the purposes of this thesis has revealed a number of cases 
reported elsewhere, which almost certainly appeared at the Old Bailey, but which 
are missing from the Proceedings. The case of R v Vincent Wright, Anne Fagan and 
William Elson81 is well documented in the summary court accounts, and details are 
given of the trial at the Old Bailey. However, no reference to this case appears in the 
Proceedings.82 A further case, The King v Benjamin Lara83, was a Crown Case Reserve 
case, the report of which clearly states the matter to have initially tried at the Old 
Bailey. Again, no reference to this trial appears within the Proceedings. These 
findings illustrate that, contrary to common belief, the Old Bailey Proceedings do not 
record all cases heard at the Old Bailey.   
The methodology of this thesis has allowed for such omissions to be discovered. Due 
to the digitisation of the Proceedings84, research on the Old Bailey has focused on 
the big data possibilities of such a resource and perhaps it is unsurprising that it took 
this form of research, the closer reading of all indictments relating to one form of 
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offence, to reveal missing trial reports within the Proceedings. In slicing through vast 
amounts of data to focus upon the prosecution of a particular offence, a more 
nuanced picture of the accuracy and completeness of the Proceedings can emerge. 
Moreover, in this thesis, court and official records from other courts and offices were 
used to illustrate a bigger and more detailed picture of the prosecution of fraud, 
which allowed for the identification of missing trials. The Proceedings should not be 
analysed in isolation as additional records have revealed the missing cases from the 
Proceedings.  
Due to the focus of this thesis, it is not possible to estimate the number of missing 
trials from the Proceedings. Moreover, the complimentary records explored 
alongside the Proceedings are themselves incomplete.85 It is possible that the 
reporting of some fraud offences was due to the nature of fraud prosecutions 
primarily being misdemeanours rather than capital felony cases86; offences which 
could result in transportation at worst may not have resonated with public bloodlust. 
However, this argument is undermined by the otherwise extensive reporting of fraud 
offences.87 It is more likely that cases were sometimes missed for reasons beyond 
the substance or procedure of the offence itself. These reasons included the nature 
of the reporting itself and the purpose of the Proceedings. 
Publishers and Shorthand Writers 
From the inception of the Proceedings, the Lord Mayor of London approved of the 
publication88 but on the condition that the publisher paid the Lord Mayor for the 
privilege.89 After 1775, the licence for the Proceedings was transferred from the Lord 
Mayor to the City of London and the publisher did not have to pay to publish the 
Proceedings.90 By 1778, the City of London was subsidising the publication of the 
Proceedings on the condition that they gave a ‘true, fair and perfect narrative’ of the 
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trials.91 This requirement greatly extended the length of the Proceedings, sometimes 
resulting in one edition having a number of volumes. The length of the Proceedings 
also increased in the nineteenth century for a range of reasons, partly because of a 
growing population and partly as trials became more complicated. This is not to say 
that the Proceedings were, to any extent, a verbatim account. The narratives of the 
trials were taken down by shorthand writers and copy (the text) was then handed to 
the editor to decide what to include within the particular edition. For practical as well 
as political, social and commercial purposes, the details of the trials reported are 
highly selective. 
The greater issue for the researcher is what the writers chose to leave out of their 
reports.92 As stated above, these political, commercial, and social considerations 
were far more influential upon what writers chose to include in their reports than 
any practical limitation. However, there is suggestion that writers did not work alone 
when attending the Sessions and rather, at least pairs, if not teams of writers would 
share the burden between them thereby increasing the possibility of capturing all 
details of the trial.  
A more significant influence upon the depth of detail reported in the Proceedings 
was the involvement of counsel, for either the prosecution or the defence. This 
provided a further source of detail regarding the case as counsel would either take 
their own notes, or employ their own shorthand writers, presumably for the 
purposes of case management. There is evidence to suggest that these accounts 
were offered to the editors of the Proceedings to include in their reports. The editors 
appeared happy to accept this additional copy, even if these reports were biased in 
favour of whichever side counsel were representing. This contribution from counsel 
provided additional material for the editors and provided publicity for counsel.   
One glaring omission from the Proceedings, which will be discussed in more detail 
below, is the request by editors that legal and procedural argument be ignored by 
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the shorthand writers.93 This was for a range of reasons including not wishing to lose 
the public’s interest by including drier material of the trials and also the belief that 
revealing too much about criminal processes could act as a guide to the more cunning 
criminal.94 Details of legal or procedural matters were omitted for a non-lawyer 
reading public in the belief that they would be too technical or boring.95 Perhaps a 
more practical explanation might be the limited role of lawyers in the criminal trial 
until 1836 when barristers were allowed, as of right, to represent prisoners.96 This 
alienation of lawyers from criminal litigation naturally extended to their role in the 
compiling and publishing of criminal trial materials, including the Proceedings.97 
Consequently, the tone and content of the Proceedings is lacking in legal detail and 
focus. However, as explored in detail in Chapter 3, the majority of fraud trials at the 
Old Bailey related to misdemeanours, for which defence counsel were permitted. 
Moreover, as demonstrated in Chapter 6, this permission for counsel was taken up 
by those accused of fraudulent offences.  
The Proceedings and the Identification of Counsel 
In Chapter 6 of this thesis, the number, the role, and the significance of counsel 
involved in fraud prosecutions at the Old Bailey will be explored.  As with other 
researchers in the field, this study is estimating the number of counsel present based 
upon the Proceedings.98 There are particular methodological considerations when 
seeking evidence of counsel in the Proceedings. Langbein has voiced some concern 
with the under-representation of counsel, which he demonstrates through 
comparing the Proceedings with the diaries of Justice Ryder which reflects far more 
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involvement of counsel in trials.99 The Proceedings may have omitted the details, or 
indeed the presence of counsel, for a number of reasons. These include the refusal 
to report examples of defiance or contempt for the court shown by the prisoner 
whether through their own speeches or through counsel100, reluctance to reveal how 
crimes were committed, and the desire not to complicate narratives regarding the 
criminal system by publicising exculpatory evidence. At a time when defence counsel 
for felony was only technically allowed to present legal argument, it is likely that a 
publication which excluded legal argument would equally exclude reference to the 
counsel making such argument.  
There may have been a less cynical reason for leaving out defence counsel 
involvement such as the mistaken belief by short-hand writers that they needed the 
permission of counsel before publishing details of their speeches.101 The dearth of 
reference to counsel may also have been due to innocent, though frustrating, poor 
short-hand writers who missed a lot of detail from the trials. When Edmund Hodgson 
took over writing the Proceedings in September 1782, the length and quality of the 
reports increased significantly.102 As seemingly did the presence of counsel. This can 
only be a tentative connection however as the 1780s saw a great increase in counsel 
within the Old Bailey.103 
A further factor which may have effected rates of counsel reporting was the offence 
forming the subject of the trial. Different offences were represented to greater and 
lesser extents within the Proceedings. This was for a number of reasons such as public 
interest. Forgery cases were well reported due to the high execution rates which 
attracted public attention.104 It has been suggested that fraud, as well as arson, were 
also well reported105 and there is certainly suggestion from some of the longer 
Proceedings’ accounts of fraud trials that there was a public appetite for fraud trials. 
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Of course, just because the Proceedings omit details of counsel does not mean that 
counsel were not present.106  
In identifying counsel in fraud trials a range of approaches have been taken. As 
detailed above, keyword searches are problematic when identifying counsel due to 
the lack of consistency in to how they were referred. However, even when reading 
all fraud cases between 1760 and 1820, it is not always clear when counsel are 
present. From the 1780s it is far clearer when counsel are present due to such 
phrases as ‘counsel for the prisoner’. After 1783 counsel were named within the 
Proceedings107 and given the very few number of counsel appearing at the Old Bailey, 
even where words such as ‘counsel’ are not used, it is clear who these counsel are.108 
Counsel such as Adolphus, Silvester, Garrow, and Fielding (William) are present in 
fraud trials time and time again.109   
The Functions of the Proceedings 
Throughout the life of the Proceedings, these reports had a range of functions. These 
functions depended on the aims of the publisher, the political climate of the day and 
the readership. The Proceedings needed to be financially viable as a commercial 
enterprise, they played a procedural role in that they were used for appellant and 
sentencing purposes, and as a semi-regulated publication the Proceedings inevitably 
played a political role in the wider discourses surrounding criminal justice. All of these 
functions impact upon how the researcher should read this source.  
Commercial Venture 
From the publisher’s perspective, the Proceedings were a commercial venture like 
any other newspaper or pamphlet. The 1770s saw a collapse in the commercial 
viability of the Proceedings, as the number of newspapers grew and these 
newspapers increasingly published crime news. This competition may explain why 
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the publishers so readily accepted subsidies from the City of London in the 1770s. 
Whilst one printer of the Proceedings in 1727 claimed the Proceedings were not ‘to 
please the vulgar part of the town with buffoonery, this not being a paper of 
entertainment’.110 The publisher of the Proceedings could never escape the practical 
requirement that the Proceedings had to sell enough copies to allow for printing and, 
post-official subsidy, to justify public expenditure of funds. One method whereby the 
publishers periodically catered for the more ‘vulgar part of town’ was in the phonetic 
printing of witness testimony, particularly of Irish witnesses, the effect of whose 
accents the Proceedings would make much comedic value.111 In later years, the City 
of London would uncharacteristically prohibit such low methods of entertainment.112 
The publication of the Proceedings required a careful balancing of differing aims and 
objectives. Clearly, the Proceedings needed to appeal to the general public and 
needed to be entertaining. Consequently, sensational and shocking cases relating to 
murder, sodomy and rape would be expected to be well reported.113 As today, cases 
of lethal violence received more attention and the Proceedings detail these more 
than other offences.114 However, as today, murder was relatively rare and thus, other 
more shocking offences which might interest the pubic, were focused upon.115 The 
selection of the trials has been attributed to the sentencing of the offence rather 
than because of the actual crime; capital offences received more press coverage than 
non-capital offences.116 Consequently, trials of forgers and arsonists received much 
coverage as forgery in particular attracted higher execution rates.117  
A further significant shortcoming of the Proceedings is the way in which trials were 
condensed. John Langbein has rested great faith in the completeness of the 
Proceedings but he overlooks the attention and detail given to some offences over 
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others. Shoemaker has raised grave, and well-founded concerns, that in every 
sessions, three to six days of trials were being compressed into eight to twenty four 
pages.118 Such compression leads to a false impression of the length of trials, or the 
severity with which such offences were perceived by the courts.  
Procedural Tool 
Between at least 1775 and 1837, the Proceedings played a procedural role in the 
administration of justice. The Recorder of London used the Proceedings to construct 
lists of those convicts sentenced to death who were recommended for mercy to the 
monarch.119 These recommendations would be passed to the Privy Council before 
being presented to the monarch. Simon Devereaux has uncovered convincing 
evidence to suggest the use of the Proceedings by the Recorder in presenting his 
recommendations to the monarch; on several occasions direct page references to 
the Proceedings appear in the Recorder’s notice.120 The Recorder used the 
Proceedings as a concise resource in order to get an overall picture of the particular 
trial he was considering.121 With eight sessions of the Old Bailey per year, the 
Recorder would have been under pressure to decide the cases in good time, partly 
to have one Sessions completed before the next began, partly because in the interim, 
the condemned prisoner was left languishing in prison.122 To the modern historian, 
and certainly to the modern lawyer, the use of the Proceedings as a tool for deciding 
any judicial matter is surprising. These reports were not verbatim and more 
significantly in this instance, did not contain any of the legal or procedural 
argument.123 However, the Proceedings did contain evidence as to the character of 
the prisoner and it was this evidence which was used in deciding when to lessen the 
sentence.  
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The Proceedings also played a role in the limited appeals process of the day. There is 
evidence the Lord Chancellor used the Proceedings to inform himself of cases when 
deciding upon appeals.124 The Proceedings acted as guidance to the lower courts, in 
particular the summary courts. There is evidence of magistrates, particularly in 
Middlesex, regularly purchasing the Proceedings.125 Whilst the use of the 
Proceedings to the magistrates is not apparent, assumedly one purpose would be to 
keep magistrates abreast of the work of the assize court and also, to monitor how 
cases referred to the Old Bailey by their offices were reported.  
Political Tool 
The Proceedings were a significant political instrument. During the 1770s, radicals 
such as John Wilkes, the Sheriff of London, called for more transparency in office and 
particularly in the courts. Wilkes believed that the administration of justice should be 
open to the public and took a range of steps to make the Old Bailey more transparent 
with some being more successful than others.126 Wilkes saw the Proceedings as the 
means by which the Old Bailey could be opened up and all trials could be reported.127 
Thus, in 1775, the City of London began to publish the Proceedings on an 
authoritative footing and the requirement that the Proceedings be a ‘fair, true and 
perfect narrative’ description of trials was evidently fulfilling a number of 
requirements, including the purpose of making transparent the wheels of justice.  
Of course, this opening up of the courts did not play a purely democratic role, it also 
acted to demonstrate to the populace the consequences of crime. It is perhaps no 
coincidence that the City of London authorities took over the publication. Clearly the 
City governors such as the Aldermen saw the importance of the criminal justice 
system and related publications, and the declaratory and normative role reporting of 
the criminal justice system could play. As shall be revisited throughout this thesis, 
with particular focus in Chapter 7, to understand the prosecution of fraud, an 
understanding of the political and economic motivations of the City of London and 
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its aldermen is essential. With regard to the Proceedings themselves, it is significant 
that the City of London aldermen recognised the value of publicising the 
administration of justice.  
The Proceedings: Methodological Considerations  
Bias and Partiality 
As a publication subsidised and guaranteed by the City authorities, it would be 
tempting to conclude that the Proceedings were no more than state propaganda. But 
this conclusion would be too simplistic.128 The government subsidised newspapers in 
much the same way as the City of London subsidised the publishing of the 
Proceedings and thus, some parallels can be drawn between the two. Historians 
largely agree that these subsidies were often too low to actually influence the 
commercial decisions of the publishers and the press regularly published material 
which opposed the government such as criminal trials which reflected the failings of 
the Bloody Code and the justice system as a whole.129 This is not to say however that 
the Proceedings were not influenced by the government or the City authorities. 
Whilst Devereaux suggests there to be ‘no evidence that anyone in the City 
government ever sought to influence the Sessions Paper130’, the Proceedings were 
not published entirely at the will of the editor. The Recorder had a lot of influence 
over the Proceedings and this partly explains why the reports became so uniform 
following the 1770s.131  
The Recorder and the City authorities wanted the Proceedings to reflect the 
successful functioning and justice of the criminal trial system. Examples of prisoners 
not showing due reverence for the law by arguing with judges or not taking the 
proceedings seriously were very rarely published within the Proceedings.132 
Moreover, details of any defence were frequently excluded or curtailed. One reason 
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for this may be to give more of an impression of the clarity of the prosecution.133 In 
a time of private prosecutions, reflecting a smooth prosecution process may have 
acted to encourage more lay prosecutors to utilise the criminal courts. Perhaps more 
significantly, the focus upon the prosecution case may reflect how the authorities 
wished to legitimise the sentencing of criminals, which frequently involved their 
transportation and at times, execution. The speeches made by prisoners, asking the 
court to spare their lives, were very rarely reported. Again, this is most likely due to 
the desire of the authorities to justify the harsh sentences and Bloody Code which 
underpinned the criminal justice system.134 
In 1790, the City of London requested that the Proceedings only publish the 
convictions secured at the Old Bailey and make no reference to the acquittals. This 
only lasted for three years before the publishers of the Proceedings demanded to be 
allowed to publish acquittals alongside convictions; the public were seemingly less 
interested in the Proceedings when they only listed the convictions.135 Why the 
Proceedings became less popular during this period of restriction is not entirely clear 
however. One explanation might be that the public became aware of this censoring 
and lost respect for the Proceedings as they knew them to be less than objective. 
There is certainly evidence that the public were actively involved in correcting the 
mistakes published in the Proceedings which is demonstrated by a number of 
corrections which had to published in relation to previous editions.136 These public 
complaints reflect the reality that people were attending the Old Bailey to watch the 
trials and when the Proceedings published inaccurate details, they were quick to 
vocalise this. The decision to only publish the convictions of the Old Bailey must have 
been immediately apparent to a public who had witnessed a day of trials, an average 
of thirty-nine percent of which would have resulted in acquittal.137  
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Old Bailey Online (OBO): the Digitisation of the Proceedings 
From 2000 to 2005, the Old Bailey Sessions Proceedings were digitised and this 
digitisation project, Old Bailey Online (OBO), has transferred all of the Proceedings 
onto a database.138 This process required the digitisation of 190,000 pages of the 
Proceedings alongside 4000 pages of the Ordinary’s Accounts.139 In their entirety, the 
Proceedings consist of 134 million words.140  
The Process of Digitisation 
Until digitisation, the Proceedings were recorded on microfilm and it is from these 
films that the OBO project obtained their data.141 Due to the Proceedings being so 
inconsistent in layout and form, optical character read software could not be used, 
preventing any automated method for digitizing the Proceedings.142 Instead, all of 
the content of the Proceedings was manually entered into the OBO database.143 To 
limit error, all content was double rekeyed – entered into the database twice – and 
then the two versions were checked against each other using recognition 
software.144 Errors cannot be wholly eradicated through this method, partly because 
of the human element involved in the transcription of the Proceedings. However, for 
every paper, a link to the original image of the report is attached. This is designed to 
allow users to check and confirm the text themselves.145 If users identify an error in 
the transcription, they are encouraged to contact the OBO team in order to rectify 
this. 
Ostensibly, the OBO project appears to have taken a number of steps to ensure that 
the transcription of the Sessions Proceedings has been accurate and the use of crowd 
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sourcing to identify errors and problems ensures the accuracy of the OBO as an 
ongoing project. However, there are several potential concerns of which the 
researcher should be aware of when using the OBO and whilst safeguards have been 
put in place by the project, these reduce inaccuracies but do not eradicate them.  
The first is the use of the double re-key approach to transcribing the Proceedings. 
This approach will undoubtedly highlight a number of the typographical errors 
caused directly by the transcribers. Typographical errors are inevitable and by using 
two different transcribers to input one trial report, it is assumed that these 
transcribers will make different errors, thereby highlighting mistakes in both 
transcriptions. This approach however does not address the potential for both 
transcribers to miss-read the original trial reports in the same way. The character and 
potential concerns regarding the Proceedings themselves have been addressed 
above but one concern for the modern day transcriber is not the substance of the 
Proceedings, but the form. Given the number of the Proceedings, there must be a 
number of these which have typographical or spelling errors. There has yet to be a 
comprehensive study as to the extent of these errors, however, the researcher must 
assume these errors to be present. How does the transcriber address these errors? 
One approach is that the digitized versions of the Proceedings ought to be a true 
reflection of the original source as the source itself is greatly significant to the 
academic, if not to the family genealogist and the wider public. However, transcribing 
the Proceedings, warts and all, creates potential for problems in searching the OBO 
for specific keywords or names.  
Digitisation of Archives 
Traditionally, databases have been used as an interim aim, to create a tool through 
which future research can be conducted.146 This is certainly true of the OBO, which 
includes several statistical tools and searchable material for the researcher. When 
translating historical sources into databases, one of the most striking problems can 
be maintaining consistency between entries.147 This can be due to a number of 
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factors such as the original source material being in different forms and layouts and 
more problematically, an inconsistency in spelling. The Proceedings create a further 
cause for inconsistency in the substance of the source itself, such as information 
being laid out in different parts of the Proceedings, or being absent.   
A recent critique of the use of digitisation of historical sources suggested that this 
process removes the researcher for the source itself and prevents the reader from 
engaging with the nuances of the document as a whole.148 This would certainly be 
the case were the Proceedings to be read as isolated trial reports as the Proceedings 
were a commercial as well as a quasi-official publication and, as such, much can be 
gleaned from reading individual trial reports within the context of the document as 
a whole. It is partly for this reason that the OBO attached a link to a photograph of 
the original page of the report to every trial record. However, only the specific page 
of the original document is attached to the trial transcript and so, reading a case 
within the context of the document as a whole is not straightforward. It is possible 
to see a Sessions Paper in its entirety on the OBO if the researcher searches through 
the ‘browse’ function by date.149 Whilst it is true that digitisation physically removes 
the researcher from the source, having images of the material allows for the reading 
of the document as a whole, including the reading of handwritten notes which may 
be written upon the document. 
Digitising sources captures the substance of the text but not the form. It is possible 
through OBO date searches to see the layout of the Proceedings and an image of the 
original document.150 A digital image will not reveal the quality of the paper upon 
which the text is written or printed, nor will it always reflect the different uses of ink 
which may allow the research to draw some conclusions about the order in which 
handwritten notes are made upon the document. For example, in the case of letters 
sent during the eighteenth century, the quality of the paper may be indicative of the 
wealth of the writer or the esteem with which the writer holds the recipient. In the 
                                                          
148 Richard Ireland ‘Why everything we know about criminal justice history is wrong’ Law, Crime and 
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case of a document which has a number of entries from different authors, the level 
to which the ink may have faded may indicate the times at which the entries were 
made. The second of these examples does not impact upon the use of the OBO per 
se however, historians of newspaper and print may be interested in the quality of the 
paper used in the Proceedings and thus, a digital record will not reveal this 
information. Form aside, the content of archives, and the OBO in particular, are 
generally made available in their entirety for the researcher and such records will 
have the same advantages and limitations as paper-based sources.151 
A further concern with the digitisation of archives lies in the requirement to 
categorise information so as to allow searches, both qualitative and quantitative, of 
the material. This concern is greatly aligned with the wider issue of how historical 
documents can and ought to be read. There is a growing dialectic in thought 
surrounding the reading of historical material and within the wider humanities 
community, with the reading of big data.152 The process of digitising any material and 
imposing searchable terms, inevitably involves the ‘squeezing’ of data into pre-
defined categories.153 This process of categorisation will be explored further below.  
Search Tools and Tagging 
The OBO used a method of text encoding whereby XML (extensible mark-up 
language) tags were used to code specific details of the Proceedings such as the 
defendant’s name, gender, and age along with a number of other variables.154 These 
were then linked together through a process of concatenation, bringing all of this 
data into distinct but connecting files.155 This method is now being superseded by 
more cutting-edge programmes and methods but XML encoding has been used to 
                                                          
151 Tim Hitchcock, Robert Shoemaker and James Winters ‘Connected histories: a new web search 
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great effect in a number of projects up to the current day.156 The OBO method allows 
the researcher to search by a range of categories either singularly or through a 
bespoke search of their making.157 This tagging also facilitates both qualitative and 
quantitative methods of searching within the Proceedings.  
Data-Mining 
Data-mining is a process whereby data can be searched to locate specific 
information. The best example of this would be using search terms to locate the 
number of times such terms appears across the Proceedings. This can be very 
successfully achieved for legal historians in particular as the Proceedings are very 
regular in form.158 There are however, potential pitfalls to data-mining. First, and as 
Ted Underwood has pithily summarised: ‘in a database containing millions of 
sentences, full-text search can turn up twenty examples of anything’.159 However, it 
is not the false positives that the researcher should be concerned with, it is the data 
that several searches will lose. The process of searching acts to filter out alternative 
hypotheses: ‘If scholars use the wrong search terms, they literally misread their 
sources, and might not read them at all’.160  
To the legal historian, it may be tempting to agree that technical legal language 
makes data-mining searches unproblematic as largely legal language overcomes the 
problem of changing meanings and context of language in other sources.161 However, 
as shall be demonstrated below, when searching for fraud prosecutions, the 
formulaic use of such language in indictments as ‘fraudulent’, become deeply 
problematic.  
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Searching for Fraud Offences within the OBO 
The biggest challenge in using the OBO to research fraud offences comes in 
identifying which cases are to be defined as fraud. In Chapter 3, the definitions of 
fraud offences and the development of their underlying doctrines will be explored in 
depth. It shall become apparent that a small number of particular frauds were 
pursued in the Old Bailey and that, as in other courts, these offences closely aligned 
with other property and deception offences. This has caused the categorisation of 
fraud offences to be deeply problematic.  
The OBO separates trials into a number of categories relating to offence: Breaking 
Peace, Damage to Property, Deception, Killing, Miscellaneous, Royal Offences, Sexual 
Offences, Theft and Violent Theft. These larger categories are then separated into 
sub-categories such as Deception-Fraud. When transcribing the Proceedings, the 
OBO team produced guidelines as to how the transcribers should categorise the trials 
into these offences.162 The transcribers were instructed to categorise the trial by the 
description of the indictment that was generally contained within the first paragraph 
of the trial report. If the indictment was not present or unclear, the transcribers were 
to categorise the offence based upon the testimonies of the witnesses within the 
Proceeding. Indictments were usually written to a formula.  Due to this pro forma, 
these indictments do not contain much information163 but they should contain 
enough to roughly categorise the offence.  
This approach is, for many if not most offences, unproblematic as it is clear which 
offence applied. However, there are examples within the Proceedings of offences 
being described ambiguously. As shall be shown below, deception, fraud, 
embezzlement and forgery cases are the most common offences to have unclear 
indictments. 
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Upon first glance, the categorisation of offences within the OBO appears 
straightforward. There is a category of ‘deception’ and within this there is a 
subcategory of ‘fraud’. However, these categories are unfortunately far less useful 
than they appear. The category of ‘Deception’ itself within the OBO includes forgery, 
fraud, perjury and bankruptcy offences.164 This categorisation appears to be 
somewhat of an afterthought of the OBO in that it is difficult to clearly link all of these 
offences. It is not the case that all of the offences are connected in that they require 
an element of ‘deception’. For example, many bankruptcy offences involved people 
not surrendering themselves to Commissioners in good time, with no accusation of 
deception levelled against them. 
This categorisation has two fundamental flaws. There is no engagement with the 
ontological parameters of fraud offences or the interaction between these offences 
and other property offences. There is great overlap between crimes such as 
embezzlement, larceny, cheating by false pretences and other such offences165 both 
in substance and in the manner in which they were prosecuted. Because of this, in 
searching all fraud indictments between 1760 and 1820, there are a number of false 
positives within the results identified by the OBO. If conducting simple statistical 
searches of the number of fraud offences, an inaccurate picture would be gleaned. 
For example the 1819 prosecution of Alexander Lauder has been categorised by the 
OBO as a Deception-Fraud. The transposing of the trial by the shorthand writer is a 
more complete reflection of the indictment and at first glance does appear to be a 
fraud. However, a closer reading of the text reveals that this case was in fact relating 
to theft:  
ALEXANDER LAUDER was indicted for that he, on the 30th of August , being 
servant to David Vines ,did, upon trust and confidence, deliver unto him four 
sacks of flour… his property, safely to keep the same to the use of the 
said   David Vines ; and that he, the prisoner, after such delivery, and while he 
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was such servant, did feloniously withdraw himself from his said master, and 
go away with the said goods, with intent to steal the same, and defraud his 
said master thereof, contrary to the trust and confidence in him put by his said 
master , against the statute. 
This indictment is clearly larceny firstly, because it stipulates ‘intent to steal’ and 
secondly, because it states the offence was a felony which statutory fraud offences 
were not. Another common error in categorisation of fraud came in the relationship 
with forgery. The trial of Joseph Marks demonstrates that such mis-categorisation 
can not only categorise non-frauds as fraud, but can also mis-label frauds as other 
offences.  The trial of Joseph Marks166 has been categorised by the OBO as a forgery, 
when in fact it is a fraud, carried out through the use of a document.167 
A potential method to overcome these categorisation errors may be the use of search 
terms such as ‘swindlers’, ‘cheats’ or ‘artful device’, but again, we must be very 
careful to recognise that the shorthand writers themselves had so much influence 
over the reporting of the trials, that in most cases the reader hears not the voice of 
the actors within the trial, but the reporter. This does not result in such searches 
being useless as word searches may reflect the lexicon of the day. However, any 
statistical conclusions about the prosecution of fraud at the Old Bailey need to be 
significantly couched in the context of the Proceedings and their ultimate digitization. 
It was decided that a sample with a very limited number of false positive results was 
significantly more accurate than using keyword searches which would certainly result 
in false positives. Because of this the OBO system of categorisation has been 
accepted for this thesis, as it is preferable to any alternative approaches.  
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Additional Archives 
Court Records 
In order to gain a more accurate impression of the prosecution of fraud, this thesis 
looks in depth at the disposal of fraud by magistrates, and to a lesser degree, the 
presence of fraud accusations heard at the quarter sessions. The official records of 
the Old Bailey are also considered, including the numerous records for the differing 
functions of the Old Bailey.168 
Beginning at the most senior court, the official records pertaining to the Old Bailey 
and the Middlesex Sessions are unusually complicated. This was due to the four 
different overlapping types of judicial sessions held within the Sessions: quarter 
sessions, sessions of oyer and terminer, gaol delivery, and quarter sessions for the 
City and Westminster.169 Official assize records across the country are themselves, 
not entirely reliable. One essential reason for this is that so many records have been 
lost, both within London and across the country: ‘The survival pattern of some 
documents is inexplicably uneven’.170 Whilst the records are relatively well 
preserved, where they exist, there are a number of these records which are either 
too fragile for researchers to access, or are yet to be cleaned and so are, for the 
present time, mostly unreadable.171 
Where records do exist, they are idiosyncratic in their methodological challenges. 
Assize records are being increasingly researched and this research is revealing the 
unreliability of much of the information held within these records. J.S Cockburn 
sardonically claimed this research to have varying effects for researchers:  
                                                          
168 For an overview of the Middlesex Sessions and the wider role of the Old Bailey see P.S King, Guide 
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Legal historians will welcome the slow unlocking of these [assize record] 
laconic formulae which conceal the early history of our legal processes. But 
for the social historian the operation may well be painful. For it seems to 
reveal that one of the most attractive bodies of early-modern legal material 
is of limited value as a basis for the naïve sociological analysis to which it has 
most often been subjected.172  
The Reporting of Fraud: Summary Courts  
In order to ascertain both how fraud accusations were reported, and how a portion 
of these indictments arrived in the Old Bailey, it is necessary to use summary court 
records to estimate the frequency with that fraud accusations were made, and how 
they were consequently disposed of at summary level. Sadly, the information 
required to answer these questions does not exist in an easily accessible or complete 
archive. The two main archives that record summary justice within the City of London 
are the Minute and Rough Books from the Mansion House and the Guildhall. There 
are also records pertaining to prisons such as the Bridewell, but these only record 
those cases that resulted in a conviction and imprisonment, missing any complaints 
which resulted in dismissal or committal to a higher court.  
The Minute and Rough Books of the City however make reference to cases that were 
dismissed as well as tantalising and often colourful detail of how the complaints were 
addressed by the magistrates and their clerks. For example, in the information given 
by Robert Cuzons against George Snyder and John Hamot for a false pretence, the 
defence against which was that the whole episode had been an elaborate April Fool’s 
joke.173  
As courts of no record, the Guildhall and the Mansion House records served no 
official purpose. Rather, the books were kept for the clerks’ own records and so they 
were taken untidily and are often difficult to decipher. Fortunately Greg Smith has 
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transcribed a number of the Guildhall Minute Books, and a small number of the Lord 
Mayor’s Waiting Books.174 Like the Mansion House Minute Books, the Guildhall 
Books record approximately a month per book and surviving records run from May 
1752 to 1796. These records are not complete however and Smith estimates that 
approximately fifty-five books remain, of which the first surviving fifteen he has 
transcribed.175 These books run from 1751 to 1781. In assessing the frequency and 
disposal of fraud-related cases within the Guildhall, a further six Minute Books176 
have been assessed along with ten Mansion House Minute Books.177 In total, twenty-
one Guildhall Minute Books have been analysed for the purpose of this thesis. There 
are far fewer records pertaining to the Middlesex Sessions. However, there exists a 
number of accounts from individual offices to the Treasury, as well as some 
remaining collections of informations and recognizances from petty sessions that 
detail fraud-related hearings. As there are no equivalent records to the City 
Magistrates for Middlesex, this makes comparisons between the two jurisdictions 
problematic. 
For the quarter sessions, quantitative research of court records is blighted by the fact 
that often the offence, the parish of residence and the occupation of the defendant 
were all unreliable.178 More significantly, like the summary courts, the quarter 
sessions records have not been digitised and so any research, including that 
conducted for this thesis, requires sampling of the records rather than any 
comprehensive analysis. Many of these sources may be in a good enough condition 
to be digitised, particularly after cleaning. However, archives such as the quarter 
sessions, and indeed any court roll, will prove deeply problematic for digitization. 
This is primarily due to the bulking and difficult manner in which these archives were 
recorded, with multiple pieces of paper hand-sewn together and then attached to 
the vellum which would be wrapped around the outside. The result is a large number 
of documents which would take a very long time to photograph and considerably 
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longer to key into a database. It is not a coincidence that the Proceedings were 
chosen for digitization. These records were originally printed onto sheets and had 
been transferred onto microfiche before the digitization took place. Consequently, it 
is unlikely that any archives in roll form will be digitised in the near future. 
As shall be explored in detail in Chapter 7, the summary court records are the most 
problematic of all in that these courts were courts of no record and consequently the 
archives which have survived are rough notes taken by clerks and for no official 
purpose. This results in the records being ad hoc and without pro forma, resulting in 
the research being significantly more difficult than for other court records that were 
kept in a rigidly formulaic manner (in form rather than in substance).  
Newspaper and Parliamentary Papers 
A commonly utilised source of archives by crime historians is newspapers. This thesis 
uses newspapers very little, and for two reasons. First, regional newspaper editors 
during this period shamelessly copied the text of the more substantial Metropolis 
newspapers. If trying to ascertain details of an Old Bailey case, the best place is 
undoubtedly the Proceedings themselves. Where newspapers do reference the Old 
Bailey, the text is often directly lifted from the Proceedings.179 The second reason for 
not relying upon newspapers is that only nineteenth century newspapers have been 
digitised.180 Consequently, researching pre-1800 is extremely difficult and given the 
tendency for newspapers to duplicate copy from the Proceedings, such an arduous 
task would reap few rewards. Newspaper accounts of the fraud accusations in the 
magistrates could be of potential use and the publications of Bow Street Magistrates, 
The Hue and Cry have been consulted for the early part of the period. 
Parliamentary records during this period have not been researched in detail. 
Parliamentary records for the time directly proceeding this period, in particular the 
time around the passing of the 1757 Act that codified fraud offences181, would 
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certainly be significant. Sadly manuscript records of the House of Commons before 
1770 were destroyed.182 However, analysis of the jurisprudence surrounding such 
legislation provides insight into how the Act was assimilated into pre-existing case 
law.183 
A number of other archives have been explored including a cache of records 
belonging to a prosecution association within the City of London184 and a number of 
miscellaneous documents belonging to and used by court clerks and other legal 
professionals.185 In addition to these, multiple contemporary practitioners’ texts and 
sources of black latter law are explored in order to identify the doctrines and 
enforcement of fraud-related laws.  
Disciplinary Approaches 
There is much discussion regarding the value of interdisciplinary approaches to 
research.186 This type of approach can bridge two very different disciplines such as 
law and history. This interdisciplinary awareness does not always require stepping 
outside of wider disciplines however as there is much fragmentation within 
disciplines, particularly within historical research.187 Crime history is generally 
thought of as a sub-discipline of social history that has developed more within the 
discipline of history, than across other disciplines such as sociology, criminology, and 
law.188 There are notable exceptions in the form of individual researchers189, but for 
the most part, crime history stands within a traditional context of historical research. 
This thesis is taking a wider interdisciplinary perspective, uniting both traditional 
legal history with cutting-edge crime history. This approach is bringing together 
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fundamental legal research in the form of black letter law searches and also wider 
texts traditionally used by legal historians, those being sources written by or for the 
legal practitioner. This will be further complimented by methods more commonly 
found in crime history research such as data-mining and quantitative research of big 
data.  
Legal History 
The methods of legal history are utilised throughout this thesis, from the tracing of 
the substantive law in Chapter 3, to the use of legal secondary sources such as 
justices’ notebooks and wider court records. As a sub-discipline, legal history is slowly 
growing in both scope and popularity. However, this niche area of research is not 
homogenous and there is a significant difference between legal history and legal 
history.190 The first is more traditional, focusing upon the development of precedent 
and substantive law. The second sub-discipline has a broader scope and seeks to 
situate legal developments in a wider legal or social system. More traditionally, legal 
history has been confined to the history of black letter law, the development of legal 
precedent and, to a lesser extent, the development of the legal profession. Legal 
historians are moving away from the traditional approach of ‘what law is’ to ‘how the 
law works’191 and since the 1970s, has increasingly focused on the relationship 
between law and society, what is commonly called ‘The law and…’ approach.192 This 
thesis is questioning the ontological definitions of fraudulent offences but is also 
seeking to answer the question of ‘what was fraud in practice?’ 
However, legal history approaches remain a source of potential tension falling 
between history and law.193 Crime historians have criticised legal history as having an 
internalist explanation for legal change, and not considering the social influence of 
the law.194 Innes and Styles argued that in looking to the minutiae or detail of legal 
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procedure, legal history stops being able to answer the big social questions posed by 
the likes of Edward Thompson or Douglas Hay. Questions such as ‘in whose interest 
is the law?’ and ‘against whom is the law enforced?’ John Langbein has been criticised 
for this very limitation but both crime historians and legal historians appear more 
guided by Langbein than the likes of Thompson and Hay.195 However, where Langbein 
can appear blinkered in his view of the law and its operation, this thesis is seeking to 
actively address the perception of legal history as being an inward looking and self-
contained discipline. ‘Law cannot be treated purely as an intellectual system’.196 
Rather, the law must be appreciated for the way it is couched within society, and 
how the law is used, in this case by prosecutors.  
Other legal historians are keen to look outside of the strict confines of ‘the law’. There 
are a number of schools within legal history, primarily differentiated by the larger 
law schools in England and North America. One such is the ‘Wisconsin School’ of legal 
history, pioneered by J. Willard Hurst, which promoted the message that law must 
be seen in its social and economic context, not as an autonomous entity.197 Such 
approaches acknowledge that there is a gap between formal law and actual practice, 
mediated by customs, social norms, and popular views. This gap however is not at all 
surprising and we ought not to be preoccupied with stating its existence. Rather, we 
ought to question why there is this gap; does practice differ from law in order to 
conform to some economic imperative or dominant social discourse?198 This thesis 
does not directly engage with any school of legal history as such but it repeatedly 
engages with the gap between the laws of fraud and how they were applied.  
Crime History 
Crime history is distinct from legal history and there is surprisingly little interaction 
between the two. Crime history is a relatively new sub-discipline, emerging in earnest 
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from the 1960s onward.199 This sub-discipline grew out of a desire to study history 
‘from below’, ‘the need to explore and imaginatively to reconstruct the experiences 
of the dispossessed and inarticulate’.200 This approach certainly moved away from 
more traditional approaches to history that focused upon powerful actors such as 
politicians and monarchs. However, there are two central criticisms to this ‘history 
from below’. First, such history from below approaches have been ‘curiously blind to 
the size and importance of the large middling groups in English society and to their 
influence on the way in which the criminal law was used’.201 Second, whilst earlier 
approaches to crime history continued to engage with wider sociological theory, 
particularly the works of Marx and Weber202, these approaches have gradually 
separated and crime historians seem reluctant to engage with structuralist or 
positivist approaches to history, though both approaches do seek to use the criminal 
law as a lens through which to understand wider society.203  
Crime history is currently moving forward on a wave of digitisation.204 This 
enthusiasm for digitisation is not unproblematic and has been explored critically 
earlier in this chapter. However, one very important positive of digitising archives is 
the extension of the opportunities for quantitative research.205 Recent years have 
seen an increase in critical approaches to digital humanities and new technologies, 
and their use in historical research tends to be described in utopian or dystopian 
narratives.206 However, like any new method, digitisation has both advantages and 
limitations. As shall be detailed below, digitisation and the opening up of quantitative 
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analysis of big data can be extremely positive and provide far more accurate analysis 
of research questions allowed for by than methods involving sampling data.  
One aspect of crime history that requires more attention is the dearth of the use of 
theory in analysing the vast quantities of data to which digitisation has led. As shall 
be demonstrated throughout this thesis, it is not enough to have collected and 
quantitatively analysed big data. To optimise the use of this data, it is necessary to 
analyse it in a broader context and to use it to test and explore larger theoretical 
standpoints. One theory that crime historians have utilised is that of Grounded 
Theory. This approach is not unproblematic and shall be critically explored before 
demonstrating how it has been utilised in data collection for this thesis.  
 
Grounded theory 
Grounded theory emerged in the 1960s, ‘discovered’ by Glaser and Strauss.207 
Grounded Theory is a form of qualitative analysis that seeks to bridge the gap 
between theory and method by beginning research ‘knowing nothing, in contrast to 
the typical research plan of knowing the problem beforehand.208  Grounded Theory 
has since been applied to quantitative methods.209 The main rationale behind 
Grounded Theory was that it is a ‘no preconceptions method’.210 Barney Glaser has 
stated that when using Grounded Theory: ‘I discovered that writing up data was 
much faster than thinking up conjectures to suit a perspective which could be very 
irrelevant’.211 This seductively simple approach is unsurprisingly popular as it appears 
to allow for a straightforward methodology permitting mere description of how data 
was collected.212 Glaser himself argues that Grounded Theory ‘suits a methodology 
                                                          
207 For a brief history of Grounded Theory see Barney G. Glaser, The Grounded Theory Perspective: 
Its Origins and Growth, The Grounded Theory Review Volume 15, Issue 1 (2016) 
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for the PhD dissertation, since it automatically provides the desired original 
contribution required for the PhD’.213  
However, Grounded Theory really is too good to be true. There are some pointed 
criticisms of Grounded Theory and the most significant is levelled against the claim 
that data collection can be carried out without any prior agenda or initial theories or 
research questions. The idea of ‘raw’ data has been labelled ‘naïve’214, and the idea 
that data can be merely ‘discovered’ is problematic. There is emerging literature on 
Critical Grounded Theory, which is drawing on critical realism to counter the 
assumptions of Grounded Theory.215 Whilst this thesis is not greatly engaging with 
critical realism, it is certainly the case that any thesis that seeks to make conclusions 
about large social, economic, legal, or political reality requires a methodology that is 
capable of engaging with the relationship between the structural and the material.216 
Critical Grounded Theory has yet to be applied in historical research but this thesis 
embraces an approach closer to this critical approach in that ‘proto-theories’ were 
utilised in data collection.217  
The main criticism of Grounded Theory is that the discovery of ‘raw’ data is not 
possible and this is equally applicable to any historical research. If we accept that 
archives are the methods by which crime historians answer research questions, then 
it is the political and theoretical stance of historians which dictates the sources they 
use.218 An historian interested in researching the everyday experiences of the lower-
classes has made a conscious decision that this is an area worthy of time and study. 
Even historians who do not think they have a clear standpoint or polemic should be 
aware that their approach can ‘all too easily be the unconscious vector of values 
taken for granted by people of their own background’.219 Historians must engage in 
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reflexivity otherwise they will miss the assumptions and values which they 
themselves impart upon the method of their research.220  
As presented in the introduction to this thesis, a theoretical approach aligned with 
Marxist understandings of the legal and economic world of the eighteenth century 
has been utilised for this research. This approach has informed both the data 
collection and the analysis of this data. The central research questions of the thesis 
are designed to explore and reveal much larger issues pertaining to the use of the 
law during this period. Most notably, for whom the criminal law acted and the way 
in which the entire legal system operated to protect property and to secure the 
conditions necessary for trade and the extension of markets through the bolstering 
of credit relationships. These larger issues did not only appear from the data 
collected, but the very questions asked and the data sought acted to shape the 
process of data collection.  
Consequently, this thesis does not utilise Grounded Theory which has been identified 
as problematic. Rather, the data for this thesis has been collected through an 
iterative process which has primarily been led by the data and informed by theory. 
For example, it was clear during the early stages of this research that the Proceedings 
held little information regarding the accused. However, in order to answer the 
question of whether fraud was committed by a particular class, other information 
was sought and interpreted from the Proceedings which allowed for the typology of 
fraud to be imposed onto the cases heard at the Old Bailey. This example 
demonstrates how rather than accepting the archives available at face-value and 
using the data to form research questions, such questions were developed both from 
the available data, and from the current historiography surrounding the eighteenth 
century criminal justice system.   
As argued in the introduction to this thesis, this theoretical underpinning is essential 
to truly engage with the relationship between the law and the socio-economic 
context of the time, namely the continuation of the introduction of capitalism 
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through the bolstering of the conditions required for proto-capitalism.221 This thesis 
also engages with approaches from both crime history and legal history, uniting the 
exciting methodologies of big data with a contextualised understanding of the wider 
legal system and its operations.  
Legal History and Crime History: Bridging the Divide 
As Godfrey recently argued ‘crime historians are promiscuous [and] work across the 
boundaries of contagious disciplines’.222  It is certainly the case that crime historians 
are increasingly working with disciplines such as criminology, the wider social 
sciences, and geography. However, little collaboration is being conducted between 
crime historians and lawyers, legal historians or otherwise. Perhaps this is because 
law is not traditionally what Godfrey describes as a ‘contagious discipline’ and is more 
an inward-looking discipline. However, there is great scope for collaboration 
between the fields of crime history and legal history and this collaboration can be 
most successful when converging under the umbrella of theoretical approaches. This 
theory may continue to be Grounded Theory, but there are many other options, as 
demonstrated by this thesis. More traditional legal historians are as keen to embrace 
Grounded Theory as crime historians. Sir John Baker has suggested that the optimal 
method of research is one which prioritises beginning with archives and forming 
research questions based around what the researcher uncovers.223 Whilst Baker does 
not actively engage, or indeed identify, a grounded theoretical approach, he is clearly 
advocating researchers to secure familiarity with an archive before identifying the 
research questions that will flow from such familiarity.  
Engaging with wider theory may include engaging with methods and theories derived 
from the social sciences. There is a resistance amongst historians to interact with the 
social sciences but collaboration with social scientific research methods and wider 
theoretical perspectives should be encouraged. The tension partly arises due to the 
use of history by social sciences as a testing ground for their theories of the present 
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day.224 The tension is also partly due to the discussion above, that as a discipline, 
history is less engaged with methods than the social sciences. Some crime historians 
are increasingly using social science methods but it is still widely believed that an 
historian’s methods are her sources.225 However, much can be learned by adopting 
wider methodologies, particularly the use of theory as an analytical tool. 
Interdisciplinary research must be a discussion between disciplines, not the uncritical 
adoption of external methods to legal sources.226 This applies to any interdisciplinary 
research. Richard Ireland has recently highlighted the weaknesses in crime historians 
uncritically referring to the law without reference to the underlying doctrines.227 
Likewise, Edward Thompson was extremely critical of sociologists using historical 
examples to support larger theories, without giving equal thought to the historical 
aspect of the research: ‘…it is only too often the case that the theory takes 
precedence over the historical evidence which it is intended to theorize’.228  
This thesis strives to strike a balance between focused historical method and broader 
questions: ‘questions that are better specified theoretically, better articulated 
archivally, and better grounded in an understanding of the complexities and 
ambiguities of the administration process’.229  
Methods of Analysis 
Theory as Methodology  
As highlighted in the Introduction to this thesis, there is a strong theoretical 
underpinning to this thesis, both to the research questions, and to the method by 
which research findings are analysed and explained. The relationship between the 
emergence of capitalism and the prosecution of fraud will be revisited time and again 
throughout this thesis. Archives will be explained and contexualised through the 
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works of E.P Thompson and Douglas Hay, alongside a raft of other primary and 
secondary sources that recognise the relationship between commerce and the law.  
To some extent, this thesis is a revisiting of the works of Hay and Thompson, through 
a demonstration of the importance and relevance of applying structural theory to 
legal phenomenon such as the prosecution of fraud. To answer bigger questions 
about society, we must take a structural approach.230 Whilst this study is partly 
exploring why and how certain individuals prosecuted fraud offences at the Old 
Bailey, these individuals did not exist in a vacuum and to understand their choices, 
we must understand the choices available to them and the conditions and context 
within which such choices were made: 
 So let us look at history as history – men placed in actual contexts which they 
have not chosen, and confronted by indivertible forces, with an overwhelming 
immediacy of relations and duties and with only a scanty opportunity for 
inserting their own agency – and not as a text for hectoring might-have-
beens.231  
For this reason, the structural confines that shaped and sculpted the choices and 
behaviours of prosecutions of fraud in the eighteenth century will inform the analysis 
of the data underpinning this thesis. We therefore need to embed the theoretical 
into the practical.232  
Constructing a Fraud Database 
This thesis is taking a mixed-methods approach to the many archival sources utilised. 
A large amount of the analysis is qualitative, particularly that relating to the tracing 
of the doctrines of fraud and how these were interpreted and developed by 
contemporary practitioners and court officials. However, in keeping with crime 
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history methods, this thesis also draws heavily upon quantitative data, derived 
primarily from the Proceedings, as digitised by OBO.  
The majority of the quantitative analysis has been categorised and collated into a 
database, bringing together the data derived from the Proceedings. The database 
was constructed from the cases categorised as fraud by the OBO. Between 1760 and 
1820, 469 indictments for fraud were heard at the Old Bailey.233 There were fewer 
cases of fraud, but there were 469 indictments. The distinction between cases and 
individual indictments has been made because it was fairly common for a prisoner to 
be accused of a number of offences within one trial. Of the sample, 23.7 percent of 
reports contained multiple indictments. A typical example is that of John Williams, 
charged with three counts of fraud in the spring of 1779.234 Some of these trials 
contained multiple charges of fraud and some contained multiple charges of differing 
offences, with one or more being for a fraud as well as another offence such as theft. 
For example, in 1774, Charles Nangle and Mark Love were indicted on two charges, 
one for fraud and one for forgery. This would not be unusual as often a financial note 
or, in this case, a bill of exchange was forged and then attempted to be passed off 
through the use of deception.235 The prevalence and significance of multiple 
indictments will be discussed in Chapter 4 but when the ‘469 cases’ are referred to, 
this is not to say 469 separate offenders but rather, 469 different counts of fraud 
between 1760 and 1820.  
The manner of prosecutions at the Old Bailey during this period was such that a 
number of different complainants could bring separate charges against one prisoner 
at one time, and these would all be heard together and recorded within one report 
of the Proceedings. Elizabeth Rufley was tried in 1760 for three separate counts of 
fraud by three separate complainants and for three separate quantities of goods 
obtained, ranging from sixteen to thirty-seven shillings in value.236 Consequently, if 
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an approach were taken whereby all charges relating to one individual were 
conflated, valuable information about the type of complainant or the value of the 
goods obtained would be lost.  
A wide range of information was collected in the database including information 
relating to gender, occupation of the prosecutor, offences, method of execution of 
the offences, the value of the goods obtained, and so on. For the most part, collection 
of this data was unproblematic, although, as results are revealed throughout this 
thesis, it will become clear that some cases were reported in more depth than others. 
It is in the construction of the database that the data-led approach of this thesis 
becomes apparent. Some of the data was collected in response to very deliberate 
research questions such as the gender of the prosecutor or the value of the goods 
obtained. Other questions emerged iteratively as the data-collection process 
progressed. Questions such as the method by which the frauds were committed 
became necessary as it was discovered that the offence itself was not always 
apparent. Likewise, garnering information about the defendant was rarely possible 
and so this typology of fraud allowed for a better understanding of how, and to some 
extent who, was committing these offences. Such additional research questions 
arose through the data-collection process.  
This iterative process allowed for flexibility in the collection of the data that 
ultimately forms the basis of this thesis. By taking a data-led approach, the creation 
of this database developed according to both original research questions and 
questions that arose from the data collection itself. For example, the ‘type’ of fraud 
committed was not initially considered but through analysing the Proceedings, it 
became clear that a typology of fraud, imposed upon the more generic details of the 
indictments, would result in a far clearer understanding of the forms of fraud 
appearing at the Old Bailey.237 This typology brought together both data collection 
and analysis in so far as the wider understanding of the 469 indictments allowed 
more detailed categorisation of the data.  
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Because of the depth with which these 469 indictments are being analysed, the 
period of 1760 to 1820 is an ideal timeframe as it reflects a broad era of socio-
economic change and allows for some significant quantitative analysis of a large 
number of indictments. The scale of the indictments is however not so great as to 
prohibit close-reading analysis of each indictment. Moreover, the timeframe and the 
number of indictments forming the basis of the database allows for research into 
other court archives such those pertaining to magistrates’ courts and the quarter 
sessions238. Research into these archives allows for a more holistic study of the 
prosecution of fraud. 
Having described the methods through that data has been collected and analysed, 
the following chapter will outline the laws and doctrines of fraud and fraud-related 
offences in the years proceeding our period.  
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Chapter 3 Fraud: Offences, Ontology, and Connections 
As a collection of offences, fraud is ontologically problematic. Fraud offences have 
existed at the interface of civil law and criminal law for hundreds of years and it is 
this interconnectedness that has resulted in fraud and financial misconduct being 
viewed with ambivalence in the twenty first century.239  
Upon the introduction of the Fraud Act in 2006, the Attorney-General claimed the 
law had previously been ‘too precise, overlapping and outmoded to give effective 
coverage over the breadth of frauds committed today’.240 Certainly by the twenty 
first century, fraud and financial misconduct were legislated for in great detail. 
Increased opportunities and mechanisms for committing contemporary frauds are 
simultaneously mirrored by the increased criminalisation of financial misconduct, 
which is far greater than in the eighteenth century. However, the dislocation 
between the existing laws against fraud and how these were applied to everyday 
offending was no less apparent in the eighteenth century. As shall be demonstrated 
in this chapter, fraud’s existence in legal no man’s land has caused great confusion 
for both the public and legal professionals since the twelfth century. 
In the eighteenth century, there were accusations that the laws surrounding fraud 
were as equally outmoded as expressed by the Attorney-General in 2005. In a 1753 
open correspondence to the Duke of Newcastle, the famous magistrate, Henry 
Fielding lamented: 
 “Trade being alarmed, complained to the above magistrate, who 
apprehended many of these cheats. But as the laws then in being were 
insufficient to bring them to justice, they mostly escaped punishment; and 
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the tradesman, beside the loss of their goods, were put to additional, fruitless 
expenses”.241  
The central focus of this chapter is to identify the defining characteristics of fraud 
offences during this period. Furthermore, this chapter will also explore how the law 
developed from the Tudor period to the eighteenth century, illustrating how these 
laws undulated between very narrow, and very broad application. In exploring these 
changes, this chapter will go on to explain why these laws changed in the way that 
they did, and will contextualise the state of the law and the offences available to 
prosecutors of fraud from 1760 to 1820.  
In exploring the central offences that made up the laws of ‘fraud’, this chapter will 
further demonstrate why the law was not always fit for purpose during the 
eighteenth century. The enforcement and operation of these laws will then be 
explored alongside how these fraud offences operated within the wider law. Through 
more traditional legal methods of researching statutory and case law, the central 
doctrines and ontology of fraud offences will be identified in order to better 
demonstrate how fraud was positively defined. Fraud offences will then be 
negatively defined by comparatively drawing out the contrasts with other criminal 
offences of the time.  
An even wider contextualisation of fraud offences will be illustrated through an 
exploration of the laws of fraud in comparison with civil law doctrines, particularly 
those relating to contract law. It will reveal that pre-1757 law resulted in many 
prosecutors being left without recourse to the criminal law due to the limitations of 
the doctrines underpinning fraud, or due to the lacunae created where fraud 
intersected with other areas of law.242 This will in turn demonstrate how the laws 
developed post-1757 in order to extend the application of fraud offences and provide 
greater recourse to the criminal courts for prosecutors. This will begin to 
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demonstrate how these developments reflect a shift in jurisprudence, with the 
sympathies of the court beginning to favour particular actors, namely shopkeepers 
and those extending credit.   
In first exploring the definitions and blackletter law surrounding fraud offences, this 
chapter will introduce the foundations of knowledge necessary to answer the three 
central questions of this thesis. The first question - what was fraud? -  is partially 
answered in that the doctrines and offences of fraud will be identified. As stated in 
the introduction to this thesis, an initial doctrinal approach to the definition of fraud 
will be taken in order to define fraud offences. In identifying the black letter laws of 
fraud and then seeking to understand how these laws developed by identifying the 
underlying doctrinal framework shaping this jurisprudence, this allows for a second 
stage in the identification of eighteenth century fraud, that being how was fraud 
enforced. In the chapter following this one, the choices of litigation open to 
prosecutors of fraud will be considered and this can only be done having first 
identified the types of fraud offences. 
The second central thesis question of who was prosecuting fraud, will also require a 
foundational understanding of the development of the law in this area. How the 
jurisprudence developed reflects the social, economic, and political priorities of the 
time. Many of the cases explored in this chapter were decided in the appellant court, 
known as the Twelve Judges. There were very limited opportunities for appeal within 
the English legal system and the Twelve Judges was the only available forum within 
the system where points of law could be clarified and the common law honed.  
These judges sat in trials of first instance across the justice system, and in all courts, 
both civil and criminal. This multiple jurisdiction of the judicial system is significant 
as those individual judges had a firm grasp of the legal developments across all areas 
of law. Consequently, developments in contract law, or property law, may have 
influenced the jurisprudence relating to the criminal law, and vice versa. This cross-
pollination of doctrines is particularly relevant to fraud offences that, as argued in 
the introduction to this thesis, sat at the interface between the criminal and the civil 
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law. In explaining this interconnection in more detail, we can better understand how 
the laws of fraud developed and why.  
 
Fraud: Offences and Ontologies 
The identification and tracing of fraud offences across the centuries requires a use of 
traditional legal method techniques used by today’s legal practitioners such as the 
use of law reports and online legal library resources 243. However, due to the English 
doctrine of implied repeal, it is difficult to trace law backwards, particularly if there 
has been decisive legislation which impacts upon a particular offence. In the case of 
fraud, the Theft Act 1968, the Theft Act 1978, and the Fraud Act 2006 all radically 
redefined fraud through the addition of the dishonesty element to the mens rea, and 
then in 2006 by streamlining types of fraud a smaller number of core offences. 
Because of this doctrinal break in fraud offences, the tracing of these offences before 
this time requires legal historical methods rather than legal methods244. The radical 
redefinition of fraud offences acted to overrule the majority of corresponding case 
law and subsequently, when trying to identify such case law, it was necessary to pick 
up the threads of the law using historical methods. These methods required using 
sixteenth to nineteenth century sources such as Justice of the Peace records and 
contemporary practitioner texts.245 By identifying central statutory and common law 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, this acted as a touchstone from which 
further statutes, cases, and commentaries were identified.  
Once contemporary legislation and cases had been identified, these sources of law 
were analysed by first identifying the relevant ratio decidendi and obiter dicta of 
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judgments246, and then identifying the common themes and characteristics of fraud 
held in the judgments. This analysis resulted in the identification and classification of 
fraud offences from the Tudor to the Georgian era. 
Eighteenth century fraud offences can be defined both positively and negatively; 
what fraud was, and what fraud was not. The act of positively defining fraud resulted 
in the identification of five central doctrines of fraud: that a fraud must be conducted 
through the use of an ‘artful device’; the law does not act to protect ‘a fool’; a criminal 
fraud must have some public harm; a criminal fraud must be something other than a 
contractual misrepresentation; in either contractual or criminal fraud, the tricked 
party must have taken steps to protect themselves. These five doctrines themselves 
interconnect. For example, a ‘public fraud’ could be that which ‘such…common 
prudence would not be sufficient to guard against’.247 At this level, it can be seen that 
it is the prudent person, not the fool who is protected by the criminal law, and that 
reasonable steps would not have protected the prudent person. Where possible 
these five doctrines will be addressed separately but due to the ontological closeness 
of the doctrines, examples will be provided which could apply to one or more of the 
doctrines.  
A sixth doctrine of fraud has been identified and this relates to frauds against public 
offices and officials. This doctrine has been deliberately separated from the central 
five as it is this doctrine which makes fraud offences in the eighteenth century a 
felony rather than a misdemeanour and consequently was legislated for 
specifically.248 The main example of this felonious fraud is the fraudulent obtaining 
of naval prize monies and as a felony, this offence will be considered alongside, but 
separately, to the misdemeanours which made up the majority of fraud laws.  
                                                          
246 The ratio decidendi of a judgment is the part which forms the basis of the decision. The ratio 
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Having illustrated the application of the five doctrines of fraud to the main fraudulent 
offences, this chapter will then consider fraud as negatively defined. Fraud offences 
significantly interconnected with other criminal offences and, by the nineteenth 
century, the law surrounding wider dishonest property offences and financial 
misconduct was complex and interlocking. There was potential for interconnection 
between a number of offences including, but not limited to, larceny, embezzlement, 
forgery and uttering, as well as offences more recognisable as fraud such as cheating, 
obtaining goods by false pretences, false personation and fraudulent obtaining of 
naval prize money.  
The process of identifying fraud offences through the centuries is an exercise in 
detection. As in other areas of law, Parliament legislated hastily and sporadically 
throughout the eighteenth and into the nineteenth century. Often legislation was so 
specific in its application that dozens of separate pieces of legislation related directly 
to the same offence. However, individual pieces of legislation would be used to apply 
these offences specifically to individual subjects249. For example, the law of forgery 
developed over hundreds of years as specific documents became the subject of 
forgery laws.250 The volume of law surrounding fraud offences is not as great as 
forgery but there was still a large amount of interlocking and overlapping legislation 
and common law and it shall be demonstrated how such a piecemeal approach to 
the creation of the criminal law caused confusion and lacunas throughout the law.  
Before considering the interaction of fraud offences with other crimes, the central 
offences of fraud will now be outlined and explored within the original framework of 
the five underlying doctrines of fraud as identified within this research.  
Cheating and Obtaining Goods by False Pretences: the Roots and Branches of Fraud 
The most common form of fraud committed during this period was obtaining foods 
by false pretences (‘false pretences’). To fully contextualise fraud by false pretences, 
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the more general crime of cheating must be understood. The common law offence 
of cheating was the predecessor of false pretence and formed the basis of fraud by 
false pretences.  Cheating required the presence of all of the five central doctrines of 
fraud identified above. The common law offence of cheating pre-dated the later 
offences, forming the majority of the precedent for fraud by the eighteenth century. 
As a distinct offence, cheating was an ancient common law misdemeanour that can 
be found scattered throughout the history of the common law. It was from the 
common law offence of cheating that the doctrines underpinning later fraud 
offences. Cheating and fraud by false pretences are being considered together as the 
offences are so closely linked that the doctrines apply equally to both.  
‘Cheats’ and ‘cheating were common shorthand for fraudulent offences from the 
sixteenth to the nineteenth century, as well as existing as an offence in its own right. 
Cheating was in many ways a catch-all offence. There is much evidence from 
practitioner texts and guides of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that 
cheating was treated as a generic offence falling under the broad umbrella category 
of ‘fraud’.251 Whilst ‘fraud’ was not a specific offence in itself, those administering 
the law during this period often considered cheating and fraud as being two sides of 
the same coin, if not the same side of the same coin.252 This legal shorthand has been 
discussed in Chapter 2 and the multiple examples below will further illustrate how 
the language surrounding fraud can be methodologically problematic. 
The first doctrine of fraud to be considered is the ‘artful device’. This doctrine 
underpins cheating and consequently also fraud by false pretences.  
The Artful Device 
Sergeant Hawkins253 described cheating as “deceitful practices in defrauding or 
endeavouring to defraud another of his known right by means of some artful device 
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contrary to the plain rules of common honesty”.254 Later legislation defined cheating 
as a crime used by ‘evil disposed persons, to support their profligate way of life, have, 
by various subtle stratagems, threats, and devices, fraudulently obtained money, 
goods, etc’.255 Such a device is not merely physically seizing property256 but is rather, 
some deceitful method, or ‘crafty means’257 by which property is obtained. The 
definition of an ‘artful device’ was flexible, allowing for the accommodation of a 
range of possible offences but generally it has been held that mere lying was not 
sufficient.258 The use of the artful device was often associated with some element of 
planning rather than an opportunistic crime. In the 1782 case of R v John Patch, the 
method by which the crime was committed was deemed “an artful and preconcerted 
(sic) scheme”259 and was thereby held to be fraud by false pretences. 
Judges were flexible in their application and interpretation of the ‘artful device’ but 
this is not to say that it was not central to the establishing of a cheat: 
“That the deceitful receiving of money from one man to another's use, upon a 
false pretence of having a message and order to that purpose, is not 
punishable by a criminal prosecution, because it is accompanied with no 
manner of artful contrivance, but wholly depends on a bare naked lie.”260 
The methods by which frauds were carried out will be explored in detail in Chapter 
5. Of these methods, all entail an artful device such as the exploitation of information 
to trick shopkeepers into handing over goods or extending credit. This artful device 
could also entail the extraction on information to later use to swindle third parties. 
Such forms of artful device have been historically perceived as particularly invidious 
as they involved ‘those who trick you out of your knowledge, by what they commonly 
                                                          
254 1 hawk c.71 s.1 quoted in Cited in J.W Cecil Turner (ed), Russell on Crime Vol.2  11th Ed. (London, 
Stevens & Sons Limited, 1958) p.1330 
255 41 Geo. 3, c. 70   
256 The crime of larceny shall be outlined later in this chapter. 
257 R v B. Lara (1795) 6 Term Reports 565; 101 E.R. 706  
258 Robert Shoemaker, Prosecution and Punishment (Cambridge University Press, 1991) 
259 168 E.R. 221; (1782) 1 Leach 238 
260 As cited in R v B. Lara, 6 Term Reports 565; 101 E.R. 706 
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call ‘sucking your brains’.261 This crafty device of obtaining information or knowledge 
to then use in a fraud will be returned to and illustrated throughout this thesis.  
The term ‘artful’ had a moral as well as a legal use. In 1753, Henry Fielding voiced 
concern about ‘a body of artful, designing men, called Gamblers, [who] stood in need 
of reformation’.262 ‘Artful’ was often used in literature to refer to the cunning and 
dishonest. The most famous of these characters is the ‘The Artful Dodger’ who 
appears in Charles Dickens’ Oliver Twist.263  Consequently, the artful device was a 
flexible term but remained an essential doctrine should a cheat or accusation of fraud 
by false pretences be proven.  
The second essential doctrine of fraud was that of the law not acting to protect the 
foolish.  
The Fool 
A well-established doctrine of the criminal law was to offer little protection against 
cheating as it was not a crime for one man to make a fool of another.264 To the 
modern consumer, protected by a raft of measures, this doctrine may seem alien. It 
may be argued that the law’s very raison d’etre with regard to fraud is to protect 
people against the unscrupulous cheat. However, historically the law placed greater 
emphasis upon individual responsibility, with the criminal law in practice resembling 
the modern civil law.265 Prior to the eighteenth century, the criminal law was more a 
forum of dispute resolution.266 This understanding of the early modern criminal 
                                                          
261 John Fielding, Extracts from such of the penal laws as particularly relate to the peace and good 
order of the Metropolis  2nd ed.- (T.Cadell, 1763) 
262 John (and Henry) Fielding,  An Account of the Origin and Effects of a Police set on Foot by the 
Duke of Newcastle (1753) p.28 
263 Charles Dickens, Oliver Twist (Penguin Classics, 2003) First published in 1838 
264 F T Giles, The Criminal Law (Penguin Books, 1954) p.218 and relied upon in the 1703 anonymous 
King’s Bench case, 87 E.R. 863; (1703) 6 Mod. 105. 
265 The relationship of these criminal doctrines to contract law shall be considered in detail later in 
this chapter.  
266 For a comprehensive overview of the common law see Langbein, John H et al, History of the 
Common Law. The Development of Anglo-American Legal Institutions (Wolters Kluwer Law & 
Business, 2009) 
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justice system is different to other views such as those posited by John Langbein 
although even this view changes by the mid-eighteenth century.  
As with fraudulent misrepresentation in modern contract law, the victim of a cheat 
pre-1757 would have to show they had not been foolish when falling foul of the 
cheat. This is very much in keeping with the liberal tradition underpinning the English 
law267. Individual responsibility has long been at the heart of the English legal system, 
whether this be in relation to obligations such as contracts or with regard to criminal 
responsibility268. There are still very few positive duties on people in the criminal law 
and generally individuals have no legal duty to one another269, although there are 
some limited exceptions such as when one has entered into a contract or when 
statute imposes a duty270. Areas of law such as tort have opened up some limited 
positive duties on citizens but with regard to fraud offences, the majority of duties 
during this period were negative: to not actively cheat someone out of a benefit. 
However, until the mid-eighteenth century, there persisted a strong judicial belief 
that individuals, in particular contracting individuals, were responsible for their own 
decisions. This is very closely connected to the contractual doctrine of caveat emptor, 
buyer beware.271 Michael Lobban has claimed that, even by the nineteenth century, 
there existed no underlying doctrine of caveat emptor and rather, judicial decisions 
were made on a case-by-case basis.272 The significance of the doctrine that the law 
should not act to protect a fool directly challenges Lobban’s thesis and the case law 
laid down in this chapter consistently reflect how the judiciary applied such doctrines 
                                                          
267 P.S Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Clarendon, 1979) Chapters 3, 5, 8, and 10. 
See also Norrie, Crime, Reason and History, Chapter 2 
268 Ibid 
269 A legal duty would impose on the individual a positive responsibility to act and a standard by 
which one is expected to perform. For example, there is a legal duty on drivers toward other 
road users and the standard to which the driver is held is that of the reasonable driver, as partly 
dictated by the Highway Code, see Nettleship v Weston [1971] 2 QB 691 
270 Criminal law experts such as Andrew Ashworth have written extensively on the role of omissions 
and the significance of positive duties to act. In particular see: Andrew Ashworth, ‘Manslaughter 
by omission and the rule of law’, Criminal Law Review, 8 (2015), pp.563-577; Andrew Ashworth, 
‘The scope of criminal liability for omissions’ Law Quarterly Review, 105 (July, 1989) pp.424-459 
271 For more detail on Caveat Emptor see Michael Lobban, ‘Misrepresentation’ in William Cornish et 
al, eds, The Oxford History of the Laws of England, Volume XII: 1820-1914 Private Law (Oxford 
Scholarship Online, 2010)   
272 Michael Lobban ‘Nineteenth century frauds in company formation: Derry v Peek in context’ Law 
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to accusations of frauds and cheats. It shall be further demonstrated later in this 
chapter how the laws of contract increasingly embraced individual responsibility 
through the doctrine of caveat emptor, and how the criminal laws of fraud were 
broadened in order to move such frauds into the criminal courts.  
Significantly connected to, if not inseparable from, the doctrine that the law did to 
act to protect a fool was the doctrine that the fraud needed to be of a public nature. 
Whilst the law would not protect a fool, the judiciary were also aware that frauds 
and cheats that affected the wider public needed to be contained. 
Public Nature 
A fraud had to be of a public nature in that anyone could fall foul of the cheat. The 
crime was thereby one that required a wider social harm. ‘Wider social harm’ 
referred to frauds that could have been committed against any reasonable person 
taking reasonable steps to protect him or herself. This doctrine was consistent with 
the doctrine that the law did not act to protect a fool in that the victim of a cheat 
could only bring a successful case if there was no way of verifying the cheat for 
themselves.273 This pivotal requirement spoke to the defining of a cheat as a public 
harm, rather than a mere private transgression. This doctrine was altered and 
developed throughout the eighteenth century to shift the burden of proof of harm 
to the accused and thereby widen the definition of a criminal cheat.  
A complainant of a cheat must have shown that the accused did ‘effectuate his 
fraudulent intent, such as common prudence would not be sufficient to guard 
against’.274 Effectively, the prosecutor needed to successfully argue that the cheat 
could have fooled members of the wider public. There is no direct jurisprudence 
regarding the gullibility of the average member of the public and it is in this area that 
the jurisprudence surrounding fraud would develop.  
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The distinction between private and public harm goes to the heart of the purpose of 
the criminal law, to act as a protection for wider society, rather than the civil law 
which acted to resolve disputes between individuals. Not every instance of cheating 
or obtaining goods by false pretences was a criminal offence but the common law 
was widely used to punish behaviour seen as immoral or deceptive, that was 
injurious to the public or caused a public mischief.275  
By the eighteenth century, the judiciary was becoming more sympathetic to the 
victims of cheats and frauds. They recognised the need to extend the application of 
the criminal law in this area in order to provide more access to the criminal courts. 
Counsel for the defendant in the 1788 case of R v Young, pleaded: ‘That this was not 
an offence at common law, but a bare naked lie, against which the common prudence 
of the prosecutor, if he had exerted it, was sufficient to guard [and not public 
nature]’276 This narrow view of the application of cheating, whilst reflective of the 
law of cheating, was not accepted in later cases. In a 1789 case, Ashurst J, in reference 
to the 1757 Act which codified cheating, held that: 'The Legislature saw that all men 
were not equally prudent, and this statute was passed to protect the weaker part of 
mankind.’277  In the same case, Lord Kenyon addressed the strict doctrine of the law 
not protecting a fool:  
he [the complainant] was perhaps too credulous, and gave confidence to 
them, and advanced his money; and afterwards the whole story proved to be 
an absolute fiction. Then the defendants, morally speaking, have been guilty 
of an offence. I admit that there are certain irregularities which are not the 
subject of criminal law. But when the criminal law happens to be auxiliary to 
the law of morality, I do not feel any inclination to explain it away.278  
Lord Kenyon’s judgment reflects the alteration in attitude to the application of the 
offence of cheating. Historically the common law was stretched to great lengths to 
ensure that cheating was defined as creating a public mischief and thus, indictable 
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under the law. An illustrative example of this is the 1704 prosecution of two 
individuals who agreed to the outcome of a foot race in order to defraud a third 
person.279  This was deemed a public nuisance as it undermined the trust assumed in 
every day gambling and was ‘publick [sic] in its consequences’.280 This very early 
example of match fixing reflects how enthusiastically the common law doctrine of 
cheating was applied. Consequently, whilst a public interest requirement for the 
common law of cheating ostensibly reduced its application, in practice ‘public 
interest’ was very broadly interpreted, with cheating limited to the cheating of or by 
public officials. Common law cheating was also applied to a range of circumstances 
which were deemed in the public interest and were contingent either upon the 
position of the cheater or the position of the cheated. For example, some professions 
or positions of trust such as doctors281, those providing foodstuffs282 or those working 
for a parish.283 Particular forms of cheating at common law were common in relation 
to manufacturing, gaming,284 trade and many other areas.  There were dozens of 
formulations of cheating at common law, the existence of which illustrate how 
significant, in practice, the suppression of deceptive practice was within the common 
law. 
The transference of judicial sympathies toward the credulous member of the public 
is significant. It demonstrates how the judiciary were beginning to perceive fraud 
offences less in terms of breach of contract and more as a criminal offence, requiring 
the protection of all members of the public, not just the economically astute. The 
doctrine that criminal fraud had to be distinct from contract law contrived alongside 
this change in jurisprudence. 
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In particular, judges were open to extending the definition of a public harm to 
instances that threatened commercial relations. The public nature of a fraud was 
often interpreted as being a fraud that caused some socio-economic harm:  
'It is well known that a very considerable share of the money transactions in 
the commercial world is carried on by means of the credit given to drafts upon 
bankers; and therefore any fraud which tends to impeach such a security is a 
matter of public concern, as it must necessarily impede the usual course of 
circulation’.285 
 This judicial desire to protect trade was reflected in later legislation which defined 
cheats and obtaining goods by false pretences as those which led ‘to the manifest 
prejudice of trade and credit’286 
The case law surrounding cheats is preoccupied with the distinction between criminal 
and civil law. In simplistic terms, the key distinction, as explored above, between the 
two was the public nature of the fraud. Lying and cheating between individuals was 
deemed to fall under other areas of law such as contract, not criminal law,287 and 
those believing themselves cheated were equally, if not more likely, to pursue their 
claim in the civil courts.288  
The distinction between the public or private nature of a cheat is not easily discerned, 
although the case law explored demonstrates that fraudulent sale of goods to the 
public were likely to be interpreted as cheats, perhaps because the courts were keen 
to protect the wider community as consumers. Cheats which undermined day-to-day 
commercial activities were far more likely to be deemed criminal than civil. As shall 
be repeatedly demonstrated through this thesis, the courts were quick to criminalise 
and punish those who committed frauds that undermined commercial activity. The 
interpretation and enforcement of the common law of cheating demonstrates that 
this motivation to protect conditions of commercialism had existed in the law before 
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the period of this thesis and, as shall be demonstrated below, continued in earnest 
well into the nineteenth century.289  
Pretences and Misrepresentations: Criminal Meets Contract Law 
The offence of obtaining goods or monies by false pretences is perhaps the clearest 
illustration of an offence which existed at the interface between fraudulent criminal 
offences and the civil law. Inducing a party to enter into a contract under a fraudulent 
misrepresentation could be pursued either under the civil or the criminal law. A 
contractual fraudulent misrepresentation could be, in practice, the same as a false 
pretence given to obtain property. Examples of obtaining through false pretences 
include pretending to be ‘merchants of fortune’ in order to acquire credit, to trick a 
buyer into buying falsely weighted goods or giving a false residence.290 
During the sixteenth century the Star Chamber created a raft of precedent 
concerning fraudulent activities, in particular the criminalisation of fraudulent 
misrepresentation made during the formation of contracts.291 This intersection 
between criminal and contract law is an understandable one and the doctrines 
underpinning both contract law and criminal law lend themselves to each when 
applied to false pretences. These doctrines include the requirement in contract law 
for any contractual representation to be of existing fact and not merely a promise to 
act in the future. The practical application of this doctrine can be best seen in the 
case of R v Jennison in which a man promised to marry a wealthy spinster.292 Jennison 
took money from the woman in order to set up house for the two of them for when 
they would be married. It later transpired that Jennison was in fact married and never 
had any intention of marrying the woman. The court found Jennison to have obtained 
money through a false pretence, not the pretence that he was going to marry the 
woman, but the pretence that he was single and in a position to marry. The promise 
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to marry was a statement of future fact and thus could not be a false pretence; the 
pretence that he was unmarried however was a statement of existing fact.  
Case law across the criminal courts consistently demonstrates that judges were keen 
to distinguish between fraud and breaches of warranties which they felt ought to be 
pursued in the civil courts. Lord Ellenborough in particular delivered a series of 
judgments in which he stressed the need to distinguish between criminal false 
pretences, and breaches of contract.293 Lord Mansfield294 was equally aware of the 
interconnection of criminal and contractual actions and was loath to ‘sustain an 
action simply upon misrepresentation’.295  
In 1733, Chief Justice Raymond held that even in cases of deliberate deceit as to the 
weight of goods, this constituted a private contract and was therefore not 
indictable.296 There was a significant shift in jurisprudential attitudes to the 
distinction between contractual and criminal fraud.  This shift occurred gradually 
through the middle of the eighteenth century. Prior to this development, judges were 
inclined to find contractual fraud a civil rather than a criminal matter. One 
explanation for this distinction can be found in the 1719 case of Wilders in which the 
possibility of mistake by the seller played a central role in the reluctance to use 
indictments to tackle false weights and measures.297 However, the eighteenth 
century saw a shift in judicial approaches to the extension of the criminal law in this 
area, and a broadening in the willingness to interpret sale of goods frauds as criminal. 
This change in jurisprudence continued as the judiciary acted to secure the condition 
required for commercial activity. By using criminal sanctions to address dishonesty 
in commercial dealings, the judiciary was declaring such actions to be of such social 
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and economic harm, to the extent that they affected the entire community, and not 
just the individual.  
This is not to say that all judges began to find a crime where fraudulent 
misrepresentation had been used to induce a contract. An illustrative example can 
be found in the 1775 case of R v William Bower regarding the knowing exposure to 
sale, and selling of wrought gold under a sterling alloy.298 Bower reflects how courts 
were generally keen to find a public cheat in cases of trade. However, one of the 
bench in Bower, Justice Aston, believed there was an important distinction between 
selling by false measure and selling under the standard; selling by false measure was 
harder to check, but merely delivering a lesser amount and the complainant not 
checking was a matter of contract. Cheating was regularly applied to cases involving 
false weights and measures299 as purchasers rarely had the opportunity to verify their 
purchasers at the point of sale. Because of this, if a cheat was carried out during a 
trade, it was mostly treated as a public ill and thus, an indictable cheat.300 The 
commonly used authority for this distinction was the case of R v Wheatly, as decided 
by Lord Mansfield301:  
‘And that the fact here charged should not be considered as an indictable 
offence, but left to a civil remedy by an action, is reasonable and right in the 
nature of the thing: because it is only an inconvenience and injury to a private 
person, arising from that private person's own negligence and carelessness in 
not measuring the liquor, upon receiving it, to see whether it held out the just 
measure or not.’302  
Again, it is significant that the doctrines which places onus on the deceived to take 
steps to protect themselves. If the cheated had an opportunity to verify the 
fraudulent representation and failed to, this was more likely to be considered a civil 
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breach. However, had the cheat been unverifiable, this would be more likely to be 
interpreted as a crime of which any person may have fallen foul.  
A further distinction separating a criminal fraud from a contractual fraudulent 
misrepresentation was the mens rea of the criminal offence. Alan Norrie’s research 
engages with the significance of mens rea in the criminal law. Norrie, like Douglas 
Hay, has argued that the construction of the criminal laws surrounding property was 
designed to specifically protect the property of the upper classes against the lower 
orders.303 This was achieved primarily through the strict construction of the mens rea 
of property offences, that being the need for dishonesty and intent.304  
According to Norrie, the narrow, and essentially objective definition of dishonesty 
was specifically defined so as to prevent the motive for committing property offences 
being relevant to any substantive element of the criminal trial; the purpose being to 
prevent the poor from claiming any justification for their misappropriation of 
property due to their poverty. This played a significant function in the silencing of the 
accused within the trial as until sentence was passed, there were very few 
substantive defences available to the accused. Norrie is quite right that the 
substantive law offered no opportunity for the accused to speak to the motive for 
their actions but this does not mean that courts were unwilling to allow the accused 
to explain themselves.305 Rather, this explanation went to the sentencing of the 
accused. 
Cheating and fraudulently obtaining goods by false pretences required the intent of 
the accused. Intent is elaborated upon by such phrases as ‘deceitfully intending’.306 
There is little case law or jurisprudence that defines ‘deceitful intent’ but commonly 
variations in the used wording within indictments at the time included: ‘unlawfully, 
knowingly, and designedly307’; ‘that he, being a wicked and evil disposed person, 
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intending to cheat and defraud308’; ‘being an ill designing person, of dishonest 
conversation, not minding to gain his livelihood by honesty, did falsely pretend309’. 
Lord Ellenborough restated the need to show the mens rea of fraud, that being 
'knowingly and designedly', and went on to detail how: 'A man may innocently obtain 
goods on a pretence which is false, if he do not know that it is false: as if a servant, 
ignorant of the deceit, be sent by his master for goods upon a false pretence, which 
he directs him to make.'310 This judgment clearly restates that intent must be present 
but also, that the act may be carried out through an innocent third party without 
negating the intent of the principle actor.  
By the nineteenth century, contract law had developed to allow for a scale of 
knowledge when committing on fraudulent misrepresentation.311 In eighteenth 
century criminal law however, the mens rea of a cheat or fraud was simple intent 
with knowledge that the representation was a fraud.312 
The Offence of Obtaining Property by False Pretences 
Obtaining goods by false pretences was primarily defined by two statutes, one 
passed during the reign of Henry VIII and the other passed just before the start of our 
period, in 1757. It is important to note that obtaining property by false pretences 
continued to exist as a misdemeanour in common law, punishable by a fine and/or 
imprisonment.313  
The first of the statutes that criminalised the fraudulent obtaining of goods, 
stipulated the need for the goods to be obtained through the use of ‘privy tokens and 
counterfeit letters’.314 The Act was limited in its application because in order to be 
prosecuted, it had to be shown that the goods had actually been received and thus, 
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it was not an offence to attempt to obtain goods through false pretences.315  A 
further limitation was that the act by which the goods were obtained could not be a 
verbal representation316 or a ‘bare naked lie’.317 As has been demonstrated earlier in 
this chapter, this doctrines of the ‘artful device’ and the need for a representation 
beyond a mere lie continued to be of significance into the eighteenth century.  
Judges consistently ruled throughout the eighteenth century that unless the fraud 
was carried out using ‘false tokens’, the action amounted to no more than ‘making a 
fool of another’.318 Again, we see the liberal heart at the centre of the English law.319 
The individual was required to show that any member of the public could have fallen 
foul of the cheat, while the law added a caveat that the cheat had to be carried out 
through the use of a false token. Clearly the courts would not allow for credulous 
members of the public to use the criminal justice system having been tricked by 
merely a few carefully chosen smooth words.  
Judges were unsympathetic to those tricked by frauds carried out by mere words as 
it was felt that precautions should have been taken against such a fraud, mainly the 
asking for some written evidence or token.320 Not only was the presence of a token 
a requirement, it also had to be a sufficiently convincing token and not just anything 
written.321 For example, a scrupulous shopkeeper would have been expected to 
further question a terribly written, semi-literate scrawl purporting to be from a 
gentleman sent with his servant. This application of the doctrine requiring a public 
wrong introduces and overlaps with the doctrine that the tricked should have taken 
steps to verify the statement. Again, it appears that the law before the eighteenth 
century made prosecuting fraud difficult. However, in 1757, Sir John Fielding 
introduced a new Act into Parliament through his patron, the Duke of Newcastle, and 
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this Act resulted in the further extension of the laws of fraud in order to make 
prosecutions easier.  
In 1757, the ‘Obtaining money by false pretences etc’ Act was passed.322 This Act took 
a step in the consolidation of false pretences, both in its definitions and applications. 
S.1 of the Act defined the elements of obtaining goods by false pretences to be the 
intentional obtaining of ‘money, goods, wares or merchandizes, with intent to cheat 
or defraud’.323 ‘False pretences’ are very loosely defined in the 1757 Act, allowing 
pretences of future as well as present promises.324 However, the Act contained some 
significant limitations. One such limitation was that the 1757 Act only applied to 
monies, goods and chattels but not to securities or chose in action.325 While this was 
addressed in 1812326, the Act was eventually repealed in 1827327 and replaced the 
same year by legislation328 which sought to address defects in the eighteenth century 
Act.329 During our period however, where chose in action, or some of the newer 
financial instruments of the time were misappropriated, obtaining goods by false 
pretences could not be utilised.330 
Before exploring why this Act was introduced, the individual elements of the offence 
warrant attention in order to demonstrate how the offence operated. By exploring 
the actus reus of the offence, it will become clear that the Act widened the offence 
of obtaining goods by false pretences, thereby giving the cheated greater recourse 
to the criminal law.  
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Pretences 
It is in the definition of ‘pretences’ that the change in jurisprudence surrounding 
fraud during the eighteenth century becomes apparent. Prior to the 1757 Act, 
‘pretences’ was very narrowly defined thereby limiting the scope for prosecutions. 
However, by the eighteenth century there was an extension of the definition of 
pretences, and thus, the manner by which frauds could be committed in order to be 
brought before the criminal courts. As one commentator of the period highlights: 
The term false pretence is of great latitude, and was used…to protect the 
weaker part of mankind, because all were not equally prudent…but still it may 
be a question whether the statute extends to every false pretences, either 
absurd or irrational upon the face of it, or such as the party has at the very 
time the means of detecting at hand…331  
This illustrates the changing sympathies towards a need to protect more credulous 
members of society, as was present in judgments regulating cheats. Notwithstanding 
this shift, a successful complainant would need to demonstrate that they believed 
the pretence, and were not wholly irrational to do so. Again, there is significant 
overlap between the doctrines of fraud. Here the connection is between the 
requirement to show some steps of verification of the representation, and that the 
law does not operate to protect a fool.  
Following the introduction of the 1757 Act, which allowed for false pretences to be 
in the form other than a token, there was a continuance of jurisprudential wrangling 
to define what constituted a ‘pretence’. The presenting of a cheque, the value of 
which the presenter knew to be worthless, constituted a pretence, even if words 
were not spoken.332 Likewise, presenting a counterfeit note could be a false 
pretence.333 A false pretence could even be found where the accused failed to correct 
another’s false assumption. This was illustrated in the case of John Story who tried 
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to innocently collect his own post at a post office but was given a money order for a 
‘John Storey’, which he then accepted without correcting the postal worker.334  
Another example is given by the commentator, East, who refers to the case of R v 
Skirrett in which it was held that reading false words to an illiterate person in order 
to execute a deed using his signature was a false pretence.335  
Reliance and Reasonable Steps 
Whilst it would seem that the courts were happy to extend the definition of false 
pretences to capture a wide range of fraudulent behaviour, the prosecution of 
obtaining of goods by false pretences was not straightforward. The prosecutor had 
to show that he or she was induced to part with their money or goods because of the 
false pretence. This is very similar to the requirement in cases of fraudulent 
misrepresentation in contract law.336 This placed the prosecutor in an unusual 
position because they had to show they had been duped by the ruse even though 
they had taken steps to verify the pretence.  
This of course required admittance on the part of the prosecutor that they had been 
duped by the accused and had consequently handed over the goods. Often 
prosecutors were unwilling to admit this, especially in open court where they would 
potentially expose themselves to ridicule.337 In demonstrating that they had been 
deceived by the false pretence, a prosecutor would have to show that this behaviour 
was not merely a sales trick or some form of trap into which they, the gullible 
individual fell. Rather, as with cheats, they had to demonstrate that this offence had 
a public dimension and any person could have fallen foul of it, and that they were 
not asking the law to protect a fool.  This doctrine was also consistent with the 
contractual doctrine of caveat emptor in that the onus was placed upon the buyer to 
take reasonable steps to ensure the contract into which they entered was 
beneficial.338 Again, there is emphasis placed upon prosecutors to protect 
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themselves against fraud, rather than for the criminal law to apply to all fraudulent 
offences, regardless of the behaviour of the prosecutor.  
Obtaining Property by False Personation 
The third most common form of fraudulent misdemeanour was obtaining goods by 
false personation. In essence, this offence was a form of fraud carried out by 
pretending to be someone else. An early-eighteenth century justice held that 
personating a man is no harm, unless it be for an ill intent.339 However, pretending 
to be someone else in order to commit a fraud was a widespread form of fraud which 
was criminalised in both the common law and statute. Similar to obtaining goods by 
false pretences at common law, obtaining property by false personation was defined 
as a misdemeanour.340 Due to the imprecise language often used when recording 
prosecutions for fraud offences, the specific offence is often recorded purely as 
‘fraud’ which may explain why many believed false personation to be synonymous 
with cheats.  
When such behaviour was prosecuted it often fell within the offence of conspiracy.341 
This was to be expected as many cases involved more than one offender. For 
example, in the case of R v Robinson342, a servant conspired with another man to 
personate her master so as to solemnise a marriage that was used as the basis of a 
rather audacious claim upon her master’s property. This was therefore both a cheat 
and a conspiracy. False personation was also similar to deceptive practices relating 
to documents and financial instruments and as such, Chitty argued that “false 
personation…is nearly allied to forgery”.343 A range of offences have similarities to 
obtaining goods by false personation. Commentators claimed that false personation, 
‘is in its nature nearly allied to forgery, with which it is usually accompanied, to give 
it efficacy’.344 Assumedly that was because perpetrators would falsely personate a 
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creditable or trustworthy person it order to pass off a forged document.345 Obtaining 
goods by false personation required the jumping of the same doctrinal hurdles as 
cheating and false pretences and all five doctrines had to be satisfied.  
Public Harm 
Obtaining property by false personation was widely criminalised by statute. In 
keeping with the flurry of legislation created by parliament in the eighteenth 
century346, and the piecemeal approach through which this legislation was adopted, 
false personation was legislated according to whom the prisoner had impersonated. 
For example, the offence of impersonating a soldier to obtain wages347 fell under 
different legislation to the offence of impersonating a sailor348 or impersonating a 
South Sea stock owner.349 Personating the master or mistress of a servant in order to 
give a reference was also criminalised.350 Such an approach applied to a seemingly 
unending list of officials and office holders including Inland Revenue officers351 and 
even teachers.352 
The clearest examples of public cheating can be found in relation to cheats against 
public officials. Such acts were indictable offences353 and there is a suggestion that, 
where possible, fraud against a public officer has been preferred to an action of 
private fraud or cheating. An illustrative example of this is R v Blackbourne354 in which 
a woman pretended to be a widow in order to execute a bail bond. This was 
interpreted as being a fraud upon a public officer acting in the course of justice.355 
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As shall be illustrated in Chapter 5, obtaining goods by false personation is more 
frequently found at the Old Bailey alongside the fraudulent obtaining of naval prize 
monies. It is to this offence that we now turn.  
Prize Money Fraud 
Naval frauds differed from other types of fraudulent offence in one key respect, that 
they were felonies rather than misdemeanours. Moreover, they were capital 
felonies. The methods by which naval frauds were carried out will be discussed in 
Chapter 5, as will the important issue of who was prosecuting these offences. The 
criminalisation of fraudulently obtaining prize monies (naval frauds) was greater than 
other forms of fraud offence. It was the target of the fraud, the Navy and its agents, 
which gave this type of fraud the sixth doctrine, being carried out against a public 
authority.  
Fraud offences relating to prize monies were codified in such a way as to apply to 
different methods of obtaining these monies. For example, 31 Geo. II. c. 10, s. 24 
(extended to marines by 32 Geo. III. c. 33, s. 23) stated:  
“That whosoever willingly and knowingly takes a false oath to obtain the 
probate of any will or wills, or to obtain letters of administration in order to 
receive the payment of any wages, pay, or other allowances of money or prize-
money due, or that were supposed to be due, to any officer, seaman, or other 
person who has really served, or was supposed to have served, on board of 
any ship or vessel in the King's service, shall be guilty of felony without benefit 
of clergy.”  
This Act also extended the method of fraud to other instruments used to commit 
naval fraud.356 There are distinct interconnections between naval fraud and forgery 
or uttering. These offences will be considered below. However, what is apparent for 
naval frauds is that the law was constructed in such a way as to take account of the 
customary payment methods observed by the Navy and to avoid any of the 
                                                          
356 31 Geo. II. c. 10 
                                                                  Prosecuting Fraud in the Metropolis, 1760-1820 
 
86 
 
ontological and procedural complexities associated with prosecutions for obtaining 
goods by false pretences or forgery. In doing so, it ensured a more straightforward 
prosecution and also, that the offence was unquestionably prosecuted as a felony. 
The policies surrounding the defining naval fraud as a felony will be discussed in 
Chapter 5, but for current purposes, it is apparent that the laws surrounding naval 
fraud were distinct from more traditional fraud and deception offences.  That is not 
to say that courts did not recognise the connecting doctrines of naval frauds with 
other offences such as forgery and perjury.357 However, unlike fraud offences, where 
it was apparent that a fraud had been committed with regard to prize money, there 
was less confusion, or indeed flexibility, as to which offence could be pursued by the 
prosecutor.  
Naval frauds were legislated for more thoroughly than other areas of fraud. These 
frauds were defined as capital felonies due to the huge economic, social, and political 
significance of the Navy to the economic growth of the nation. The Navy, whether 
fighting or merchant, allowed for the expansion of trade and the growth of the 
empire. Moreover, the Navy held an important symbolic place at the heart of British 
culture.358 Prize money frauds were seen as crimes against the navy and all those 
who were employed by the Navy. As shall also be detailed later in this thesis, sailors 
were very popular with the general public and it was widely known and condemned 
that the Navy often did not pay its sailors regularly. Those who committed fraud 
against the navy were seen as taking resources from hard-working and brave sailors. 
As highlighted in a 1795 case of Turtle v Hartwell: 
 ‘The Legislature have anxiously provided for those most useful and deserving 
bodies of men, the seamen and marines of this country; for this purpose they 
have made regulations to protect their earnings from those impositions which 
are too frequently practised upon them; and have for their own benefit 
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imposed various restrictions upon the modes by which they might transfer 
their property’.359 
As the only felonious version of fraud, prize money frauds will be considered 
separately to other forms of fraud in this thesis. However, as shall be demonstrated 
in later chapters, the key distinction between different types of fraud was the 
prosecutor. As the form of fraud prosecuted by the navy, prize money fraud is a 
significant example of fraud found within the Old Bailey during this period.  
Fraud and the Wider Criminal Law 
This chapter has so far positively defined the central offences surrounding fraud and 
the corresponding doctrines, in that it has explained which offences and behaviour 
constituted a fraud offence. This chapter will now negatively define fraud, in that 
those offences which closely interlocked with fraud offences shall be explored. These 
were the offences between which counts had to distinguish instances in which 
property had been obtained but it was not another offence.  The offences most 
closely aligned with fraud were larceny, forgery, and uttering. These offences will be 
explored in relation to the doctrines of fraud identified above. In order to 
demonstrate how closely they were aligned, and also where they were delineated.  
Larceny: by Trick and by Servants 
Larceny has a winding and intricate history passing through both multiple statutes 
and innumerable cases. To trace this path in its entirety is not required for the 
purposes of exploring offences relating to fraud. Nevertheless, in considering the 
offences which sat at the peripheries of fraud, a more nuanced understanding of 
deceptive and fraudulent offences might be gained by paying heed to the most 
common property offences of the period.  
The relationship between larceny and fraud stretches back to the twelfth century, 
and the two areas of law developed and altered through the ages in both a symbiotic 
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and juxtaposed nexus. The historic laws creating and surrounding theft have widely 
been seen as a maze of arbitrary distinctions between a range of offences from 
larceny to embezzlement to obtaining property by false pretences.360 Robert Peel 
thought larceny and the common law of cheating were so similar, particularly the 
mens rea, that in 1827 he introduced a bill into Parliament to bring the two offences 
together.361 However, before this unification there continued to be interlocking and 
conflicting doctrines between larceny and fraud. In light of this, and to understand 
the operation of the laws surrounding larceny and fraud, these shall be considered 
in some depth.  
Limitations of Larceny and the Need for the Artful Device 
Bracton defined larceny as being “the fraudulent dealing with another man’s 
property with the intent of stealing it against the will of its owner”.362  ‘Fraudulent 
dealing’ was derived from the Roman concept of ‘contractatio’ that, whilst a vague 
doctrine, always demanded the change of possession of the goods alleged to have 
been stolen.363 The mens rea of larceny was not only concerned with contractatio 
but also animus furandi. Animus Furandi injected a further requirement of dishonesty 
and deception into the offence of larceny. 
In the simplest terms, the offences of larceny required that without the consent of 
the owner, a thing must be seized (cepit) and then carried away (asportavit).364 The 
need for both these elements acted to greatly limit the application of larceny. 
Ultimately, resulted in the creation of a range of other property offences such as 
larceny by a trick, theft by servants and embezzlement and fraudulent offences such 
as cheats and obtaining goods by false pretences. Even considering the most basic 
definition of larceny, it is apparent how fraud and larceny interacted: where it 
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appeared that the goods were seemingly willingly handed over to the accused, 
larceny could not apply.  
Consequently, the fundamental distinction between obtaining goods by false 
pretences and larceny is the requirement in larceny for the seizure of goods. As 
stated by Justice Gould in 1789, ‘…to constitute the crime of larceny the property must 
be feloniously taken from the possession on the owner’.365 There is extensive case law 
from the sixteenth century demonstrating the relationship between fraud offences 
and larceny. The 1783 case of R v Richard Horner demonstrated how obtaining goods 
by false pretences, if carried out with a pre-concerted ‘plan to rob’, could in fact be 
a larceny, particularly if the jury can find there was animus furandi.366 Likewise, a case 
heard by the Twelve Judges in 1820 demonstrated how cases could appear as a 
conspiracy to defraud, but was in reality a theft due to the pre-arranged nature of 
the theft, concealed as a gambling fraud.367 This is one of the few examples in which 
the facts of a case could have been framed as larceny but was addressed as a fraud. 
This is significant as the prosecutors chose to pursue a misdemeanour rather than a 
felony.368 
There have been a number of significant cases that have tried to extend the definition 
of ‘seized’ within larceny. Moreover, there were many occasions in which proving 
larceny was difficult as the goods had been handed over to the accused freely. A 
common example of this was when someone sought to buy some goods and asked 
to try or examine these goods before buying or later going on to steal the goods.369 
The most significant example of such a situation is Pear’s Case.370 In Pear’s, a horse 
was hired with the intent to take the horse and not return it. The court interpreted 
the law such that this behaviour fell under larceny. The defence was that the owner 
had consented to giving the horse to Pear and consequently, there had been no 
seizure. The court rejected this claim, holding that even though the owner had 
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consented to the passing of the possession of the horse, he had not consented to the 
passing of the title of the horse and thus, the horse was not legally transferred, but 
merely bailed to Pear. Thus, by taking the horse in its entirety, both the actual horse 
and the title to the horse, Pear had seized the horse and therefore committed 
larceny. This distinction has frequently been referred to as ‘larceny by a trick’.371 Such 
reasoning was applied by the law and the courts into the nineteenth century with 
case law supporting the doctrine that licencing of goods, as bailment of goods, does 
not equate to the free transfer of those goods. Therefore, the intentional and 
dishonest taking of those goods still amounts to larceny.372  
Whilst Pear’s case may have ostensibly squared the circle and broadened the offence 
of larceny to cover the theft of goods not physically seized, this conceptual 
manipulation of the laws of larceny created yet further overlap between larceny and 
other deception offences such as obtaining goods by false personation. Cases such 
as R v Atkinson373 in 1799 which established that in situations in which only the 
possession and not the title of goods had passed, this would be obtaining goods by 
false pretences and not larceny by a trick.   
Giles succinctly illustrates these close ties between the offences, stating that larceny 
by a trick “…in its very nature is so closely akin to fraud that at times upon the same 
facts it is possible to launch a prosecution either for stealing or for false 
pretences”.374 Thus the seemingly straightforward ontological difference between 
larceny and obtaining goods by false pretences being whether the goods were taken 
without the owner’s consent, is blurred to the point of uselessness.   
In 1812, Chitty went so far as to argue false pretences to be a ‘species of larceny’.375  
This close connection and overlap between false pretences and larceny created a 
confusing number of options for prosecutors. James Fitzjames Stephen highlighted 
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the very real problems of such interconnection between the two offences when he 
stated that: ‘a failure of justice frequently arises from the subtle distinction between 
larceny and fraud’.376  This subtle distinction between fraud and other offences was 
not only limited to larceny, but also existed between fraud offences and forgery. 
Forgery and Uttering: the Continued Need for Public Harm 
Chitty also believed there to be an indistinguishable connection between forgery and 
fraud, claiming: ‘Forgery, at common law, seems only to have been a species of fraud, 
and is therefore, often intermingled with false personating and other means of 
defrauding’.’377 Experts in the history of forgery equally agree that forgery was closely 
connected to the fraudulent offence of obtaining goods by false pretences.378 Often 
forgery was the method by which the goods were obtained. Just as Tudor legislation 
regarding false pretences required these pretences to be in the form of a token, so 
too did forgery offences require the imitation or doctoring of some document. The 
similarities between the two forms of offences extended to the underlying doctrines 
of fraud at the centre of this analysis: that the offence could affect any member of 
the public and thus was a public harm, and that the complainant had taken steps to 
protect themselves against this offence.  
Forgery, far more so than fraud offences, was codified by innumerable statutes and 
by the middle of the nineteenth century. This was because statutory forgery was 
composed of a myriad of legislation arrived at via the process of criminalising the 
forging of particular writings, on a document by document basis.379 At statute, there 
were dozens, if not hundreds of individual pieces of legislation which criminalised 
specific forgery of specific writings. Listing all of this legislation would be a thankless 
task in that such specificity would only reflect that a piecemeal approach had been 
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taken, but which would not really explain why such legislative steps had been 
taken.380  
Statutory offences of forgery that closely aligned to fraud offences included the 
forgery of writings relating to the supply of goods;381 the felony of forging the mark 
on silver or gold382, forging or uttering the will of a seaman383, forging a marriage 
licence384, forging any document of an attorney and any writing which affects, 
trespasses or conveys shares in public companies.385  
By examining a select few of the Forgery Acts, it becomes apparent how even the 
larger pieces of forgery legislation was very specific in its application, such as the 
Forgery Act of 1562 which extended forging to ‘false and untrue charters, evidence, 
deeds and writings.’386 Elizabethan legislation introduced a wide range of forgery 
offences including the forging of wills, which would previously have been considered 
private documents and therefore, would not have been indictable as a forgery. Here 
again we see the keen distinction deployed in the early modern era between private 
and public harms. Again, there is a gradual move in jurisprudence to relocate 
previously defined private trespasses into the criminal courts.  
The doctrine of public harm is most significantly recognised in common law forgery. 
Forgery at common law was an ancient offence but one that, by the eighteenth 
century, was used far less frequently than statutory forgery.387 This was perhaps 
because of the continuing limitations of common law forgery. As with other forms of 
deceptive offences at common law, it was a requirement that the forgery in question 
related to documents of a public nature such as deeds or public records.388 The 
forging of private documents was deemed to be a civil rather than a criminal offence, 
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much like private cheats and obtaining goods by false pretences with only a private 
affect.389   
The Quality of the Forgery 
As with fraud offences, the doctrines of not protecting a fool and the need to show 
reasonable steps to ascertain the truth of the deception extended to forgery. In 1806, 
a Crown Case Reserved case confirmed that a forgery could not be indicted if the 
attempt to forge was so poor as to not be distinguishable as any particular type of 
financial instrument.390 Here we see the similar approaches between false pretences 
and forgery, in particular the tension between not protecting a fool, but equally not 
forsaking the credulous but innocent.  This mirroring of doctrinal underpinning 
further demonstrates the extent of the interconnection between fraud and forgery.  
Uttering 
With regard to fraud offences, the uttering of false coin or banking notes was a 
different species of offence to forgery as the forging of coin was deemed a Royal 
offence. This separate categorisation is significant as Royal offences were tried very 
differently in that they were prosecuted by the state. However, there are parallels 
with the uttering of other forms of forged documents or financial instruments. 
Uttering was a far easier offence to prosecute as mere possession of the forged 
document was often enough to convict whereas for forgery, the tools of forgery also 
needed to be produced391. Similarly to many forms of forgery, uttering was defined 
by legislation as needing to be carried out toward a certain type of person or within 
a particular manner and could not apply to the general presentment of a 
document.392 
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Uttering could be carried out through an innocent agent.393 For example, if an 
individual handed a forged banknote or document to an unknowing servant and 
instructed the servant to exchange the note or document for a benefit, then the 
individual would still be held culpable of the uttering. The servant would be an 
innocent agent and as such would not be treated by the court to have broken the 
chain of causation between the individual and the ultimate passing off of the forged 
document or note. This is similar to the jurisprudential discussion surrounding fraud 
offences which showed specific understanding of the potential use of innocent third 
parties to conduct fraud. Of course, if the servant were aware of the forgery, he or 
she would still not prevent both parties being culpable of uttering as the initial 
uttering would have occurred when the document was given to the servant.  
The Operation of the Law: Fraud alongside other Offences 
Forgery was utilised in a similar way to fraud offences, with an interconnection 
between various statutes and the common law: 
 “when a case arose which would not exactly fit a statute, recourse was had 
to the alleged common-law crime; but this was nearly always done in order to 
override arguments of a narrow technical character on the exact description 
of a particular document…”394 
Fraud offences, such as the obtaining of goods by false pretences could not be merely 
tacked on to the end of a forgery indictment as the clerk of indictment’s insurance 
policy. Rather, the fraud offence needed to be as clearly laid out as if the whole case 
rested upon it, even if the fraud offence really was a secondary offence to the 
forgery.395 
Both common law and statute were the requirement that the thing forged must be 
a ‘writing’. This was a wider definition than a ‘document’ and in the mid-nineteenth 
century, the definition of a ‘writing’ was very broadly interpreted. A notch on a 
                                                          
393 R v Giles (1827) 1 Mood. 166 
394 Cecil Turner, Virginia Law Review p.948 
395 R v Benjamin Rushworth, 168 E.R. 822; (1816) Russ. & Ry. 317 
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baker’s wooden tally falsely representing, that bread had been delivered, was 
deemed a writing.396 As such, there are definite parallels between the extension of 
the definition of pretences with regard to fraud offence, and the definition of a 
document. Here it is apparent that the courts were equally willing to widen the tests 
for forgery they were for fraud offences.  
Uttering, like forgery, related to specific types of documents and writings and where 
an offence had been committed using an instrument outside of one of the many 
statutes, the courts were disinclined to accept a use of fraud offences as an 
alternative to uttering.397 This was most likely because uttering was a Royal offence 
and of particular significance to the state.  
Forgery and uttering were closely aligned with obtaining goods by false pretences; it 
was the uttering of the forged document which acted as the pretence to obtain the 
goods. Forgery was codified and clarified to a much greater extent than any of the 
fraud offences, perhaps more significantly, forgery offences were increasingly 
defined as felonies, with all the prosecutorial benefits which came with such 
status.398 In light of this dedicated legislation it is perhaps to be expected that forgery 
would be more popularly selected as an offence if a prosecutor had an option 
between false pretences and forgery.399 
Conclusion  
Both before and during this period, the laws of fraud were varied and multiple. The 
most commonly seen fraudulent offence at the Old Bailey, obtaining goods by false 
pretences, evolved from the ancient common law misdemeanour of cheating. 
Obtaining goods by false pretences continued applying the five central doctrines of 
cheating: that a fraud must be conducted through the use of an ‘artful device’; the 
law does not act to protect a fool; a criminal fraud must have some public harm; a 
criminal fraud must be something other than a contractual misrepresentation; in 
                                                          
396 Example given in Cecil Turner, Virginia Law Review p.951 
397 R v Field, 1 Leach 383; 168 E.R.294 
398 See Chapter 4 
399 Ibid 
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either contractual or criminal fraud, the tricked party must have taken steps to 
protect themselves. These doctrines shaped the types of frauds appearing in the Old 
Bailey during this period, and had significant impact upon wider doctrines and areas 
of law including contract law and larceny.  
The laws surrounding fraud during the early eighteenth century were very narrowly 
construed, making it difficult to pursue a criminal prosecution for fraud offences. In 
particular, the doctrines that the law did not protect a fool and that a criminal fraud 
needed to be a public harm, were construed to limit criminal frauds until the 
eighteenth century. As financial markets and commercial relationships become 
larger and more complex throughout the eighteenth century, the judiciary and the 
legal system acted to allow more prosecutions for fraud. This was achieved by 
altering the scope of the five doctrines of fraud. 
This willingness to find criminal culpability for fraud that, in previous centuries may 
have not been heard in either criminal or civil court, can be explained by the shifting 
purpose of the criminal justice system over the civil jurisdiction with regard to 
contract law. By the eighteenth century, the criminal justice system was acting to 
bolster the favourable conditions for trade and the developing complexity of the 
markets. This period is what this thesis is being referring to as ‘proto-capitalism’. 
Alongside the economic transformations that were taking place, the eighteenth 
century was also a period of change in the construction and ontology of fraud 
offences. From a narrowly defined set of offences, the mid-eighteenth century sees 
a widening of the doctrines of fraud, particularly a softening of the standard to which 
the prosecutor was held, allowing for increased prosecution of fraud in the criminal 
courts.  
This chapter has also explored in depth how fraud offences interacted with other 
offences. As shall be demonstrated throughout this thesis, offences such as obtaining 
goods by false pretences operated in a dual manner, as an independent and 
significant offence in its own right, and also to a lesser extent, as an alternative count 
to other indictments for larceny or forgery. This dual usage demonstrates the 
flexibility of fraud offences, as well as how erroneous it would be to consider fraud 
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offences in a vacuum, removed from other property laws of the time. Prosecutors 
and the courts were fully aware of the interconnectedness of offences during this 
period, and the interdependent relationship between areas of law and the courts 
within which these laws were heard. In the following chapter, the options open to 
complainants of fraud will be considered, revealing why particular routes within the 
legal system were chosen over others in the attempt to resolve claims of fraud.  
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Chapter 4 Disposal of Fraud Accusations: To Prosecute, To 
Litigate, or To Walk Away? 
The previous chapters have explored the definitions and forms of fraud offences in 
place during this period. Significantly, it has been established that fraud sat at the 
interface between the criminal and the civil law. Victims of frauds could sometimes 
pursue a number of criminal offences, or they could be barred from using the criminal 
courts due to the failure to establish one of the five underlying doctrines of criminal 
fraud as defined in this thesis. However, failure to establish one of these doctrines 
did not always mean that the defrauded had no further recourse to justice and, as 
illustrated in Chapter 3, judges would often hold that these cases should have been 
pursued in the civil courts.400  
Having earlier established that accusations of fraud could be pursued in a number of 
different ways, this chapter explores the mechanisms and motivations for utilising 
these options. Using archival data from a range of courts, some conclusions are 
drawn regarding which courts or method of disposal were more frequently used with 
regard to fraud and why this might be. First, the interaction between the criminal 
and civil court systems is explored, alongside discussion of why either system may be 
preferred for disposal of fraud accusations at this time. Second, attention is paid to 
occasions when prosecutors chose to use the criminal justice system to pursue their 
accusation of fraud. In particular, whether fraud accusations were made in the 
summary or quarter sessions courts and, if such accusations were pursued in the 
summary courts, what types of fraud were being reported to the magistrates’ 
courts.401  
It will become clear in this chapter that both the civil and the criminal courts had 
attracting and repelling characteristics for those pursuing accusations of fraud. This 
                                                          
400 For example per Lord Ellenborough, R v Pywell and others 171 E.R. 510; (1816) 1 Stark. 402  
401 As accepted in Chapter 2, the Magistrates’ records across London are minimal and primarily 
relate to the City of London rather than Middlesex. However, as also stated in Chapter 2, this 
does not prevent some conclusions being made about the type of offences being reported in 
these lower courts.  
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chapter identifies a pivotal question: given the litigation and prosecution choices 
available402, why did 469 indictments of fraud appear at the Old Bailey between 1760 
and 1820? This question clearly intersects with the three over-arching questions of 
this thesis: What was fraud during this period?; Who was prosecuting fraud?;  How 
were frauds prosecuted at the Old Bailey? By exploring the litigation options available 
to the those believing themselves to have fallen foul of a fraud, a step is taken in 
ascertaining the types of fraud heard across the entire judicial system, who would 
choose the Old Bailey over other juridical options, and what procedural or practical 
measures might entice the prosecutor to pursue their grievance in the Old Bailey.  
It shall be demonstrated how extraordinary it was that so many indictments for fraud 
offences should appear at the most public and senior criminal court in the 
Metropolis. Moreover, a further and significant step in this thesis is taken by 
demonstrating that given the financial incentives and ramifications in the 
prosecution of these 469 indictments, the choice of using the Old Bailey for many of 
these indictments appears astonishing. This chapter argues that these indictments 
should really have been heard either in civil courts, or in much lower criminal courts. 
The reason for the appearance of these indictments at the Old Bailey is returned to 
throughout this thesis, but in this chapter, the focus is upon demonstrating how 
surprising it is that these indictments appear at the Old Bailey at all.  
Civil or Criminal? Fraud within the Wider Court System 
When pursuing an accusation of fraud, what choices were available to the 
complainant? What factors motivated complainants to employ one avenue of the 
justice system over another? During this period, a complainant of fraud had many 
options to pursue.  
During the eighteenth century, and well into the nineteenth century, prosecutions 
were initiated, organised, and paid for by private citizens.403 Whilst there were the 
                                                          
402 ‘Prosecution’ is the verb used throughout this thesis for criminal legal actions whereas ‘litigation’ 
is being used to signal litigation in the civil courts. 
403 John Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Trial (Oxford University Press, 2003) p.11 
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beginnings of police forces within the metropolis, their role was primarily focused 
upon deterring street crime and executing warrants for arrest404; the police played 
no official role in the prosecution of crime until well into the nineteenth century.405 
A Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) would not be created until 1898 but the role 
of the DPP was limited to a handful of cases.406 There also existed an Attorney-
General, but during the eighteenth century407 this office was to act as lawyer to the 
Monarch and not to represent the state or individual victims.408  As such, the criminal 
justice system was one of personal confrontation rather than state-initiated 
bureaucratic procedure.409 If someone believed they had been a victim of crime, it 
was left to that individual to conduct a prosecution.  
However, there were significant obstacles in pursuing private prosecutions in this 
manner, most notably the great expense of prosecution in terms of both the direct 
financial costs and subsequent loss of earnings. The state therefore needed to 
impose a system whereby citizens would either be persuaded or compelled to pursue 
their claims through the criminal courts. The Crown and the government provided 
‘episodic reinforcement’ of criminal prosecutions in the early-eighteenth century.410 
As well as alleviating the financial burden upon prosecutors, the state also provided 
a range of rewards and incentives to encourage the use of the criminal courts.411 For 
                                                          
404 For further details and a comprehensive history of the police see J.M Beattie, Policing and 
Punishment in London, 1660-1750: Urban Crime and the Limits of Terror (Oxford University Press, 
2001); King, The Historical Journal; Gregory J Durston, Burglars and Bobbies: Crime and Policing 
in Victorian London (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012) 
405 The exception was the Bow Street Runners which shall be returned to in Chapter 7. 
406 Douglas Hay and Francis Snyder, ‘Using the Criminal Law, 1750-1850. Policing, Private 
Prosecution, and the State’ in D. Hay and F. Snyder (eds), Policing and Prosecution in Britain 
1750-1850, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989 p.37 
407 The significance of the Attorney-General in the prosecution of complex fraud cases certainly 
altered during the nineteenth century. For further discussion of the Attorney-General in the 
nineteenth century see in particular: Taylor, Boardroom Scandal; James Taylor, Historical 
Research and Taylor, English Historical Review. 
408 For an in-depth discussion on the role of the Attorney-General see Guy Lurie, The Attorney-
General in Eighteenth-Century England. J. JURIS 125 (2013) 
409 King The Historical Journal, p.25 
410 Langbein, ‘Origins’ p.120 
411 Norma Landau, Law & History Review (1999) p.507 
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example, the Reward System was introduced in 1692412, which awarded up to £40 
for successfully prosecuting a felony. 
The state also utilised a series of measures to coerce such enforcement. All courts 
had the right to bind over prosecutors through recognizances in cases of serious 
felony. This was to ensure that, once instigated, they continued with the prosecution 
and did not either come to an out of court settlement or discontinue the case once 
they realised the cost implications.413 
Magistrates in particular were bound by statute to prevent the compounding of 
felonies, whereby a felony was disposed of through methods other than the assize 
courts.414 In Chapters 7, it will become apparent that London Magistrates, in 
particular Middlesex Magistrates, did not abide by such laws and in fact, were eager 
to use methods of alternative dispute resolution to dispose of many cases, often 
felonies, which came before their benches.  
People had a number of choices when believing themselves to have been a victim of 
crime. These included putting into motion the wheels of the criminal justice system, 
using informal community sanctions, or not reporting the matter at all.415 Within 
these broad headings of response, there were a number of more specific choices 
available. Informal community sanctions will not be considered in depth here416, but 
the decisions made available by the criminal justice system deserve greater 
consideration as it is through the analysis of these that insights can be achieved 
regarding the practical and theoretical workings of the criminal justice system.  
The Intersection between the Criminal and Civil Law 
Before exploring some of the motivations of complainants in favouring the criminal 
justice system over the civil, or vice versa, some context is required to explain the 
                                                          
412 4 & 5 Wil & Mar c.8 s.2 
413 Landau, Law & History Review (1999) p.507 
414 2&3 Phil. & Mar., c.10 (1555) 
415 King The Historical Journal, p.27 and Shoemaker, Prosecution  
416 This thesis is primarily concerned with occasions when the criminal justice system was utilised 
rather than when it was bypassed.  
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interaction between the two systems. Civil law was primary in the eighteenth century 
legal system and the criminal law was barely an ‘appendage to civil jurisdiction’.417 
Although criminal cases tended to receive the majority of public attention, it was 
within the civil courts that most hearings and disputes were resolved. John Langbein 
has argued that during the eighteenth century, civil law was ‘trial avoiding’ whereas 
criminal justice was ‘trial–centered’.418 However, Langbein limited his consideration 
to the assize courts. As shall be returned to later in this chapter, Magistrates’ courts 
existed to filter out the majority of cases before they reached the superior courts.  
This distinction in the volume of business passing through the civil and the criminal 
courts would certainly resonate with the modern lawyer. The twenty-first century 
civil courts are increasingly concerned with dispute resolution419, whereas the 
criminal courts are used as a public forum in which to reiterate and demonstrate 
social morality through the public shaming and punishment of criminals420. However, 
in the eighteenth century, this distinction in purpose between the criminal and the 
civil courts was less clear.421  
Criminal courts were not the only means by which to pursue a grievance in the 
eighteenth century. There also existed a number of civil courts that may have 
appealed to those wishing to take legal action.422  Unlike today, the delineation 
between the criminal and the civil law was less strict in the eighteenth century, 
primarily due to the system of private prosecution. This modern distinction between 
the civil and the criminal is largely due to the introduction of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions in 1898, the establishment of the police as the sole investigators and 
                                                          
417 Langbein, ‘Origins’ p.7 
418 Ibid 
419 Lord Woolf, Access to Justice (1996) The full report can be found at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.dca.gov.uk/civil/final/contents.htm 
(accessed 13th July 2016) 
420 Further theoretical discussion of public punishment can be found in Michel Foucault, Discipline 
and Punish and Norrie, Crime, Reason and History  
421 An example of the interaction between the civil and the criminal law and the greater role of the 
civil law in incidences now considered criminal see Drew Gray ‘Settling their Differences: The 
Nature of Assault and its Prosecution in the City of London in the Late Eighteenth and Early 
Nineteenth Centuries’ in Katherine D. Watkins (ed) Assaulting the Past: Violence and Civilisation 
in Historical Context (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2007)  
422 Landau, Law & History Review (1999) p.533 
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then prosecutors of crime, and finally the establishment of the Crown Prosecution 
Service in 1986. Comparably though, the decision of whether or not to report a crime 
to the police still rests with victims of crime to this day. However, contemporary 
prosecutorial agencies such as the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) and Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) increasingly conduct 
investigations into the fraudulent misconduct of individuals and companies without 
being invited by any particular ‘victim’.423  
The fluidity between the eighteenth century civil and criminal courts extended to the 
bench. Due to the relative infrequency of assize court sittings, even in London, the 
majority of judges sitting on the bench at the Old Bailey spent most of their time 
hearing civil matters in the civil courts; courts that sat every working day (including 
Saturdays but not Sundays), and not merely for two weeks, eight times a year. These 
judges sitting at the Old Bailey were seconded from the three central civil courts: 
King’s Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer.424 As has been discussed in Chapter 3, 
this judicial overlap is particularly significant for the development of fraud offences 
which straddled both the civil and criminal law, as well as equity and the common 
law.  
In addition, the decline in general civil litigation425, partly due to the increase in 
expense, led many barristers practising in civil law to seek to subsidise their income 
through criminal briefs.426 This interrelationship between the civil and the criminal 
courts further supports the assertion that the criminal courts were really an 
appendage to the civil courts and consequently, any understanding of the eighteenth 
century criminal court as being separate from the civil is anachronistic.427 Rather, in 
                                                          
423 For powers relating to these agencies see: The Criminal Justice Act 1987 (in particular, section 2) 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, Financial Services Act 2012, Enterprise Act 2002, 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 
424 Langbein, ‘Origins’ p.7 
425 W.A Champion, Recourse to the Law and the Meaning of the Great Litigation Decline, 1650-1750: 
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ed Christopher W Brooks and Michael Lobban (The Hambleton Press, 1997) 179 
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understanding the criminal courts, it is essential to give due consideration to the 
doctrines and practises of the civil system.  
With regard to fraud in particular, this intersection between criminal and civil 
doctrines is acute and cannot practicably be separated. A complete exploration of 
the civil courts is not possible in this thesis as it would require a detailed analysis of 
the various courts and the types of action pursued in each, whether that be the King’s 
Bench, Chancery or another venue, often depending on the nature of the action and 
the remedies sought.428 However, for current purposes it is enough to appreciate 
that there was often an option for complainants to seek redress for an alleged fraud 
through civil, as well as criminal channels.  
Factors Contributing to Choosing Between the Civil and the Criminal Courts 
It is impossible to definitively determine why complainants chose to use the civil or 
the criminal courts. This is partly because this would not have been questioned at the 
time they made their complaint. Perhaps in some circumstances the courts may have 
questioned why the prosecutor had chosen the civil courts over the criminal, but such 
motivation would only rarely be of importance to the grievance, such as when the 
motives of the prosecutor were called into question by the accused.429 Sadly, very 
few records remain of the preliminary stages of the complaints.430 There are a small 
number of justices’ notebooks such as those of Dudley Ryder431, but such records are 
few in number.432 This does not prevent speculation as to why certain courses of 
action were more or less likely to appeal to prosecutors and pulling together a range 
of evidence can provide insights into this decision-making.  
The focus of this thesis is the 469 fraud cases that appeared at the Old Bailey and it 
must be questioned why the prosecutors of these frauds chose to pursue their claims 
in the most serious criminal court available to them. Why did these prosecutors 
                                                          
428 Lobban, Law Quarterly Review p.292 and Mark Freeman et al, Business History, p.637 
429 Hay ‘Policing and Prosecution’ p.348 
430 King The Historical Journal, p.27 
431 See James Oldham’s forthcoming transcriptions.  
432 For further discussion see Chapter 7 
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choose the criminal justice system? And why did they choose the most senior 
criminal court available to them? The factors which most likely played a role in this 
decision making were the cost of any legal action, the procedural characteristics and 
difficulties of each court, the remedies available for each court, and the increased 
publicity such action would bring. 
The Cost of Legal Action 
From the seventeenth century onward, legal costs increased, both in civil and 
criminal courts.433 In London’s superior courts, costs of actions doubled between 
1680 and 1750.434 Civil litigation became more expensive overall during the 
seventeenth century, but this was predominately because of taxes imposed by the 
government and increasing counsel fees.435 This was for a number of reasons 
including that some courts began to demand numerous copies of documents to be 
filed and additional government stamp duties were imposed upon some forms of 
litigation.436 Such expense is likely in some instances to have pushed the civil litigant 
into the criminal courts.  
Criminal prosecutions were also expensive. Every stage of the process needed to be 
paid for separately, this included paying several officers of the court individually and 
at different rates depending upon the required task. Costs also varied depending 
upon the venue and the number of clerks involved, regardless of which court was 
chosen. When seeking to prosecute an alleged crime, the would-be prosecutor was 
faced with a complex myriad of options regarding both venue and form of complaint. 
The most common route into the criminal justice system was via the summary courts. 
The prosecutor would attend at a sessions of the local magistrate and request that 
an indictment be drawn up by the clerk of indictment. Prosecutors could also have 
initiated proceedings at higher criminal justice courts, directly at either the quarter 
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or assize sessions.437 The prosecutor could then have proceeded to indictment or 
could opt to proceed via a recognizance.438  
Summary court records from the City of London at the turn of the nineteenth century 
reveal some of the more common costs incurred by the would-be prosecutor in the 
lower courts. These costs varied depending upon the action pursued. The complexity 
and variation of the pricing of court officials continued with regards to the form of 
offence being pursued. An indictment for a common law felony cost two shillings, 
whereas an indictment for felony laid down by statute cost three shillings and four 
pence.439 When pursuing multiple indictments, there was an additional charge of 
four pence and a shilling had to be paid for every affidavit sworn.440 Additional costs 
could be incurred should the prosecutor not know the whereabouts of the 
transgressor, or if the accused refused to attend the sessions. The prosecutor would 
need a warrant issued by the Bench (which was very common), and the issuing of the 
warrant itself would cost four shillings and four pence.441 A warrant was of no use 
without someone to execute it, a duty that many left in the hands of a constable who 
would charge approximately five shillings for his trouble. Consequently, the very first 
stage of a prosecution, carried out in the least expensive method and without legal 
representation could cost the prosecutor almost a pound.442  
At the quarter sessions, indictments were less frequently used because complainants 
would often resort to having the accused bound over with a recognizance rather than 
proceeding to a full prosecution.443 This was largely due to the expense; 
                                                          
437 Shoemaker, Prosecution, p.23 
438 For a comprehensive exploration of the use of recognizance, see Shoemaker, Prosecution  
439 Tables of fees for Clerk of the Peace of the City of London and for other jurisdictions at the 
London Metropolitan Archive reference CLA/047/LC/02/001 
440 Ibid 
441 Papers re case against William Gorden and Thomas Drewry  at the London Metropolitan Archive 
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an average of eight or nine shillings per week on food. For more details on cost of living see M 
Dorothy George, London Life in the Eighteenth Century (1965, Penguin Books) and Lorna 
Weatherill, Consumer Behaviour. For more details of average incomes see L.D Schwarz, London in 
the Age of Industrialisation: entrepreneurs, labour force, and living conditions, 1700-1850 
(Cambridge University Press, 1992) 
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recognizances were seen as a cheaper and simpler method to achieve the ends of 
complainants.444 Of course many still wished to see their accused formally convicted 
but often the recognizance was enough to either alter the accused’s behaviour, or to 
satisfy the complainant that some measure had been taken against the accused.445  
If the prosecutor chose to proceed via indictment at the quarter sessions rather than 
the assize, the clerk of the quarter session would also need to be paid in order to 
draft the indictment.446 Norma Landau estimates that a prosecution at the quarter 
sessions could be carried out for fifteen shillings, provided no legal representation or 
advice was required.447 If a solicitor was hired (it was unusual for barristers to be 
required in the quarter sessions), the cost of a prosecution could rise to £2.448  
Legal professionals greatly increased the cost of prosecution, whether they were 
attorneys, solicitors, or barristers. There is much discussion relating to the use of 
counsel in the Old Bailey until the mid-nineteenth century specifically in relation to 
fraud prosecutions, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.449 Counsel 
may not have been prevalent in the eighteenth and nineteenth century courts, 
although solicitors were frequently employed at the preliminary stages of the 
criminal justice process in order to help navigate the procedure and idiosyncrasies of 
the court system.450  
In light of these contingencies, it is difficult to estimate the average cost of a 
prosecution in the eighteenth or nineteenth century. However, we know that the 
higher the court, the more expensive the prosecution. A complaint to the summary 
court would be cheaper than applying for an indictment directly at the quarter 
sessions or assize courts. However, if this complaint related to a felony, there was a 
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strong possibility that the prosecutor would find themselves liable for the assize 
court costs at a later date. The more complex or serious a matter pursued by the 
prosecutor, the more expensive the process would become.  
Having examined the pecuniary implications of using the civil rather than the 
criminal, and the lower or higher courts, the question remains whether such 
considerations impacted upon the 469 prosecutors of fraud under consideration. The 
increases to costs, such as the instruction of counsel by fraud prosecutors, will be 
considered in depth in Chapter 6. However, what is apparent is that prosecutors by 
and large chose to use the most expensive route through which to pursue their 
grievances. As will be shown in Chapter 5, the majority of fraud offences heard at the 
Old Bailey were misdemeanours and so, prosecutors could equally have pursued 
these cases at summary or quarter sessions level.  
In order to gain a better understanding of the economic motivations of prosecutors, 
it is necessary to know the value of the goods lost which form the subject of the 
fraud. Of the 469 indictments that form the focus of this study, the value of the goods 
or monies obtained are vary widely. Fortunately, there are details of the goods 
obtained by fraud for all fraud indictments heard at the Old Bailey during this period. 
The table below reveals that the majority of fraud cases related to goods worth less 
than 500d (or just over £2).  
Table 4.1: The Value of Goods Obtained by Fraud Indictments 
 Frequency Percentage 
Less than 500d 318 67.8 
500-1000d 34 7.2 
Over 1000d 117 24.9 
Total 469 100.0 
Whilst nearly sixty-eight per cent of cases concerned incidences where the obtained 
goods valued less than £2, there were many cases in which the goods were worth 
even less. In 1785, Thomas Field was charged with fraudulently passing off a financial 
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instrument, the value of which was a mere two shillings.451 It is notable that someone 
spent considerably more money on a prosecution than the value of the goods lost.  
The mere fact that such cases appear at the Old Bailey demands attention. As shall 
be explored below, these prosecutions were mostly in relation to misdemeanours 
and, as a result, there was no financial reward or gain for a successful conviction. 
Moreover, it has been demonstrated that criminal trials were expensive, and the 
burden of paying for these prosecutions was squarely on the shoulders of the 
prosecutor of a misdemeanour. It may be concluded that even where high-value 
goods were obtained, the use of the criminal law to address this loss of property was 
not cost-effective and was essentially an unprofitable undertaking in purely 
monetary terms. Given that nearly sixty-eight per cent of fraud indictments at this 
time concerned relatively small amounts of money and low-value goods, the choice 
of using the highest criminal court appears even more extraordinary. 
Not only were over two thirds of prosecutors for fraud choosing to engage with a 
branch of the criminal justice system that would cost more than the goods lost, but 
they were not financially gaining by this choice.452 This again suggests that 
motivations for using the criminal justice system were driven by more than financial 
gain.  
Procedural Considerations 
As today, civil and criminal procedure differed in the eighteenth and early-nineteenth 
centuries. The main areas of divergence in procedure lay in the level of discretion 
attributed to the prosecutor or plaintiff, the level of complexity of pre-trial and trial 
procedure, and the options and role of the testimony of the prosecutor or the 
plaintiff. The extent of the discretion of the prosecutor after complaint differed 
depending upon whether the offence was one of misdemeanour or felony.  
                                                          
451 OBP, May 1785, trial of Thomas Field (t17850511-76) 
452 See below 
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Once a felony was reported by a complainant, the decisions regarding proceedings 
were limited. This was true at least according to the Marian statutes.453 In requiring 
prosecutors to be bound over by the magistrates to pursue any future prosecution, 
the Marian statute circumscribed the autonomy of the private prosecutor and limited 
the prosecutor’s discretion as to whether to prosecute.454 However, the complainant 
would not be subject to the restrictions of the Marian statutes if the complaint was 
initiated in one of the civil courts, entirely by-passing the criminal justice system.455 
The role of discretion is vital in understanding the eighteenth century legal system 
and will be considered in more detail in Chapter 6. However, it is apparent that 
prosecutions of offences such as obtaining goods by false pretences had more 
discretion than those prosecuting felonies. In such cases, prosecutors may have felt 
more confident using the higher criminal courts as they would have the discretion to 
cease proceedings without great sanction.  
The cost considerations of the civil courts were inextricably linked to procedural 
complexities and limitations. In the eighteenth century common law courts, there 
was a general feeling that the law operated well, but that procedures were becoming 
increasingly oppressive and complex, leading to delays in administering justice.456 By 
the nineteenth century, the complexity and perceived injustice of the chancery 
courts was publically acknowledged and ridiculed.457 It is little wonder that 
complainants who found their case straddling the criminal and civil system might 
choose to pursue their claim through criminal justice channels rather than being 
entangled in the web of civil court procedure.  
A further fundamental difference between criminal and civil trials was the role of the 
prosecutor. Civil litigants could not give evidence as they had an interest in the 
outcome of the trial and thus, were seen as open to perjuring themselves.458  
                                                          
453 Langbein, ‘Origins’ pp.41-43 
454 Ibid p.42 
455 For in-depth discussion of the Marian Statutes see Langbein, Origins; John H. Langbein, 
Prosecuting Crime in the Renaissance: England, Germany, and France (Harvard University Press, 
1974) 
456 Brooks, Lawyers p.48 
457 The best example can be found in Charles Dickens’ Bleak House (Wordsworth Editions, 1993) 
458 Langbein, ‘Origins’ p.38 
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Prosecutors in criminal cases however could give evidence and speak for themselves 
in open court.459 In criminal cases, the overarching victim was the Monarch, the Head 
of State. This went beyond the merely symbolic when it came to rules of procedure 
and evidence as this allowed the victim to be seen as a witness, not a litigant, and 
thus was not an interested party per se, meaning they could give evidence.460 This 
opportunity to publically speak about how they had been injured or had suffered at 
the hands of the accused may have contributed to the complainant’s use of the 
criminal courts. The prospect of being able to publically shame the accused may have 
enticed the complainant away from the civil system and accept the risks of criminal 
jury trial.  
Of course, in using the criminal courts, prosecutors also gave a voice to the 
defendant. In civil matters neither interested party could give direct evidence. It is 
for this reason that civil jury trial was less useful because the testimony of the parties 
was excluded.461 Regardless of the practical successes of the ‘accused-speaks trial’462, 
a vexatious prosecutor may not have risked exposure through giving direct voice to 
his victim.463  
Remedies 
A motivating factor for using any facet of the law would have been the anticipated 
outcome of the case. As today, the civil courts were limited in the remedies they 
could enforce and therefore greatly relied upon the use of damages. There were 
some equitable remedies available during this period, but these were restricted to 
the Chancery courts.464  
                                                          
459 Landau, Law & History Review (1999) p.534 
460 Langbein, ‘Origins’ p.38 
461 Ibid p.8 
462 Ibid p.38 
463 For further discussion regarding the vexatious prosecution see Hay ‘Policing and Prosecution’ 
464 For an overview of the Court of Chancery and equitable remedies see: P Tucker, ‘The Early History 
of the Court of Chancery: A Comparative Study’ English Historical Review, Sep 2000, Vol. 115 
Issue 463, p.791.  
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Should a case of fraudulent misrepresentation be litigated as a breach of warranty or 
contract, there were some additional considerations for the parties.465 The initial 
concern of the claimant and the court relates to the fourth doctrine of criminal fraud 
identified within this thesis. If the court believed the matter to be a clear breach of 
warranty then the accuser could only bring this matter in a civil court at the criminal 
branch of the justice system would be closed to them.466 Alongside the satisfying of 
this doctrine, the two most significant considerations for accusers of fraud were the 
extent of common law damages, and whether property was recoverable.467 As today, 
contract law in the eighteenth century held that bona fide purchasers for value 
without notice could not forfeit the transferred property due to a previous fraudulent 
conversion at an earlier stage in the life of the property.468 Thus, if the fraudster had 
sold the goods obtained by fraud to an entirely innocent third party, then the goods 
could not be recovered by the original owner. This was not the case for larceny, 
where the property could be recovered by the initial owner.469 The relationship 
between the two offences has been detailed in the proceeding chapter. 
Consequently, in cases of fraudulent misdemeanour, had the goods been sold to an 
innocent party there would be no way, either under criminal or civil law, to recover 
the fraudulently obtained property.  
Complainants may have resorted to the criminal justice system in order to recover 
their goods. Such motivation is closely linked with the earlier discussion considering 
costs of prosecution. It was possible for the goods obtained by felony to be recovered 
by the victim.470 However, this did not apply to goods that had been obtained 
through fraud and false pretences. The legislation allowing restitution of goods was 
passed in the time of Henry VIII and only applied to offences that were felonious. As 
                                                          
465 The jurisprudential use of common law contract law in relation to fraud cases has been explored 
in Chapter 3 
466 For more detailed discussion regarding the five doctrines of fraud see Chapter 3 
467 For a comprehensive authority on the development of contract law and damages recoverable in 
instances of contractual misrepresentation see: P.S Atiyah, Essays on Contract (Clarendon 
Paperbacks, 1990); Atiyah, Rise and Fall  
468 For an overview of contractual remedies and the disposal of property see: G H Treitel, Remedies 
for Breach of Contract: A Comparative Account (Oxford Scholarship Online, 1988)  
469 Giles, Criminal Law p.225 
470 21 Hen 8, c.11 
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false pretences were a misdemeanour, victims of most frauds could not reclaim their 
goods.471  
Had the properties obtained not been converted or title passed to an innocent third 
party, then properties could be recovered in the civil courts, whereas they could 
never be recovered in the criminal courts. However, criminal courts had many 
remedies and punishments available to them.472 The criminal remedy available 
depended upon the type of offence in question. The majority of trials heard, at any 
stage of the criminal process, were property offences, and in those cases, mostly 
larceny. With regard to property offences, Landau has argued that, certainly in the 
quarter sessions, the main aim of the court was to gain compensation for the victim 
and not to punish the accused.473 However, as stated above, compensation was not 
possible in cases of misdemeanour. Prosecutors may have been motivated by a 
number of economic, social, or personal consequences such as punishing the accused 
or publically declaring these crimes unacceptable.  
Prosecutors had some agency over the sentence meted out to the accused through 
their influence on the judge.474 Thus, if punishment was the remedy the complainant 
desired, they could strongly influence the decision of the court. Because the criminal 
justice system was both operated and utilised by private prosecutors, the functioning 
of the courts were greatly dictated by the desired ends of prosecutors.475 In theory, 
prosecutors did not only play the main role in deciding whether to prosecute, their 
role continued well beyond the trial and into sentencing. Should the accused have 
confessed to the crime, prosecutors would be consulted by the court when 
determining sentence.476 When the accused did not plead guilty, the court could still 
consult the prosecutor after the jury convicted in order to find a satisfactory outcome 
for the prosecutor.477 Of course, this was limited in capital offences, although the 
prosecutor continued to play an important role in any decisions of the judge or later, 
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in any appeals for mercy. This consultation of the complainant further supports 
Landau’s hypothesis that the courts’ overall objective was to satisfy the prosecutor. 
Landau’s research mainly focused upon assault offences, but the logic of the criminal 
courts being prosecutor-focused, particularly at summary level, is sound.  
Having identified the lack of financial gain for such prosecutions, a motivation for use 
of the criminal courts to prosecute fraud emerges; the prosecutor either sought to 
punish the accused478, to deter individuals from committing such crimes against them 
in the future, or to make a broader declaratory statement regarding intolerance of 
such crimes. As shall become apparent when exploring the prosecutors of fraud, a 
large number of complainants were shopkeepers or artisans.479 Such complainants 
may have felt particularly vulnerable to fraud and may have wished to publically 
prosecute fraudsters, not to deter that particular individual, but to declare an 
intention to prosecute all such criminals.480 This motivation will be further considered 
in Chapter 6, in which the tools and aids for prosecutions of fraud at the Old Bailey 
will be discussed.  
The Avoidance of Publicity 
Partly due to the Proceedings and the general public appetite for crime reporting, 
trials at the Old Bailey were more likely to be publicised than those heard within the 
civil courts. This publicity may have attracted some prosecutors, but deterred others. 
In many instances, prosecutors of fraud may have chosen not to engage with the 
criminal justice system at all. Writing off a loss may have been a common occurrence, 
particularly amongst those who were not frequently the subject of fraudulent 
activities. As detailed above, prosecutions were an expensive undertaking and if the 
value of the goods lost were low, then one small loss may have been written off. 
However, those who lost property or money regularly through frauds, were more 
inclined to use the criminal justice system in order to deter future frauds. Equally, 
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479 See Chapter 5 
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those who frequently lost small quantities of goods or monies may have been more 
inclined to accept a small proportion of loss.  
Publicity may have deterred complainants of fraud offences who felt themselves 
either partly to blame for their predicament, or who felt foolish for falling foul of a 
swindle or trick. In tracing the development of fraud-related laws preceding the 
eighteenth century481 we see the continuing significance of the doctrine that the law 
does not operate to protect a fool.482 Any prosecutor of fraud ran the risk of public 
disapprobation should it be felt that the complainant contributed to their loss 
through foolishness or gullibility.  There are a number of examples of complainants 
quite clearly trying to lessen their own blame or gullibility when making an accusation 
of fraud. For example, when Daniel Brestow prosecuted Thomas Scott for defrauding 
him in gambling, Brestow went to great lengths to stress that he had not been 
careless and whilst he had been drinking, he repeatedly stressed that he did not 
ordinarily drink.483 This is a common example of a complainant putting a narrative to 
the court in which he cannot be held responsible for falling victim to a fraud. The 
complainant in a fraud accusation, whether it is criminal or civil, would have to be 
careful to demonstrate that this fraud was not committed due to the fault of the 
victim. Of course, there are no records of prosecutors who decided not to proceed 
with a trial due to their being made a fool and consequently, not engaging with the 
criminal justice system.  
As will be explored in Chapter 5, certain types of complainant may have been 
particularly embarrassed by being the victim of a fraud. For example, in the case of 
John O’Conner and John Alsibrook, prosecuted in 1773 by Richard Ryder for a rather 
crude gambling fraud which was eventually pursued as a regulatory breach of 
gambling for more than 10 pounds.484 Ryder was described before the court as having 
been ‘…a little forward in liquor; that he called again at eight and saw the defendants; 
that he was worse than with respect to liquor, than he was before, for he was quite 
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fuddled…’. This state of drunkenness resulted in Ryder not being able to recall how 
much he lost to the accused and not being able to recall how he was defrauded, 
beyond that he thought one of the accused could see his cards. The proceedings fail 
to detail any judicial comment on the behaviour of Ryder, but it is perhaps telling that 
the judgment was respited.  
Randall McGowen has suggested that shopkeepers in particular may have been 
reluctant to report frauds committed against them due to the ‘emotional and 
economic issues peculiar to this crime’.485 Assumedly by ‘emotional and economic 
issues’, McGowen is referring to the embarrassment of having been defrauded486, 
and the undesirability of being publically named as a potential target for future 
frauds. This argument is not supported by the high number of tradespeople who 
prosecuted fraud offences in the Old Bailey. Moreover, it is not in keeping with the 
existence of prosecution associations such as the Society for the Protection of Trade 
against Swindlers and Sharpers487, which were dedicated to the prosecution of fraud 
committed against tradespeople. Such associations reflect a pro-active approach to 
tackling and deterring fraud by shopkeepers. Whilst it was true that prosecutors 
needed to be careful not to look foolish in succumbing to a fraud, there is no 
suggestion from contemporary sources that shopkeepers were criticised for falling 
foul of the swindler.488 As shall be further explored in Chapter 5, a number of 
tradespeople were eager to prosecute frauds.  
Alternative Dispute Resolution 
What of those who felt they were victims of fraud but chose to resolve their disputes 
outside of the legal system? Victims had the option to not pursue a fraud at all, or 
they could seek satisfaction through the threat of prosecution alone. There could be 
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a number of reasons for this avoidance of the court system: resistance to engage with 
the tools of the state, a perception that desired ends could be achieved through less 
formal or community channels, a desire to avoid publicity, or to avoid additional 
prosecution costs. There are a number of examples within the Old Bailey of 
prosecutors declining to offer evidence at the final hour, indicating some resolution 
to the disagreement outside of the court system. Included are some examples of such 
practice being carried out with the contribution of counsel.489 For example, the case 
against William Hodge in 1813 was discontinued as soon as it reached the Old Bailey, 
even though counsel had been instructed: ‘Mr. Alley, counsel for the plaintiff, 
declining to offer any evidence, the defendant was acquitted’490 
In most instances, the courts, both civil and criminal, existed in order to resolve 
disputes between citizens. This resolution was most likely to take the form of some 
compensation or reparation, or the promise to cease the offending behaviour.491 This 
is not the forum to discuss community-based methods of dispute resolution492 , but 
an understanding of the use of the court system cannot be complete without some 
consideration of alternative, unintended uses of the court system.  
The threat of criminal prosecution could often be enough to persuade the 
transgressor from repeating their crime and even to return the fraudulently obtained 
goods. Whilst it is impossible to gauge the extent of such a practice, it was assumed, 
by both modern academics and contemporaries, that the court system could be used 
by complainants to pressure others into paying debts.493 This was not necessarily an 
underhanded motive, but was intended to recover goods or enforce a debt, ideally 
without paying the full costs for prosecution or litigation. Such out-of-court 
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settlement might be welcomed in the post-Woolf English legal system494, but in the 
eighteenth century, arbitration was generally not encouraged for felony.495 It was 
however encouraged for misdemeanour and consequently, the majority of the 469 
cases heard at the Old Bailey could have been resolved outside of the formal criminal 
sanction. Given the misdemeanour status of most fraud offences, we are again faced 
with the question of why 469 prosecutors chose to pursue their claims, at least to 
the point of beginning the trial process, within the assize court. Such prosecutors had 
less expensive and time-consuming litigation options available to them, and yet 
hundreds chose to engage with an expensive and ostensibly thankless court.  
Fraud within the Summary and Quarter Sessions Courts 
As explained above, when considering litigation options in fraud cases, it is 
imperative to consider both the civil and the criminal courts. By contextualising the 
choices available to prosecutors, this now allows for deeper consideration of why 
fraud was pursued in the criminal justice system, and more specifically, where fraud 
was pursued in the criminal justice system. Where prosecutors chose to pursue an 
accusation of fraud through the criminal courts, where did they first report their 
grievance, what types of fraud accusations appeared at these courts, and how did 
these courts dispose of these complaints?  
The answering of these questions is problematic. As explored in Chapter 2, there are 
significant methodological hurdles to be jumped when trying to use summary court 
records from this period. The summary courts were courts of no record and thus, any 
records which did exist did so at the discretion of the clerk. Moreover, a series of fires 
and lost records has resulted in no equivalent summary records for both Middlesex 
and the City. This largely prevents any comparative analysis between the two. 
However, the Minute Books for both the Mansion House and the Guildhall of the City 
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of London have been sampled in order to ascertain the frequency with which fraud 
complaints were made.  
As explained in Chapter 7, Greg Smith has transcribed a number of the Guildhall 
Minute Books, and a small number of the Lord Mayor’s Waiting Books.496 Both of 
these records were held in approximately a month per book, surviving from May 
1752 to 1796. These records are not complete and only approximately fifty-five 
books remain, of which the first surviving fifteen Smith has transcribed.497 These 
books run from 1751 to 1781. In assessing the frequency and disposal of fraud-
related cases within the Guildhall, a further six Minute Books498 have been assessed 
along with ten Mansion House Minute Books.499 In total, twenty one Guildhall Minute 
Books have been analysed, along with ten Mansion House Minute Books.  
In analysing these summary court records the frequency of fraud reporting at the 
magistrates’ court and what types of fraud were most commonly heard can be 
ascertained. Because no such equivalent records remain for the Middlesex and 
Westminster petty sessions, the City records will have to form the basis of the 
analysis. This is not to conclude that the Middlesex records would be similar to the 
City, as this thesis repeatedly demonstrates the discrepancies in the treatment of 
fraud between the two jurisdictions.500  
Frequency of Complaints 
These Minute Books reveal that between one and four complaints regarding fraud 
appear in the Minute Books per month. Sadly the records are very difficult to trace 
from one month to the next and so it is rarely possible to trace outcomes of these 
initial hearings unless they eventually reached the Old Bailey.501 It is possible that the 
Minute Books hold only a fraction of the hearings held at the Magistrates’ offices. 
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More significantly, it cannot be said that because a case does not appear in the 
Minute Books that it was not heard at that particular court. These records do reflect 
however that fraud complaints were definitely being heard in the summary courts; 
in low frequencies, but certainly regularly. The next question is whether the forms of 
fraud being heard were of the same quality and characteristics of the forms of fraud 
heard at the Old Bailey.  
Types of Complaints 
As with other court records, these summary records persistently refer to ‘a fraud’ so 
often it is not possible to ascertain the exact nature of the offence.502 However, 
extrapolating from the information available, it is apparent that the majority of fraud 
accusations heard at in the summary courts were for obtaining goods by false 
pretences.503 Accusations included the obtaining of geese or horses through false 
pretences and accusations of fraudulently obtaining goods from tradespeople.504 As 
shall be demonstrated in Chapter 5, these types of fraud mirror exactly the forms of 
fraud heard within the Old Bailey.  
The eighteenth century magistrates heard a large number of regulatory cases, both 
civil and criminal in nature. Magistrates’ offices heard a variety of disputes, the most 
common of which related to payment of debts, returning of borrowed items, and 
defrauding at cards.505 The Magistrates’ courts were an ideal setting within which to 
begin or resolve disputes relating to fraud offences that sat between the civil and the 
criminal.506 There are a number of examples of contractual and commercial disputes 
being addressed through fraud informations at the Guildhall. The Alderman 
appeared willing to adjudicate on these matters as if they had full jurisdiction in the 
civil courts. In May 1752, William Sparry accused John Knight of fraudulently 
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obtaining monies but the court found both parties had cheated each other and 
recommended they deal with their disagreements outside of the courts.507  
Fraud Disposed of within the Summary Courts 
Table 4.2: Disposal of Fraud Accusation in the City of London Summary Courts 
Disposal Frequency Percentage 
Dismissed 17 41.46 
Adjourned508 8 19.51 
Committed to 
Prison509 
4 9.76 
Upholding of 
contract510 
2 4.88 
Warrant Issued511 2 4.88 
Committed to 
Newgate512 
1 2.44 
Referred to 
Middlesex513 
1 2.44 
Unknown 6 14.63 
Total 41 100.00 
 
Overwhelmingly the most common form of disposal of fraud at the summary courts 
is dismissal. Comparative data does not exist regarding other offences and the rate 
of dismissal by Magistrates. However, as the summary courts were designed to act 
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as a filter for the wider criminal justice system, siphoning cases away from the more 
senior courts, it is perhaps unsurprising that a large number of complaints should be 
dismissed. Such a high rate of dismissal is unsurprising for fraud complaints given the 
confusion and osmosis between the criminal and civil law. Magistrates may have 
directed contractual disputes out of the summary courts and into the civil courts. 
However, there are examples of City Magistrates adjudicating on contractual 
disputes. 
In 1780, Timothy Green brought Mary Somers before Alderman Sainsbury on a 
charge of ‘defrauding’. The alderman found Green and Somers to have a contractual 
dispute and took it upon himself to find for Mary Somers, ordering Green to fulfil his 
side of the bargain.514 Such clear examples are found under the categorisation of 
‘upholding a contract’, although this is only allowed for due to the uncommon detail 
of the records in that instance. Given this potential interconnection between the 
criminal and civil law, this would explain why summary justices were likely to avoid 
using the criminal system to settle such disputes. 
The next stages, and ultimate outcomes of cases that were adjourned or where the 
accused was committed to prison, sadly cannot be traced due to the paucity of the 
records. However, it is clear that none of these cases, specifically for fraudulent 
offences, were heard at the Old Bailey. In fact, analysis of the Minute Books would 
suggest that records of those cases committed to the Old Bailey were not detailed in 
the Minute Books, but were recorded elsewhere, such as in gaol delivery records and 
calendars. This would explain why very few of the 469 indictments for fraud heard at 
the Old Bailey during this period appear in any of the summary court records. This 
certainly does not mean that cases did not originate in the summary courts, only that 
records of these have not been kept.  
As well as the most common misdemeanours of fraud, summary court records also 
included instance of fraudulent felony in the form of fraudulent obtaining of naval 
prize money. For example, the Mansion House formed the venue for a small number 
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of prize money cases such as the accusation by Thomas Broughton against Robert 
Potts and John Dickenson for the fraudulent obtaining of prize money relating to the 
vessel, The London.515 Interestingly, when the case was brought before the justices 
the next day, the information was reduced to merely a common cheat.516 This change 
of tact by the prosecutors, from capital felony to misdemeanour, suggests that either 
the prosecutors realised the potential consequences of their initial charge and 
changed their mind or, the Magistrate suggested a lesser charge. This is an 
extraordinary example as it suggests that justices were either encouraging, or 
allowing for, the compounding of felonies. Also, that this was permitted with regard 
to an offence that was treated so harshly by the criminal justice system, such as the 
fraudulent obtaining of prize monies.  
The Minute Books reflect that the types of fraud being heard within the summary 
courts are very similar to the cases heard at the Old Bailey. The most common form 
of fraud was by false pretences or a breach of contract with occasional appearances 
of frauds against the navy. However, it is significant that so many contractual 
disputes appear at the summary courts, but not at the Old Bailey. This reflects how 
the Magistrates were seen as an initial venue to report a grievance, specifically in 
relation to all manner of social and economic disputes. The Old Bailey however 
played a different role as a more senior and obviously criminal court. 
There is no clear evidence that the cases disposed of at the Petty Sessions were of a 
significantly less serious nature than those reaching the Old Bailey. In light of this, it 
is necessary to look at the number and nature of fraud offences heard at the next 
most serious venue, the quarter sessions.  
Quarter Sessions 
Quantitative research of quarter sessions court records is hampered by the fact that 
often the offence, the parish of residence and the occupation of the defendant were 
                                                          
515Guildhall Justice Room – Minute Books at the London Metropolitan Archive reference 
CLA/004/02/002 6th November 1784 
516 Ibid, 7th November 1784 
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all unreliable.517 More significantly, like the summary courts, the quarter sessions 
records have not been digitised and so any research, including that conducted for 
this thesis, requires sampling of the records rather than any holistic analysis. Unlike 
the summary courts however, the quarter sessions records were at least recorded 
with some pro forma. The Sessions rolls are very large and detailed bundles of 
documents making research far more cumbersome and time constraining. However, 
samples of the quarter sessions records have been taken from Westminster and 
Middlesex, and the City. These samples cover one month per five years and provide 
a snapshot of the business heard at the quarter sessions. To give scale to the number 
of fraud cases appearing at the sessions, the number of recognizances heard that 
session is also given.  
Table 4.3: Sample of Quarter Sessions Recognizances in Middlesex and 
Westminster, 1760-1820. 
Jurisdiction Date Total number of 
recognizances 
Recognizances 
for Fraud 
Westminster January 1760 266 4 
Middlesex Sep 1765 540 2 
Middlesex May 1770 298 2 
Middlesex July 1775 127 3 
Westminster January 1777 340 4 
Middlesex January 1780 218 0 
Middlesex February 1785 26 0 
Middlesex October 1790 682 5 
Middlesex September 1795 278 1 
Middlesex July 1800 178 4 
Middlesex January 1805 208 4 
Westminster April 1810 177 6 
Middlesex February 1815 293 4 
                                                          
517 Shoemaker Archives, p.145 
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Table 4.4: Sample of Quarter Sessions Recognizances in the City of London, 1760-
1820.  
Jurisdiction Date Total number of 
recognizances 
Recognizances 
for Fraud 
The City July 1760 113 5 
The City February 1765 73 6 
The City October 1770 40 0 
The City January 1775 40 0 
The City April 1780 49 0 
The City December 1785 59 3 
The City January 1790 51 0 
The City October 1795 48 0 
The City February 1800 82 0 
The City May 1805 38 0 
The City September 1810 52 1 
The City June 1815 40 2 
The City June 1820 45 2 
Comparing the rates of fraud complaints at the quarter sessions with those of the 
summary court, it is apparent how strikingly fewer instances of fraud were heard at 
the middle-ranking court. Of the limited number of fraud accusations heard at the 
quarter sessions, the majority of them were for obtaining goods by false pretences 
and general accusations of ‘cheats’. Offences such as those heard within the 
Middlesex Sessions, including Edward Gillan, who was accused of carrying out a 
fraudulent lottery.518 Strikingly there are two examples of prosecutions for obtaining 
prize money through fraud, one in 1765 and one in 1785. Given the severity of the 
crime it is surprising that it should be ultimately disposed of at the quarter sessions 
and even more surprising that in both instances the quarter sessions went beyond 
the usual remit and hanged both accused.  
                                                          
518 MJ/SP/1774/12/005 
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Evidently the quarter sessions were not an attractive venue for prosecutors who 
brought cases directly at such a level, and nor was it attractive to magistrates who 
referred cases up to the quarter sessions in other instances. From the gaol delivery 
records, it is apparent that fraud cases were entering the criminal justice system 
through the summary courts, although they were immediately being sent to the Old 
Bailey. As these cases were largely misdemeanours they could have been sent to any 
level of the criminal court system, but would have been expected to be disposed of 
at summary or quarter sessions level in the case of more serious misdemeanours.  
Conclusion 
Having explored the options available for those subject to a fraud, it is surprising that 
any fraud beyond the felonious obtaining of naval prize monies should appear at the 
Old Bailey. As misdemeanours, these matters could have been addressed in the 
lower courts, even at the summary level. As a collection of offences which were not 
subject to the same financial support as felonies, most frauds would have personally 
cost the prosecutor a great deal of money. Moreover, with no option of a reward or 
recovering the goods obtained, using the criminal courts in matters of fraud would 
have resulted only in more financial loss for the prosecutor. However, having 
sampled and searched the lower criminal court records for complaints of fraud, there 
is little suggestion that the majority of fraud complaints were being disposed of at 
the lower levels. There are a small number of fraud complaints at the Magistrates’ 
courts, but a large proportion of these were dismissed and none identified reached 
the Old Bailey. As posited above, it is apparent that cases that were committed to 
the Old Bailey were recorded elsewhere, such as in the gaol delivery records. 
Certainly those committed to Newgate to await trial were recorded in the prison 
calendars, rather than the Minute Books. These Calendars and their recording of 
fraud offences will be discussed in Chapter 7. However, where fraud was being 
addressed in the criminal system, few fraud accusations were being disposed of in 
the lower and middle courts, but rather, a large number were to be found in the 
assize court.  
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What is also apparent from the analysis thus far is that there is little evidence of 
immediate economic motivation for the prosecution of fraud at the Old Bailey. Those 
prosecuting fraud could not recover their goods or receive any financial support or 
reward for the prosecution itself. Consequently, there must have been other 
motivations for the 469 indictments of fraud appearing at the Old Bailey during this 
time. In order to explore further what these motivations may be, it is now necessary 
to identify what types of fraud were appearing at the Old Bailey and, perhaps more 
importantly, who was bringing these prosecutions.  
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Chapter 5 Fraud in Practice and the People Who Prosecuted 
Those who use the law, shape the law. To understand English law, it is imperative to 
understand the parties who are utilising this law. As Hay and Snyder assert, until the 
law is ‘animated through the act of prosecution, or the plausible threat of it, its 
existence as a text is of little consequence, even as symbol’.519 Following on from 
Chapter 4, during the eighteenth and most of the nineteenth century, the criminal 
justice system was not self-activating. If the criminal law was to be utilised, it had to 
be done so by a prosecutor. 
This chapter will explore who was prosecuting fraud in the assize courts at this time. 
In particular, the occupations of these prosecutors will be explored, revealing not 
only who was potentially being targeted by those committing fraud, but particularly 
those people who chose to address this fraud through the highest available court. 
The cases that reached the assize courts, particularly those in the Old Bailey, had a 
greater probability of changing the legal shape of fraud laws through alterations to 
the common law. Whilst the courts that form the basis of this study did not create 
legal precedent, superior courts can only hear legal matters once they have been 
heard in lower courts. It is these courts of no record that refer matters of legal, 
factual, or procedural importance, and no such question can be decided without first 
being brought into the lower courts. Therefore, the people bringing cases into the 
justice system were more likely to shape the legal system overall, and this was 
especially so in cases of fraud. 
Establishing the occupations and backgrounds of prosecutors using the criminal 
justice system is significant because it provides an insight into whose interests were 
being furthered and, in effect, which groups the justice system served. More 
specifically in relation to fraud, information relating to the prosecutor also reveals 
something about the types of people who would fall victim to frauds, or would take 
the most serious action available to enforce the laws of fraud against others. It has 
                                                          
519 Douglas Hay and Francis Snyder, ‘Using the Criminal Law, 1750-1850’ in Policing and Prosecution, 
p.3 
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been suggested by a number of crime historians that due to the costs involved in 
bringing actions at the assize courts, the majority of plaintiffs at the Old Bailey were 
middle-class.520 A finding from the ESRC funded project, London Lives, claimed that 
between seventeen and twenty percent of litigants at the Old Bailey were of the 
labouring poor or were servants.521 Instead, it has been claimed that poorer litigants 
used the summary courts522 and the assize courts were reserved for wealthier 
prosecutors. 
As well as revealing the occupations of those bringing fraud prosecution to the Old 
Bailey, this chapter will also demonstrate how public bodies or representatives of 
such bodies were bringing fraud prosecutions at this time. These findings will 
challenge existing research on the beginnings of public prosecution523 and will 
additionally contextualise how fraud galvanised many state-connected agencies to 
undertake prosecutions.  This chapter will then problematize the individuals who 
brought and led prosecutions of fraud. This will be achieved by questioning the 
assumption that complainants of crime were the people who actually brought these 
prosecutions. Rather, the 469 indictments will be scrutinised to ascertain whether 
the person at the centre of the prosecution, bringing the accusation and providing 
the most relevant prosecutorial evidence, is the same person who has suffered from 
the fraud itself. In asking this question, insight will be given into the mechanics of 
prosecution and the relationship between those affected by the fraud and the actor 
bringing the prosecution, thereby forming the heart of the prosecution.  
Lastly, this chapter will seek to further answer two fundamental questions at the 
heart of this thesis: what was fraud? And who prosecuted fraud? This will be achieved 
through the analysis of a series of categorisations and typologies of fraud applied to 
                                                          
520See in particular http://www.londonlives.org/static/ProsecutorsLitigants.jsp 
521 http://www.londonlives.org/static/ProsecutorsLitigants.jsp (assessed 13th February 2016) 
522 Peter King ‘The Summary Courts and Social Relations in Eighteenth-Century England’ Past & 
Present no.183 (May, 2004) pp.125-172, p.145 
523 See in particular Randall McGowen, ‘The Bank of England and the Policing of Forgery, 1797-1821’ 
Past & Present, No.186; Randall McGowen ‘Managing the Gallows: the Bank of England and the 
Death Penalty, 1797-1821’ Law and History Review, Vol.25, No.2 (Summer, 2007) pp.241-282 
(Feb, 2005) pp.81-116; Randall McGowen ‘From Pillory to Gallows: the Punishment of Forgery in 
the Age of the Financial Revolution’ Past & Present no.165 (Nov.1999) pp.107-140 
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the 469 indictments that form the basis of this study. By exploring the circumstances 
under which fraud offences were carried out, not only can some conclusions 
regarding the types of people committing fraud be identified, but also it can be seen 
how the doctrines of fraud, as categorised in this thesis, translated into fraud in the 
courts. In particular, examples of the artful device used to commit fraud can be 
demonstrated and discussion around public harm, as well as the relationship 
between criminal and contract law can be explored.  
The Occupations of Fraud Prosecutors at the Old Bailey 
The occupation of prosecutors appearing before the Old Bailey provides an insight 
into who was using the assize courts and the criminal law. They also provide a better 
understanding of the significance of the criminal justice system in both the day-to-
day lives of people, as well as the significance of the criminal law as a forum within 
which to manage disputes. The occupation of those using the criminal courts reveals 
which social groups felt most comfortable using the system to pursue their own 
interests. If a broad spectrum of society using the most serious courts to enforce their 
rights, does this reflect a system both for and of the whole of society? If all social 
strata were utilising the courts proportionally, does this demonstrate the legitimacy 
of the criminal justice system?524 Just as the types of fraud found at the Old Bailey 
reflect the users and agendas of the criminal justice system, so too do the 
occupations of the prosecutors.  
This chapter will answer these questions simultaneously. Rather than focusing solely 
upon the occupation of the prosecutor in isolation, this chapter will also consider the 
nature of the offence they prosecuted and the circumstances within which the 
offence was committed. This will be achieved through the imposition of a series of 
typologies applied to the 469 indictments of fraud heard at the Old Bailey in this 
period.  
                                                          
524 Douglas Hay ‘Prosecution and Power’ in Policing and Prosecution, p.389 
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As stated at the beginning of this chapter, those who use the law, shape the law. If 
we know which social groups were most frequently using the courts to prosecute 
fraud, we can make some conclusions regarding why the laws surrounding fraud 
changed in the way they did. There is much contention within twentieth century 
literature regarding who was using the criminal justice system and what this means 
in relation to the public perception of the criminal courts525, particularly in relation 
to  the legitimacy of the criminal justice system. Douglas Hay and Peter Linebaugh, 
have contended that the criminal justice system operated in such a way as to 
promote the interests of the social elite through the protection of property rights.526 
John Langbein has strongly criticised these Marxist theories527, claiming that the 
influence of so many non-elites in the criminal justice system, including the petty 
jury, makes such an ‘elite conspiracy’ utterly impossible.528 However, by establishing 
that certain social and economic groups were using the assize courts to shape the 
offence of fraud, additional evidence emerges supporting the argument that the 
criminal justice system was indeed the tool of certain groups of society rather than 
others. Consequently, the purpose of identifying the occupations of persons bringing 
fraud prosecutions within the Old Bailey is to explore and problematize which social 
groups were using the criminal justice system to further protect both their property, 
and their commercial businesses. This is not what Langbein has criticised in others as 
a clumsy attempt to understand legal history though a straight-jacket of Marxist 
theory which requires ‘class warriors…[to]…wear rose-coloured glasses of the 
deepest hue’529 Rather, in identifying the prosecutors of fraud, this thesis will further 
support Hay’s argument that the criminal justice system as a whole clearly supported 
some forms of complaint more than others, namely, offences which threatened 
property and commercial interests.  
                                                          
525 This will be discussed further in this chapter.   
526 See all contributions within Eds Douglas Hay, Peter Linebaugh. Albion’s Fatal Tree, Crime and 
Society in Eighteenth Century England. (Allen Lane, 1975) This explanation is also taken up by 
Alan Norrie in Crime, Reason and History  
527 Although Douglas Hay has argued that he is not, in fact, a Marxist. 
528 John Langbein ‘Albion’s Fatal Flaws’ Past & Present no.98 (Feb, 1983) pp.96-120. P.107 
529 Ibid p.101 
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This thesis is not directly invoking class for reasons which shall be returned to but 
which are best encapsulated by E.P. Thompson: 
Sociologists who have stopped the time-machine and, with a good deal or 
conceptual huffing and puffing, have gone down to the engine room to look, 
tell us that nowhere at all have they been able to locate and classify a class. 
They can only find a multitude of people with different occupations, incomes, 
status-hierarchies, and the rest.530 
By identifying the occupations of people utilising the highest and most public court 
in the country to pursue fraud cases, a clearer picture will emerge of both how fraud 
laws were defined and enforced and by whom.  
The Categorisation of Prosecutors and their Occupations  
Before exploring the occupations of prosecutors of fraud, it is essential to first 
describe how these occupations have been categorised. Drew Gray provides a 
typology of prosecutors in his work on the City of London and the prosecutions 
brought at both petty and quarter sessions. Within this typology, the categories Gray 
imposes are: gentry/wealthier, merchants, masters/professionals, tradesmen and 
artisans, poverty vulnerable trades, other, city officials, and not known.531 Gray’s 
findings illustrate that in the City’s lower courts, a third of prosecutors were 
tradesmen and artisans532, and compared with rural courts, more prosecutors in the 
City’s summary courts were of a higher social level.533 As with any categorisation 
process, Gray’s categories have some overlap and prosecutors may have fallen into 
two or more of these groupings.   
Peter King has also provided categorisations of prosecutors, although with slight 
differences to Gray. King identifies the prosecutors in his study to be: gentry, 
professionals, farmers, tradesmen and artisans, maritime, husbandmen, labourers, 
                                                          
530 Thompson, The Poverty of Theory, p.85 
531 Gray, Crime, Prosecution and Social Relations, p.30 
532 Ibid p.29 
533 Ibid p.30 
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and paupers.534 What is immediately apparent from these categorisations is that 
Gray’s focus was the City of London, and King’s, rural Essex. This explains why King 
has included a number of more traditional and rural occupations such as farmers and 
husbandmen, whereas Gray included merchants and city officials. Clearly, when 
categorising a determined group into occupations, one must consider the type of 
society from which these persons are drawn.  
By its very process, categorisation joins different types of individuals together under 
an overarching banner. This is of course unavoidable, if not essential, as otherwise 
individuals would be labelled by the specifics of their profession. Professions in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as today, were wide-ranging and diverse. A 
very limited sample of the professions arising in fraud trials at the Old Bailey include: 
cutlers, corn meters, drovers, distillers, poulterers, and glass strainers.535 Without 
some form of classification, disparate cases provide little comparative worth in 
discerning meaningful historical trends within the court records. The purpose of 
categorising these professions is to allow for some conclusions regarding the types 
of people who were using the Old Bailey to enforce their property rights. This 
categorisation is also important as it reveals something about the more common 
targets for fraudulent activity and the type of settings within which fraud was carried 
out.  
This classification must be understood in context. King warns against the process of 
categorisation, or indeed, the drawing of any conclusions that can be drawn from the 
naming of specific professions. King gives the example of a carpenter, which appears 
a clearly defined trade and one that can be safely categorised as an artisan. However, 
the occupation of ‘carpenter’ could include a range of people from the master 
carpenter to the semi-skilled: ‘…if those labelled as artisans are included in the 
middling sort the importance of lower-status prosecutors will be under-estimated, 
many were journeymen or apprentices rather than masters owning significant 
                                                          
534 King, The Historical Journal (1984) p.29 
535 OBP, April 1802, trial of Daniel Moore (t18020428-153); OBP, April 1805, trial of Thomas-Joseph 
Charles (t18050424-139); OBP, September 1809, trial of Robert Streeter (t18090920-186); OBP, 
October 1766, trial of Stephen Willoughby (t17661022-58); OBP, January 1813, trial of Margaret 
Laidler  (t18130113-108); OBP, September 1816, trial of William Ashlyn  (t18160918-118) 
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amounts of wealth or capital’.536 Consequently, it is problematic to equate a 
profession with a level of wealth or social standing. Though profession may be 
indicative of a level of financial standing, there is a spectrum of success within any 
profession and one victualler may be far wealthier than another victualler. Also, 
complainants, or indeed any witness at the Old Bailey, may not have been honest in 
stating their profession. In open court, with the knowledge that their case may be 
reported in detail in the next edition of the Old Bailey Session Papers, it may have 
been tempting for a witness to exaggerate their success. Of course there is no way 
of knowing the level of exaggeration or dishonesty of witnesses but this possibility 
should be borne in mind when drawing any conclusions regarding the social standing 
of complainants before the Old Bailey. Again, we must be careful so as to avoid 
under-estimating the prevalence of lower-status prosecutors.  
E.P Thompson warns against making anachronistic references to class in relation to 
the eighteenth century.537 Even during the Industrial Revolution, people did not think 
of themselves as being members of a particular class and rather, social identification 
was less likely to be horizontal, with people associating themselves with others of 
similar incomes, and more likely to be vertical, with members associating with people 
of the same profession, trade, or guild.538 By the middle of the eighteenth century, 
the guild system was certainly on the wane, but the rise of the self-regarding class-
consciousness of the nineteenth century was yet to take hold539. This may partly 
explain why prosecutors would be unlikely to state their level of expertise of success 
within a profession, as the profession itself would be deemed a sufficient description 
of their identity.  
Ascertaining the occupation of any actor at the Old Bailey is problematic. Frequently 
cases contain no more information than the names of the complainant and the 
accused. For example, the trial of Thomas Smith, the report of which states: 
                                                          
536 King, ‘The Historical Journal’, p.31 
537 Thompson, Social History (1978) 
538 Thompson, Journal of Social History, (1974) p.396 
539 This contemporary understanding of class also creates challenges for those trying to explain 
eighteenth century fraud through the lens of white-collar crime as not all occupational roles 
fitted a twenty-first century understanding of occupation as relating to class. 
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‘THOMAS SMITH indicted for a fraud. The case was opened by Mr. Knapp, and the 
prisoner was ACQITTED [sic]’.540 This report contains no information of the 
prosecutor whatsoever. Sometimes cases contain information regarding the setting 
in which the fraud was committed. Where an occupation of the complainant is not 
stated, the wider case account may reveal more detail. Because the information from 
the Old Bailey Sessions Papers is rather opaque, an approach to collecting the 
available information has been wider than merely taking the Proceedings at face 
value. Rather, an interpretative approach has been adopted in order to make 
informed assumptions about the prosecutor. This approach has been taken with 
regard to a number of the hypothesis made in relation to the data collected from the 
Sessions Papers. For example, in the case of Reuben Thomas Craven, the complainant 
is a Godfrey Sykes.541 The Papers do not explicitly state the occupation of Mr Sykes, 
and in fact Mr Sykes does not give evidence. Rather, his servant gives evidence and 
from the facts given, it is apparent that the accused obtained goods through the 
servant, who worked for Mr Sykes in the capacity of some sort of tradesperson or 
trader. From this, it can be ascertained that Mr Sykes was most likely the owner of 
some sort of business that sold goods. Consequently, we can categorise him as a 
tradesperson, tradesman or warehouseman, though of course we cannot be 
concluded with certainty.  
Another example is that of the case of Walter Harris, who committed a fraud against 
Thomas Sheene, when obtaining ‘ironmonger’s wares’ though Sheene’s servant, 
John Owen.542 As with the case of Godfrey Sykes, the Sessions Papers do not specify 
the occupation of Thomas Sheene but his status as a tradesperson can be safely 
presumed from the details of the servant and the wares obtained. Such examples 
demonstrate that regardless of the limitations of the Sessions Papers, they contain 
many accounts with sufficient detail to make some conclusions about the occupation 
of prosecutors.   
                                                          
540 OBP, February 1795, trial of Thomas Smith (t17950218-45) 
541 OBP, April 1791, trial of Reuben Thomas Craven (t17910413-66) 
542 OBP,  July 1770, trial of Walter Harris (t17700711-64) 
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Due to the nature of categorisation, not every prosecutor falls sufficiently into the 
above ten classifications. For example, John Peters, prosecutor of Thomas Gilham in 
1815, was the proprietor of the Milford Waggon. Peters is providing a service, but it 
would be inaccurate to consequently define him as an artisan, rather, he is providing 
a service but not as a servant. Similarly, William Offin, who brought a case in 1820 
was employed as a ‘carrier’.  For accuracy, these two cases have been separately 
categorised. Perhaps these prosecutors could be categorised as being the eighteenth 
century equivalent of the service industry, although this adds little to the 
categorisation of prosecutors of fraud during the period. 
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Table 5.1: Occupations of Prosecutors of Fraud 
 
 
Tradespeople and the frauds they prosecuted 
As demonstrated in Table 5.1, the majority of complainants for fraud were 
tradespersons, and those who traded or sold wares from a property; 52.8 percent of 
complainants were shopkeepers, tradesmen, or warehousemen. Within fraud 
prosecutions during this period, recurrent professions appear such as grocers, 
                                                          
543 See Appendix 1 for details of how occupations have been categorised and the theoretical and 
methodological considerations required for this process.  
544 Broadly, ‘Artisans’ have been defined as any prosecutor who manufactured goods, or provided a 
service that related directly to the making or repairing of goods. 
545 It is interesting that at such an early stage in the life of corporate identity, there should be 
examples of companies being identified as prosecutors, as opposed to owners of companies.  
546 Rarely did servants prosecute fraud offences in their own right as complainant, rather than acting 
as an agent or servant of another complainant.   
547 This includes persons of private means. 
Occupation543 Frequency Percentage Percentage minus 
unknown occupations 
Tradesperson 170 36.2 52.8 
Naval Agent 67 14.3 20.8 
Artisan544 35 7.5 10.9 
Public Official 16 3.4 5.0 
Company545 10 2.1 3.1 
Bank of England 6 1.3 1.9 
Clerk 4 0.9 1.2 
Spinster 3 0.6 0.9 
Servant546 2 0.4 0.6 
Other547 9 1.9 2.8 
Total 322 68.7 100.0 
Missing 147 31.3  
Overall Total 469 100.00  
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owners of warehouses, and linen-drapers.548 ‘Tradespeople’ is a fairly wide 
occupational grouping and includes non-traditional sellers of goods such as 
pawnbrokers549, as well as merchants who sold to consumers directly.550 
Tradespersons also include wholesalers such as William Carey, who sold brandy and 
rum, but only by larger amounts and not less than two gallons.551 There are also a 
small number of tradesmen prosecuting who are without premises from which to sell 
their goods. For example, a Mr Price, described by his wife as a ‘salesman’ fell victim 
to a fraud in 1793552 and Thomas Barnesley, a ‘licensed hawker’ who brought a 
prosecution in 1801.553 
In order to appreciate the high percentage of tradespeople prosecuting fraud at the 
Old Bailey, a wider view of eighteenth century society and occupations therein will 
provide context. The percentage of tradespersons within the Metropolis cannot be 
known exactly, although in-depth research on occupations has been carried out with 
regard to the seventeenth century to the nineteenth centuries.554 It has been argued 
that retailing was one of the most common occupations in the country during the 
eighteenth century.555 However, different regions would have had different 
industries and consequently, different occupations making up the population. 
Justman and Van Der Beek have used Campbell’s London Tradesman and the 
insurance policies for the Sun Fire Office and Royal Exchange Assurance to chart the 
occupations within London between 1775 and 1778.556 Further analysis of this data, 
and using the same typological approach when identifying occupations of 
prosecutors for this thesis557, reveals that 27.6 per cent of insurance policy holders 
in London during this period were tradespeople. By far the most common 
                                                          
548 OBP, September 1765, trial of John Spragg (t17650918-77), OBP,  September 1796, trial of George 
Dallaway (t17960914-111), OBP, May 1800, trial of John Burley (t18000528-136) 
549 OBP,  December 1775, trial of Thomas Trotman (t17751206-86) 
550 OBP, September 1777, trial of Barnard Christian De Nassau Deitz (t17770910-101) 
551 OBP, May 1779, trial of Daniel Dempster (t17790519-44) 
552 OBP, September 1793, trial of James Stone (t17930911-124) 
553 OBP,  April 1801, trial of Lemon Caseby (t18010415-143) 
554 For example see Schwarz, London in the Age of Industrialisation 
555 Brewer, The Sinews of Power p.184 
556 Moshe Justman and Karine Van Der Beek, ‘Market forces shaping human capital in eighteenth-
century London’, Economic History Review, 68, 4 (2015), pp. 1177–1202. p.1188 
557 See below 
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occupations undertaken by London citizens related to artisanal activities, with the 
most frequent being carpentry. Consequently, there is some suggestion that whilst 
trade formed a common occupation across the country, the manufacturing of goods 
and provision of services continued to form the basis of employment.  
In light of the estimated proportion of tradespeople in London during the eighteenth 
century, the evidence indicates a disproportionate number of tradespeople were 
bringing prosecutions for fraud.  This is not the only instance where a smaller 
proportion of the population brings a large number of prosecutions. In Essex in the 
eighteenth century, farmers made up an eighth of the population and yet brought 
thirty five percent of prosecutions for felony.558 The demographic differences within 
the capital will be explored in more detail in Chapter 7, but what is apparent is that 
tradespersons were the most likely to bring high-level prosecutions for fraud. This 
does not necessarily mean that over fifty per cent of frauds were committed against 
tradespersons, only that it was this group who pursued fraud prosecutions in the 
highest criminal court. However, as shall be demonstrated below when considering 
the types of fraud prosecuted, tradespersons were certainly the target for specific 
forms of fraud.  
It is significant that tradespersons should choose the highest and most expensive 
court to pursue prosecutions for fraud offences. Table 5.2 illustrates that the most 
common offence of fraud heard at the Old Bailey was the obtaining of goods by false 
pretences. As has been explored in Chapter 3, obtaining goods by false pretences was 
a misdemeanour and thus, could have been pursued at summary or quarter session 
level. Moreover, as explored in Chapter 4, as a misdemeanour, the costs for such 
prosecutions, and the goods lost, could not be recovered. In light of this it must be 
questioned, why did tradespersons choose to prosecute fraud at the Old Bailey? In 
Chapter 6 it will be demonstrated that many tradespersons were likely members of 
prosecution associations and so, more likely to have financial and other support in 
bringing prosecutions. This may explain why tradespersons were more willing to 
undertake what would otherwise be a very expensive process with no hope of 
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financial reward. Another significant reason underpinning the use of the assize courts 
by tradespersons when prosecuting fraud was the role of the criminal justice system 
itself including the clerks who drafted the indictments and the magistrates who 
directed where in the system a trial would be disposed. The role of the magistrates 
will be addressed in the remaining chapters of this thesis. However, for current 
purposes it is apparent that what appear to be simple misdemeanours that should 
have been disposed of lower down in the criminal justice system are finding their 
way into the highest criminal court. Moreover, the majority of these prosecutions 
were brought by propertied citizens who were not necessarily members of the elite.  
As will be identified in Chapter 6, prosecutors did not have full discretion in bringing 
prosecutions. Other actors, such as magistrates and clerks of indictment, played 
pivotal roles in deciding which offences were pursued, as well as the venue in which 
they were disposed of. Of course, the prosecutor was responsible for meeting the 
costs for a prosecution in cases of misdemeanour and it is therefore likely that court 
actors could not force the hearing into the assize courts should the prosecutor not 
wish to pay higher fees.559 However, court actors could dissuade prosecutors from 
using the already burdened higher courts by recommending lesser charges or a 
simpler prosecution route. Regardless of whether these tradespeople were driving 
these prosecutions to the assize court, or whether it was official actors within the 
system, it is unclear why the courts allowed these misdemeanours to be heard at the 
Old Bailey. 
Douglas Hay has suggested that the criminal justice system at this time was a tool of 
the elite and was used in such a way as to ensure the continued system that 
protected the property of this elite.560 This argument is strongly supported by the 
occupations of prosecutors of fraud during this period. For Hay, the ‘elite’ were the 
aristocracy and landed gentry, who made up a very small proportion of the 
population. Tradespersons were by no means the elite. This group was however 
becoming increasingly more significant and influential. There was undoubtedly a 
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growth in consumerism that increased the wealth of tradespersons.561 The changing 
status of tradespersons and merchants was therefore at the heart of fraud 
prosecutions during this period. Edward Thompson has written extensively about the 
changing face of social relations in the eighteenth century.562 He argues that the 
period preceding the Industrial Revolution saw a shift in power away from a stricter 
hegemony dominated by the land owners, what Hay claimed were the elites of 
society, to a more complex social structure requiring a greater degree of negotiation 
between the old monopolisers of power, and the growing power of a new class.563 
This negotiation was indeed possible because the old hegemonic structure was one 
of a cultural, rather than of economic, military, or, as is argued here, legal nature.564 
Those with cultural power were not always those with economic or, increasingly, 
political power.565  Increasingly, new centres of commercial power were emerging 
and were creating political power as merchants bought their way into civic positions.  
Whilst the view of the criminal justice system as being a system to protect property 
is very convincing, it would be an oversimplification to suggest that society was ever 
neatly divided into a dialectic of the elites and the non-elites, or the Bourgeoisie and 
the Proletariat. Rather, in protecting property, the criminal justice system acted to 
protect the wealthier strata of society including the elite and the burgeoning 
commercial classes. An elite hegemony has never entirely been imposed successfully 
across all social strata566. Such power structures do however shape and define how 
actors within the structure operate and impose constraints that limit the paths 
potentially taken by actors.567 Rather than having the limited role of protecting the 
property of the elite against the rest of society, the prosecution of fraud in the 
eighteenth century reflects how the criminal justice system acted to protect and 
promote conditions central to commercialism. The transformation in the distribution 
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of power within eighteenth century England, at its core, was driven by growing 
economic rationalization which not only ‘nibbled…through the bonds of 
paternalism’568, but also created a space within which economic actors could utilise 
the previous legal structure to protect their wider commercial interests. Thompson’s 
focus is upon the time between feudalism and the Industrial Revolution when, 
workers were between social controls.569 It was not only workers who found 
themselves in this social lacuna. A space of negotiated claims to power was opening 
up. The status of tradespersons and merchants was changing at the same time as the 
nature of consumerism. As Marx observed: ‘a new, more colossal bourgeoisie arises. 
While the old bourgeoisie fights the French Revolution the new one conquers the 
world market’.570 
To properly understand the significance and influence of tradespersons and 
merchants prosecuting fraud, a structural approach is required in order to appreciate 
the framework within which prosecutors were operating. As will be explored in 
Chapter 6, prosecutors did not have carte blanche in deciding which rung of the 
criminal justice ladder they chose to pursue their grievance. Rather, actors such as 
magistrates and clerks played an essential role in diverting cases to the most 
appropriate venue. In making this decision, all the actors involved in prosecutions 
may have been driven by a number of factors. The most important of which were the 
nature of the offence, the circumstances in which the offence was carried out, and 
against whom the offence was committed. Lawmakers, and enforcers of the law, 
such as magistrates and clerks, enforced the law depending upon the ‘social fears, 
economic and political interests and administrative capabilities.’571   
Just as Thompson warns that to speak of class in the eighteenth century is 
anachronistic572, so too is reference to capitalism. Thompson claimed the eighteenth 
century to be the ‘predatory phase of…commercial capitalism’.573 The period 
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between 1760 and 1820 is one of proto-capitalism, wherein the circumstances for a 
more developed and self-propelling economic condition in which the values that 
underpinned capitalism were set into the social, economic, and legal structure. These 
economic conditions included the growing society of this period fostered a more 
internally mobile population. At the same time, the economy was also growing in 
complexity. Devices such as the greatly extended use of financial instruments were 
increasingly being used in lieu of money or currency. These devices were, in effect, 
another form of credit.574 Such changes are central to understanding fraud during 
this time. 
The eighteenth century markets, whether local, regional, or international, operated 
on systems of credit.575 Because there was very little currency circulating, market 
relations between individuals and tradespersons, between tradespersons and 
wholesalers, and between wholesalers and merchants, were conducted within a 
system of increasingly complex financial instruments such as promissory notes. From 
merchants to modest consumers, there was a reliance upon credit.576 Consequently, 
for systems of credit to operate, there needed to be trust that the debts would be 
repaid. Contemporaries estimated that over two-thirds of transactions were carried 
through credit rather than currency.577 To this extent, the eighteenth century 
commentator, Daniel Defoe referred to credit as ‘the strength and fund of a 
nation’578, but what fundamentally underpinned these markets was trust. Trust 
facilitated the development of more sophisticated and international forms of 
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commercial dealing at a time when the economic and financial tools required for this 
were yet to be established.579  
The law and the courts played an increasingly significant role in the underpinning of 
trust-based market relations, with fraud posing the most insidious threat to 
commercial relationships. If fraud was tolerated and allowed to thrive by going 
unpunished, trust within markets would break down, systems of credit would be 
undermined, and the markets themselves would fail. It is to be expected that those 
who benefitted most from this complex and developing commercial society should 
take steps to preserve and promote the trust that allowed such markets to flourish. 
A central group that benefitted from growing commercialism was the tradesperson 
and the merchant and so, it is unsurprising that they should be the most eager to 
enforce the laws of fraud.  
The fundamental significance of trust and the great threat posed by fraud reveal the 
central motivation behind the courts’ allowance of fraudulent misdemeanour, as well 
as felonies, to be heard at the assize level. Given the value of trust for the expansion 
of commercial activities, it was understandable that judges and magistrates sought 
to enforce trangressions. It has been commonly held that the middle-class bench 
would behave in such a way as to promote their own interests and the wider interests 
of capitalism.580 It is therefore significant that the Capital’s benches were occupied 
by the wealthier merchants and aldermen of the day.581 The courts and those most 
invested in commercial activity, the merchants and the tradespersons, acted to 
consistently reinforce their values and power within society through the courts.   
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Table 5.2: Forms of Fraud Heard at the Old Bailey 
Offence582 Frequency Percentage Percentage minus 
unknown offence 
False Pretences 234 49.9 68.2 
Prize Money 51 10.9 14.9 
Uttering 16 3.4 4.7 
Conspiracy 16 3.4 4.7 
False Personation 15 3.2 4.4 
Forgery 11 2.3 3.2 
Unclear 126 26.9  
Total 469 100.0 100.00 
     
Types of Fraud Heard at the Old Bailey 
The specific offence for which cases of fraud were brought is not always identifiable. 
This is primarily due to the persistent and ubiquitous use of the shorthand ‘a fraud’ 
when recording offences, even in official court records from the Old Bailey, the City 
of London, Middlesex and Westminster.583 However, even where a specific offence 
such as obtaining goods by false pretences is identifiable, this does not reveal the 
circumstances within which the offence was carried out.  
One purpose of this thesis is to challenge assumptions around fraud, including the 
belief that fraud was a ‘middle-class crime’ and that it was carried out in situations 
within which some previous relationship or fiduciary relationship can be exploited.584 
One method to demonstrate that the majority of fraud offences could have been 
committed by anyone, regardless of class or position, is through the imposition of a 
typology of fraud. Such a typology also better explains the types of people 
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committing these offences through the discovery of how these people carried out 
their offences; as explained in Chapter 2, there is far less information about 
defendants compared with prosecutors during the eighteenth century.  
Table 5.3: Typology of Fraud 
Typology Frequency Percentage Percentage 
Minus Unknown 
Categories 
False Servant 137 29.2 36.8 
Naval 66 14.1 17.7 
Financial Instrument 56 11.9 15.1 
Consumer 34 7.2 9.1 
Public Official 29 6.2 7.8 
Gambling 23 4.9 6.2 
Previous Relationship 15 3.2 4.0 
Intra-Commercial 12 2.6 3.2 
Total 372 79.3 100 
Unknown 97 20.7  
Overall Total 469 100  
This hypothesis is further supported when considering the types of frauds being 
prosecuted by tradespeople during this period. The main forms of prosecution have 
been categorised as ‘false servant’, ‘consumer’, and ‘intra-commercial’. These forms 
of fraud appear in the Old Bailey approximately thirty-seven, nine, and three percent 
respectively.585 
False Servant 
By far the most common type of fraud offences appearing at the Old Bailey were 
carried out via the ‘false servant’ method. This method involved the accused 
obtaining goods or monies by pretending to be sent by, or have the authority of, 
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another party. Often the creditor would know this third party. This method of fraud 
required some inside knowledge on the part of the false servant, knowledge either 
about the tradesperson and their dealings with the third party, or about the third 
party themselves. This can be illustrated through any of the 137 instances seen at the 
Old Bailey. In 1766, Stephen Willoughby was prosecuted for obtaining gin by false 
pretences through the method of claiming to be sent by his master, Mr Bicknall.586 
Mr Bicknall was a known customer to the prosecutors, Messrs. Thomas and John 
Isherwood, distillers in Aldersgate Street and Willoughby took advantage of this to 
claim goods, ostensibly on Mr Bicknall’s behalf. Another, particularly audacious false 
servant swindle was carried out by Matthew James Everingham who, in 1784, 
obtained a number of law texts, criminal practice books from a member of the Middle 
Temple under the pretence of being sent by his master, a companion of the lawyer 
Everingham sought to defraud.587 
Sometimes these false servants were known to the prosecutor and had indeed been 
a servant in the past and it was this prior recognition that allowed the accused to 
carry out their swindle. For instance, Ann Birt had previously been a servant to Mrs 
Law, who for many years had an account with the baker who brought the 
prosecution.588 When Birt left her post she had the inside knowledge and knew the 
tradesperson would recognise her when she came on behalf of her mistress to obtain 
goods fraudulently.  
The false servant scenario also applied in circumstances where the complainant did 
not know the accused, but the accused had knowledge of the complainant’s 
customers or business and utilised this information in order to obtain goods by false 
pretences. Charles Wilts obtained goods from calico printers, John and James Stirling, 
by falsely pretending to be sent from Messrs. Waithman and Bristow, who were long-
time customers of the Stirlings.589 At the trial, both Mr Waithman and Mr Bristow 
testified that they had never seen the accused before. Assuming that the court was 
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right and Wilts was guilty, Wilts must have gained knowledge of the customers of the 
Stirlings and used this to obtain the goods. 
In both instances, where the accused was known to the prosecutor and where they 
were not, we see clear examples of the first doctrine of fraud, the use of the artful 
device. Often, this artful device was the abuse of knowledge by the accused such as 
knowing that certain tradespeople provided credit to particular families. The artful 
device could equally be the abuse of the former relationship between the accused 
and the tradesperson such as the tradesperson believing the accused to have the 
permission of their master to obtain the goods.  
False servant fraud was made increasingly available due to the changing nature of 
society in the eighteenth century. London had always been a diverse city, but early-
eighteenth century London society was still bound by parish and places of worship, 
through which most people lived, socialised, and were recorded in official records. 
London was more a series of towns than an holistic city. This social structure resulted 
in the majority of persons being known to those whom they saw and traded with 
every day. This allowed for trust-based credit transactions between consumers, 
retailers, wholesalers, and merchants, as discussed above. London society began to 
change due to the increase in population and the influx of outsiders from other parts 
of the country. This loosened communal ties and resulted in new faces, new 
consumers, new retailers, wholesalers, and merchants. Consequently, these changes 
in demography resulted in greater opportunities for fraud.590  
Given that tradespersons make up 52.8 percent of identifiable prosecutors of fraud 
offences during this period, it is perhaps not surprising that this modus is the most 
common. As explored in Chapter 3, for obtaining false pretences to be successfully 
made out, the prosecutor must show that a false pretence was indeed used, and that 
they, the prosecutor, was tricked into voluntarily handing over the goods or monies. 
If tradespersons were generally of a more litigious bent, it was expected that one of 
the offences for which they would prosecute would be fraud. The method of acting 
                                                          
590 Muldrew, Social History  p.174 
                                                                  Prosecuting Fraud in the Metropolis, 1760-1820 
 
149 
 
as a false servant was perhaps substantially easier than other methods, such as those 
labelled ‘consumer fraud.’591 
Tradespersons and merchants were the most common prosecutors of fraud at the 
Old Bailey, although the courts had to be supportive of these prosecutors if they were 
going to be heard at such a high level.592 Why were the courts so ready to propel 
fraud committed against tradespersons, particularly in cases by those pretending to 
be authorised servants, into the Old Bailey? Servants were commonly employed by 
households, even by the more modest ones. These people were indispensable and a 
great deal of trust was granted them. Servants looked after the family’s children, 
cooked the food the family ate, and to a large extent, they impacted upon the family’s 
reputation in local commercial circles. It was the servants who attended markets and 
shops to buy and collect goods on behalf of the family. 
This treatment of the prosecution of this type of fraud reflects the third doctrine of 
fraud as defined within this thesis, the need for the fraud to have some public harm. 
There was great concern throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries with 
the trustworthiness of servants and this concern formed the basis of judicial 
recognition of the public harm of frauds committed by these trusted figures. In 1749, 
Henry Fielding, who would become the famous Bow Street Magistrate, established 
the Universal Register Office on the Strand.593 The purpose of the office was to act as 
an agency through which a database of all the servants in London could be held. 
Information such as a full history of employment and a record of any misdemeanours 
would enable would-be employers to have better control over whom they let into 
their homes. This ambitious project had some successes as an employment agency 
for servants, but Fielding’s passion for collecting data, which he would later take to 
Bow Street, is evident from this time. Equally evident is the public demand for 
thoroughly checked servants, reflecting a wider concern with the veracity of servants 
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and the potential for fraud and other types of offences which may befall the 
employers of untrustworthy servants  
There were a number of extremely high-profile cases in the nineteenth century 
regarding servants’ accused of attacking their masters. The 1816 case of Eliza 
Fenning, erroneously convicted for poisoning the family for which she worked, 
resulted in public outrage for the harshness with which she was treated.594 Likewise, 
the 1840 case of Courvoisier, accused of murdering his master, Lord William Russell, 
attracted public, professional, and political condemnation of his defence counsel, 
Charles Phillips. It was widely believed that Phillips went too far in defending a man 
who had brutally murdered his master in his own bed.595  
As illustrated in Chapter 3, it has often been assumed by historians that fraud 
required an element of literacy on the part of the swindler and it is this assumption 
that has propagated the perception of fraud as a middle-class crime. It is repeatedly 
apparent throughout this study that this modus operandi was grounded in 
knowledge, alongside bravado and a convincing performance, but certainly not the 
requirement for any form of literacy. Clearly, the long-held assumption associating 
fraud offences with the middle-classes, or at least the literate, is not supported by 
the most common form of fraud being carried out during this period. As the false 
servant method demonstrates, fraud relied more on the exploitation of knowledge, 
often from an insider, rather than any distinct literacy skills. While fraud became 
increasingly defined as a breach of trust596  by the mid-nineteenth century, in the 
eighteenth century, fraud was more broadly construed as an abuse of knowledge.  
Consumer Fraud 
As discussed above, the eighteenth century saw a commercial revolution that began 
in the mid-eighteenth century. It was enabled by a growth in disposable income, 
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partly created by a national fall in food prices597, and facilitated by the extension of 
credit and more sophisticated financial instruments. This commercial boom greatly 
extended the consumer classes and provided huge opportunity for commercial 
activity, both selling and consuming. However, the growth in commercial activity 
simultaneously created opportunity for fraudulent activity. The fundamental method 
by which consumer fraud was carried out was by swindlers obtaining goods or credit 
by falsely claiming to a tradesperson or merchant that they could pay the debt, or by 
pretending to be a person of good character to whom credit could safely be 
extended. This was a different mechanism to the ‘false servant’ swindle in that the 
accused was obtaining the goods or credit for themselves, rather than on behalf of a 
third party. This form of fraud has also been categorised separately as it related to a 
particular abuse of the credit system as identified by Margot Finn.598 ‘Consumer 
Fraud’ was a less common method of fraud than that of the false servant. This was 
partly because it was more difficult to carry out and, as shall be argued, less likely to 
be prosecuted. This form of fraud is a further demonstration of how the doctrine of 
the artful device was interpreted by the courts. 
There are many colourful examples of consumer fraud within the Old Bailey. Roger 
Prate obtained goods from a tradesperson by pretending he was a merchant with a 
large customer base abroad.599 A similar ruse was carried out by John Dawson and 
Joseph Clerk, who claimed to gun-maker, Samuel Knock, they had come into a great 
inheritance and consequently were credit-worthy.600 They even produced a stack of 
papers amongst which was ostensible proof of their inherited wealth from a Mrs 
Catherine Prussia Farrington. On the promise of this inheritance, Dawson and Clerk 
obtained credit from the gun-maker. The case is reported at length in the 
Proceedings due to the elaborate lengths the co-accused went in order to convince 
Knock that they had inherited the money. The ruse even included Mr Knock attending 
the estate from which the inheritance was to derive. Even though the co-accused 
used seemingly false documentation to obtain the credit, it was the wider ruse that 
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convinced Knock, which resulted in a conviction for obtaining goods for false 
pretences.  
A further illustration is provided by Henry Fielding in the 1750s:  
There is another sett (sic) who defrauded tradesman by taking on themselves 
false names, and by pretending to be related to, or connected with, some 
persons of credit and fashion, and produce false letters to prove their 
intimacy…they make it their business to enquire at inns who serves them with 
their wines and brandies from London and sith (sic) out of shopkeepers the 
names of the tradesmen here who supply them with goods. Furnished with 
this knowledge, they come to London, and one day appearing in the character 
of a country Inn-keeper, they go to the distiller, whose name they have 
learned, telling him he has taken an inn…they he was recommended to him by 
one of his customers, whose name he tells him, and describes his house and 
family. The distiller’s suspicion being lulled asleep by this stratagem, he 
cheerfully supplies his new customer with some of his best goods, and sends 
them to some appointed inn in the town, from whence they are 
conveyed…and converted into cash.601  
Consumer fraud is not always as obvious as the above cases. In some instances, the 
relationship between civil and criminal frauds is more apparent. The potential to 
enforce debts or address fraud through the courts provided the final mechanism to 
underwrite the trust within the market.602 Consequently, the doctrine that a criminal 
fraud is not merely a breach of contractual warranty is apparent. The doctrine of 
public harm is equally relevant to consumer fraud as in order to nurture trust in 
commercial relationships, it was important that contracting parties knew there was 
recourse to the law when needed. Consequently, as the complexity of the market 
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developed, and the need for commercial trust became more significant, so too did 
the involvement of the courts.603  
One regulatory criminal offence that was common across the period was that of false 
weights and measures. These offences could take a multitude of forms from selling 
under-weight bread to watered-down wine. It is perhaps not surprising that few such 
cases appear at the Old Bailey as these offences would be addressed at lower courts, 
most likely summary courts. However, although cases of obtaining goods by false 
pretences and cheats were also capable of being disposed of at lower courts, they 
were actually more likely to be found in the Old Bailey. One reason that false weights 
and measures cases may not be found at the highest courts was because a large 
number of the prosecutors were women and there has been research that suggests 
where women prosecuted, disposal of cases were likely to happen in lower courts.604 
Another reason for the dearth of such prosecutions at the assize level may be the 
operation of the doctrine of individuals needing to take some steps to protect 
themselves. Such a barrier to a successful fraud prosecution may have prevented 
such frauds from reaching the higher criminal courts as there may have been concern 
that prosecutions would place too much onus on tradespeople and relinquish 
consumers’ responsibilities to ensure the terms of the contract for sale in which they 
were entering605.  
Intra-commercial 
Intra-commercial prosecutions were accusations of fraudulent misrepresentation 
within a contract or business dealing between tradespeople. The dearth of instances 
in which tradespeople appear to be using the criminal courts and the laws of fraud 
to enforce debts or create sanctions for breaches of contract is notable and reflects 
the courts’ awareness that a breach of contract was not a criminal matter. The threat 
of litigation has long been used to recover or settle debts. Furthermore, in a time 
when the line between civil and criminal litigation was blurred and criminal 
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prosecution was arguably cheaper than civil litigation606, it might be expected that 
people would use the criminal courts to recover civil debts. There is evidence from 
some Proceedings that the courts were alert to the potential overlap between the 
criminal offence of fraud, and the civil laws of contract law. For example, the 1803 
prosecution of John Edwards was dismissed as it appeared ‘there was a contract 
entered into between the parties.607 It is unclear whether the prosecutor brought an 
action against Edwards in the civil courts, although it is certain that the Old Bailey 
judge in this instance held that the dispute was civil rather than criminal in nature. 
This is a strong example of the fourth doctrine of fraud identified in this thesis, that 
a criminal fraud could not merely be a breach of contractual warranty.  
 It is possible that the threat of the criminal law could be used to extract monies or 
recover debts, even if this threat was not carried through. In such instances, these 
cases do not appear in the courts themselves. There is suggestion that buying off 
prosecutors was fairly common during this period.608 So, it is likely that should a 
breach of contract occur, even one that was not due to a fraudulent 
misrepresentation, the accused may be quick to settle any disagreement outside of 
the courts. At a time when credit was all-important for commerce, whether for 
consumers, retailers or wholesalers, the mere suggestion that a tradesperson could 
not be trusted would have a great impact upon their creditworthiness. Daniel Defoe 
wrote extensively on the tradesperson, revealing much about the perceptions of 
credit and how tradespeople existed in a system with little actual money in 
circulation. Defoe’s guidance to tradesmen in 1729 is enlightening.609 He makes the 
extraordinary statement that ‘there is some difference between an honest man and 
an honest tradesman’610 and goes on to advise tradesmen that commercial 
agreements were more flexible than for non-commercial relationships. According to 
Defoe, it was understood in commercial circles that often payments could not be 
                                                          
606 For more details see Chapter 4 
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made on time, and credit agreements would need to be stretched.611 Defoe speaks 
of the changes to commercial dealings, stating that: ‘custom, indeed, has driven us 
beyond the limits of our morals in many things, which trade makes necessary, and 
which we cannot now avoid’.612 In light of this, perhaps it is more understandable 
that there were few fraud cases brought for dishonest dealings between tradesmen. 
On the one hand, there existed a culture of allowance for late payment of debts. On 
the other though, tradesmen would act quickly to prevent damage to their 
reputation and so, any threat of criminal prosecution would speed up the payment 
of debts.  
Naval Fraud 
The second most common prosecutor of fraud trials between 1760 and 1820 was the 
Navy. As stated when defining and characterising the underlying framework of fraud 
through the five doctrines, there is a sixth doctrine of fraud which only applies to 
instances of public prosecution of fraud. This sixth doctrine is significant because it 
recognises the importance and the distinction between frauds which fell under the 
central five doctrines, and frauds which were defined as felony and prosecuted as 
capital crime should they fall under the sixth doctrine. This is not to claim that the 
sixth doctrine of fraud does not overlap with the other five doctrines. Doctrines such 
as the need for an artful device and the public harm of defrauding the navy are at the 
heart of such prosecutions.  
Over twenty percent of known prosecutors of fraud represented the Navy. During 
this period, sixty six indictments were brought by the Navy, or an agent of the Navy, 
for the fraudulent obtaining of naval wages or prize monies. Prize money was 
additional pay received by all crew on a ship should it capture an enemy ship during 
a time of war. A captured enemy ship and its cargo would be sold, and any enemy 
sailors ransomed back to their country. The total value of this would then be split 
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between the crew according to strictly defined proportions, with the Crown receiving 
the largest share and the remainder split according to rank and position.613  
There are three central points of interest in the role of the Navy as prosecutor of 
fraud. First, that the Navy, essentially a public prosecutor, should be leading 
prosecutions for fraud. Second, that there were so many acts of fraud against the 
Navy. And third, how naval frauds interacted with other forms of fraud being heard 
at the Old Bailey.  
 
The Navy as a Public Prosecutor 
In a time of private prosecution, the state sporadically involved itself in the 
enforcement of the criminal law, with naval prosecutions for fraud being an 
illustrative example of such involvement. The more distinct state-related offences of 
treason and sedition attracted the support of the state and, as discussed above, there 
were occasions when the monarch’s lawyer, the Attorney-General, would undertake 
a prosecution directly on behalf of the Crown. However, this was not only for treason 
cases, and certainly by the nineteenth century the Attorney-General appeared more 
frequently in high-profile prosecutions of fraud against banks.614  
A public prosecutor during this time would be an institution that carried out a public 
function on behalf of the state, such as the Royal Mint or a local authority, including 
those administrating the poor laws. The presence of prosecutions by public agencies 
demonstrates a prototype model for a fledgling public prosecutor. It is known that 
certain institutions such as the Mint brought prosecutions against coiners and 
clippers during this period. Randall McGowen has written extensively on the active 
stance the Bank of England took in detecting and prosecuting forgers, certainly from 
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the early-nineteenth century.615 There has been less work on the role of the Navy as 
a prosecutor and no work on the role of the Navy prosecuting fraud.  
McGowen has concluded that prosecutorial actors, such as the Bank of England, were 
acting merely as a private prosecutor. The phrase ‘public authority prosecutors’ 
should not be confused with modern impressions of prosecution authorities, but 
rather applies to trials that were either funded directly by the state, or by an agent 
of the state, such as the Royal Mint. During this research on the appearance of public 
prosecutors in the summary courts, Bruce Smith has cast light upon‘…the 
inadequacies of the categories of ‘private’ and ‘public’ [which] have bedevilled 
efforts to characterize the extent of public participation in prosecution before 
1850’.616 In light of these concerns with identifying the public and the private 
prosecutor, it is desirable that we focus upon such attempts and turn our attention 
to the specific prosecution of fraud offences.  
Contrary to McGowen’s claim, the Bank of England was certainly not acting merely 
as a well-resourced private prosecutor. Not only had the Bank lobbied to change the 
laws of forgery but it also employed its own police agents to act as detectives and 
had internal solicitors to bring cases.617 McGowen claims these resources did not 
significantly impact upon the private status of the Bank as prosecutor.618 However, 
we must also acknowledge that the resources available to such prosecutors were 
unparalleled. Consequently, it is counterintuitive that such a powerful and influential 
organisation should be treated the same as an individual private prosecutor.  Given 
the resources of the Bank, including in-house lawyers, detectives, and police officers, 
it is hard not to conclude that the Bank of England certainly had resources that put it 
in a different category to private prosecutors.  Judges and juries were receptive to 
these public prosecutors and the Bank of England developed a high degree of 
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influence over the prosecution of offences such as forgery, even circumventing the 
Crown’s prerogative of mercy.619 
Table 5.4: Public Authority Prosecutors within the Old Bailey 
 
 
 
 
The Navy was the most prevalent, but by no means the only public body prosecuting 
fraud during this period. Over twenty five percent of fraud prosecutions were 
brought by public authority prosecutors and less than fifteen percent of indictments 
for fraud were brought by the Navy.  Other public bodies that appeared as 
prosecutors at the Old Bailey included the Post Master General620 and The Stamp 
Office621, amongst others. Other offences against the state included the use of fraud 
in obtaining support under the poor laws, offences against the postal system, and 
offences against offices of the criminal justice system, such as prisons or lower courts. 
In 1795, Matthew Swift met Sarah Burnett outside the Guildhall and pretended to 
work for the magistrate.622 Burnett was convinced that Swift could address her 
prosecution against another woman for assault without Burnett (who had no 
understanding of the magistrate’s office) having to enter the court. Whilst Burnett 
was the first witness, the case was brought by a team of prosecution lawyers, 
including the well-reputed, Mr Knowlys. Evidently, actors within the court system 
were keen to punish those who abused their institutions for purposes of fraud.  
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620 OBP, October 1769, trial of William Barns (t17691018-50) 
621 OBP, January 1785, trial of Ann Jones (t17850112-50) 
622 Old Bailey Proceedings Online (www.oldbaileyonline.org, version 6.0, 17 April 2011), September 
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Public Authority 
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From the Proceedings, the identities of the naval agents leading these prosecutions 
can often be ascertained. Of the sixty seven instances in which a naval employee or 
agent was prosecuting a fraud offence, there are almost as many different 
prosecutors as there are indictments. Some employees of the naval pay office, such 
as the Ratcliff brothers, John and Robert, appear in more than one case, although 
there is certainly no indication that there were particular individuals used to 
prosecute these cases. The diversity of individuals attending the Sessions and leading 
prosecutions indicates that there were no naval employees dedicated to the 
prosecution of crimes against the Navy. This is in contrast to the Bank of England, for 
whom, as McGowen argues, there was a specialised team dedicated to the 
prosecution of crimes against the Bank.623 Naval prosecutors reflect not only the 
significant changes to bureaucracy within the Navy, but in relation to fraud, the 
common appearance of state actors prosecuting fraud at the highest levels. The 
numbers of fraud cases being brought by the Navy at this time were still relatively 
low in comparison to the Bank of England during the beginning of the nineteenth 
century. However, it does reflect that the Old Bailey was hearing cases brought by 
public authorities a generation before McGowen claims the Bank began doing so.  
Fraud against the Navy 
Naval historians have largely over-looked the payment of prize monies and the 
potential for fraud created by the pay system employed by the Navy. Consequently, 
little is known about the naval employees and agents who distributed wages and 
prize monies to sailors. Details of prosecutors within the Proceedings reflect that 
these naval actors were employed by the ‘Pay Office’, the ‘Naval Office’, or were 
contracted as pay agents of the Navy. The role of contracted agents was certainly 
quite fluid in that they not only distributed wages to the lower-ranked sailors, but 
often acted as bankers to the officers.624  
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The presence of naval agents as prosecutors reveals much about the Navy of the time 
and, more generally, about how the criminal justice system responded to public 
authority prosecutors. The period between 1760 and 1820 saw a great expansion of 
state bureaucracy in general, and naval bureaucracy in particular. Between 1680 and 
1780, the Army and Navy trebled in size.625 This was primarily due to a succession of 
wars including the Nine Years War at the end of the seventeenth century, the Seven 
Years War starting in 1756, and the American War of Independence starting in 1775. 
Because of these conflicts, the armed forces rapidly grew in number and by the end 
of the eighteenth century the Navy was one of the largest single employers of civilian 
labour in the country.626 With this great expansion came a growth of naval 
administration. The number of clerks employed in the naval office during the first 
half of the eighteenth century increased from sixteen to 101.627 In fact, these figures 
are more likely conservative estimates as the naval office, like the civil service today, 
artificially kept their declared number of employees low by not declaring all part-
time and casual workers.628 With such dedicated resources to these matters, the 
naval office felt it could undertake more prosecutions against those undermining the 
prize money system through fraud.  
As has been detailed in Chapter 3 and above, fraud pertaining to the obtaining of 
naval prize monies were felonies and were prosecuted by quasi-public agents. Prima 
facie, this type of fraud appears distinct from types such as the false servant scenario, 
which were overwhelmingly disposed of as misdemeanours.629 However, the 
underlying mechanism for carrying out the fraudulent obtaining of prize monies was 
either the exploitation of inside knowledge about the duties and ships of the genuine 
beneficiary of the money, or through convincing the naval agent through some false 
personation to be the rightful beneficiary. In essence though, the methods of 
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obtaining prize monies were the same as those used by swindlers in false servant 
scenarios.630  
These frauds were carried out via two modus, false pretences and false personation. 
The most common prize money swindle involved the accused pretending to be a 
particular crew member in order to obtain their prize money. Often, the true 
beneficiary was deceased, which would provide ample opportunity for the false 
personation. As there were so few checks and balances to confirm the identity of the 
person presenting themselves to the pay office or the agent, all that was needed was 
a certain amount of inside information. In theory, the only information needed would 
be which ship the true beneficiary sailed on, from which port they sailed and when, 
who was the captain, and which position on the ship the individual held. However, 
as demonstrated in the case of Andrew Roman, agents would often know little about 
the ranks and positions of sailors. So, whilst there was a logbook, it is not known how 
scrupulously the book was referred to, particularly when many sailors were 
clamouring to be paid at the same time. The second most common method for 
obtaining prize monies by fraud was by pretending to be a family member of a 
deceased sailor. Hannah Mullens took a false oath to obtain the required 
documentation to prove she was the sister of Peter Roach, a late seaman who had 
served on the ship, The Burford.631 Mullens knew that Roach was due prize money 
and used a fraudulently obtained document to claim she was the next of kin.  
Prize monies played an essential role in the recruitment and placation of sailors. 
Wages were not high and were often delayed in being paid, in some cases by many 
months. The promise of prize monies was used by the Navy, and indeed the captain 
and senior officers on ships, to placate the unpaid men and ensure that sailors felt 
invested in the conflicts within which they took part. Often these prize monies were 
received before wages and acted to prevent wider unrest amongst sailors.632 For 
generations before this period, politicians and monarchs were aware of the potential 
consequences for not paying sailors. As early as 1629, Sir Henry Mervin had warned the 
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monarch ‘let not your eye that looks on the public good overlook this [victualling] mischief; 
for without better order his Majesty will lose the honour of his seas, the love and loyalty of 
his sailors, and his Royal Navy will droop’.633  
Whilst the Navy was quick to prosecute outsiders who sought to fraudulently obtain 
prize money or wages, it was less likely to reprimand those sailors who acted 
fraudulently to obtain additional pay or monies themselves. Correspondence 
between various offices within the Navy suggests that sailors would sometimes seek 
to take advantage of the chaotic pay system and there is suggestion that, should 
these ruses be discovered, they were largely ignored.634 The same reasons for 
prosecuting non-sailors for fraudulently obtaining prize monies explained non-
prosecution of sailor obtaining these monies. The Navy appreciated that they often 
failed to pay their sailors and this resulted in a precarious situation in which sailors 
could, and in fact, did often withdraw their labour or strike.635 Therefore, it was 
presumed that had the Navy prosecuted its own members for what might be seen as 
a workplace perquisite, then the risk of unrest within the ranks would have increased. 
Credit is again very important here. The prevailing wisdom at the time stated: ‘credit 
makes the soldier fight without pay, the armies march without provisions’636, and of 
course, the Navy sailed with unpaid men. It is also the reason the Navy so assiduously 
prosecuted non-sailors; that being the significance of public opinion towards the 
Navy and its sailors.  
Public opinion of the Navy was very high, presumably because the public appreciated 
the significance of a strong Navy for an island state not only surrounded by possibly 
hostile nations, but an island with aspirations for world dominance. Unlike the Army, 
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the Navy was seen as a purely defensive force and one that protected its citizens 
without the threat of being turned inland in times of civil unrest.637 This support for 
the Navy applied not only to the institution, but to the individual members of the 
Navy as well. Those in the Navy were also greatly respected by the wider public and 
even when sailors were themselves accused of having committed crime, the public 
were less likely to condemn them.638 Moreover, the Navy had a reputation for not 
paying their employees and destitute sailors were a common sight in port towns 
across the country.639 The perception of the ill-treated sailor permeated the national 
imagination. Consequently, it is not surprising that when an outsider sought to 
defraud the Navy, or to defraud a sailor of his own wages or prize money, 
prosecutions were quickly undertaken and courts were extremely harsh when 
dealing with such swindlers. The public opinion of the Navy and its sailors was 
particularly high at this time because of the perception that Britain’s thriving 
economy was reliant upon its ability to win wars.640 Moreover, naval men were 
frequently seen as the main defenders of Britishness itself.641  
Naval Checks and Balances: Limiting Opportunities for Fraud 
The fraudulent obtaining of naval prize monies were at heart very similar to obtaining 
goods by false pretences and by false personation. However, the fundamental 
difference was the prosecutor of naval frauds. The Navy played a pivotal role in the 
expansion of the British Empire and any offence against such a fundamental 
institution was predictably treated with great severity. In addition to the courts’ and 
Parliament’s appreciation for the need to protect the Navy’s interests, there was 
great public support for the Navy and its sailors as mentioned previously. Equally as 
significant was the realisation that the naval pay system leant itself embarrassingly 
to opportunities for fraud. As well as demonstrating the significance of the interests 
of the Navy during this period, this section will also illustrate how the navy exposed 
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itself to fraud and will explore some of the measures taken by the navy in order to 
limit these frauds. This will demonstrate how the Navy’s main weapon in the fight 
against fraud was high-level criminal prosecution and the use of the death penalty.  
As with other deceptive offences such as forgery, the payment of naval prize monies 
was, by the standards of the day, highly regulated, with only a few authorised and 
licensed naval agents being allowed to pay prizes.642 Every instrument by which a 
seaman or marine conveyed his prize money or wages in the hands of the public 
officers must have conformed to one of the forms prescribed by statute.643 Justice 
Kenyon stated the purposes behind this heavy regulation in 1795:  
The Legislature have anxiously provided for those most useful and deserving 
bodies of men, the seamen and marines of this country; for this purpose they 
have made regulations to protect their earnings from those impositions which 
are too frequently practised upon them; and have for their own benefit 
imposed various restrictions upon the modes by which they might transfer 
their property.644 
There were a number of illegal obtaining of prize money cases that were prosecuted 
using forgery laws. This is because the swindler would, on occasion, use some ‘false 
instrument’ or document to carry out the fraud.645 A fundamental difference 
between fraud offences and forgery is the manner in which the offence was carried 
out. In most prize money forgery cases, some contract or certificate was altered in 
order to obtain the monies. However, fraudulent obtaining of the monies was 
achieved either by pretending to be the true beneficiary through false personation, 
or by pretending to be the true beneficiary using inside knowledge.  
Such prosecutions were not always straightforward and the drafting of the 
indictment was all-important. For example, John Carver pretended to be the half-
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brother of a sailor deserving of prize monies.646 When the naval agent brought the 
prosecution, a vital element of the offence was that Carver had taken a false oath in 
the Prerogative Court at Canterbury in order to obtain the monies. As the prosecutor 
could not prove that the oath had been taken, the prosecution failed. This is a 
variation of the need, when prosecuting for obtaining goods by false pretences, to 
make clear the exact nature of the pretence through which the fraud was carried 
out.647 The statute regarding the fraudulent obtaining of prize money was strictly 
constructed by the courts. In 1816, Maxwell Hume was acquitted on an indictment 
of fraudulently obtaining prize money because he obtained not money, but bank 
notes.648  
In some circumstances, alternative indictments were brought, presumably for similar 
reasons to today, in order to allow the prosecutor other chances of success should 
one indictment fail, or to cover a range of separate but connected actions that 
amounted to different offences. This is demonstrated in the case of Darby Kerwick, 
against whom there were two indictments. The first was for taking a false oath to 
obtain prize monies thereby acting as a false pretence649 and an alternative 
indictment for the false personation of the true beneficiary in order to obtain letters 
of administration and thereby prize monies.  
The wages system used by the Navy was, by necessity, haphazard. Sailors would often 
leave England on one ship expecting to return on the same, but be moved or 
volunteer to move to another ship at a foreign port.650 This peripatetic workforce 
made payment difficult as sailors were paid on returning to England and a record had 
to be kept as to how much was owed. There were several regulations relating to pay, 
but one safeguard that applied on behalf of sailors was that they did not need to have 
a copy of their original contract in order to obtain wages. This benefitted sailors as in 
some unfortunate cases, ships sank and possessions were lost and it was considered 
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deeply unfair if sailors lost pay due to a loss at sea. In less dramatic circumstances it 
benefitted sailors not to have to produce contracts at the pay office on return as 
sailors were often gone for many months, if not years, and contracts were easily lost. 
In practice, it is likely that, when switching between ships, sailors were not furnished 
with new contracts for their new ship. Consequently, it benefitted captains and 
senior officers of ships, as well as crew, because not having to provide contracts for 
every different ship made it easier to transfer crew.  
Not having to produce a contract to recover prize money and wages provided ample 
opportunity for fraud. As has been highlighted throughout this thesis, in a time where 
identity was difficult, if not impossible, to prove, false personation was often 
successful. One safeguard the Navy most likely relied upon to ensure monies were 
not fraudulently obtained was knowledge about the person claiming the money. 
Because most sailors would try to obtain their money as soon as returning to England, 
they would more than likely visit the pay office at the same time and therefore were 
able to verify each other’s identities. A fundamental flaw in this system was that 
crews would sometimes be divided up and sailors paid for the same prize money 
many months apart. There was also the official requirement that sailors attend the 
Naval Office to claim their prize monies.651 However, payment often happened 
wherever agents could find suitable premises, often public houses, and multiple 
crews could attend for payment at the same time. For example, Albert Innes, an 
agent for the Navy, described a confused scene at the King’s Head on Fenchurch 
Street in 1763, in which a number of ships’ crews were being paid at the same time.652 
Having to pay dozens of impatient sailors, all crammed into an inn, many of whom 
would be keen to return home or to sample the recreational treasures of London 
would have been chaos. Paying multiple sailors from multiple ships would require 
the juggling of multiple pay books and documentation in order to verify the contract 
details of sailors, many of whom would have no paperwork.  
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A further contributing factor to the opportunities for fraud was that often agents 
were not accustomed with the intricacies of naval hierarchy and culture. Naval agent, 
Alexander Chorley, revealed in cross examination that he did not really understand 
the terminology of rank utilised by the Navy and ‘was not much accustomed to the 
sea’.653 The eighteenth century English Navy was an institution of contradictions. On 
the one hand, it played a pivotal role in the development of the economic and 
military strengths of a growing empire. On the other hand, it ran on a system of debt, 
being forced to pay its workforce sporadically. Likewise, the Navy was a shining 
example of modern bureaucracy, while simultaneously operating a pay system that 
rested upon a series of precarious measures that regularly fell foul of fraud.  
These contradictions led to the Navy relying heavily upon the criminal justice system 
to secure its financial interests and to prevent its reputation as an employer and an 
efficient bureaucracy from sliding into mocked disrepute. The Navy used the threat 
of capital punishment to both deter being the subject of fraud and also to counter a 
growing reputation as an organisation in disarray. Consequently, whilst the manner 
in which frauds against the navy were carried out were very similar to other 
fraudulent offences, such as obtaining goods by false pretences, the fact that these 
crimes were committed directly against the Navy explains why they were defined as 
capital felonies.  
Financial Instrument Fraud 
Of the known fraud types heard at the Old Bailey, 15 per cent related to and were 
carried out through the use of a financial instrument or document.654 The 
interconnection between fraud and forgery was most apparent when the crime was 
carried out through the use of a financial instrument or other writing. As explored in 
Chapter 3, forgery and fraud offences were often seen as two sides of the same coin. 
Given the larger number of forgery cases heard at the Old Bailey during this time 
compared with fraud offences655, it can be concluded that prosecutors were more 
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inclined to use forgery laws than fraud laws should there be a choice between the 
two. This is understandable given that forgery offences were constructed in a clearer 
way than obtaining goods by false pretences or personation, and clerks were 
reluctant to draft false pretence indictments given the additional complexities these 
created.656 Another reason why forgery offences may have been preferred over fraud 
offences was that the majority of these offences were felonies. The advantages of 
felony prosecutions was that the goods could be reclaimed, costs of prosecution 
could be recovered, and there were wider sentencing possibilities, including 
execution.657  
Whilst there is certainly overlap between forgery and fraud using a financial or 
written instrument, there were some fundamental differences. One example being 
when the instrument itself was genuine, but directed to another person, such as in 
cases of false personation in which an unauthorised servant used a genuine note to 
obtain goods from a tradesperson. The distinction between forgery and fraud is 
important because it reveals something of how both laws were used, as well as the 
limitations or advantages of using either set of offences. As has been discussed in 
Chapter 3, fraud offences played a significant role in the wider justice system as they 
acted to fill the gaps left by a system that narrowly defined forgery and larceny 
offences; where forgery could not be made out, cheating or obtaining goods by false 
pretences or false personation could apply.  
On occasion with false instrument frauds, the accused was tried for both forgery and 
fraud. In 1771, Robert Johnson was found guilty at one Sessions for the forgery of a 
financial instrument and, in the next Sessions, for the fraudulent use of the 
instrument to obtain goods from a tradesperson.658 Presumably this was because 
there were a number of prosecutors and the tradesperson, his counsel, or another 
actor, felt that the matter was best prosecuted through false pretences, rather than 
forgery. In other instances, the court found it necessary to change the indictment 
                                                          
number of Proceedings are fewer than the number of indictments or defendants. For more detail 
see Chapter 3 
656 See Chapter 6 
657 For more details of the differences between felony and misdemeanour, see Chapter 3 
658 OBP, February 1771, trial of Roger Johnson (t17710220-83) 
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during the trial. There was the case in the trial of Daniel Murphy, when the court 
held:  
It appeared upon enquiry to be a crime of a higher nature; the court therefore 
directed the jury to acquit the defendant of the fraud, and he was immediately 
committed by the court to take his trial at the next session for forgery.659  
The wording here is particularly revealing as forgery was clearly indicated as a more 
serious crime than fraud by false pretences. 
It is when examining cases of fraud by financial instrument that the interconnection 
with uttering also becomes apparent. Of course, uttering requires that the money or 
instrument be false and this is where fraud offences become so useful to the 
prosecutor. Even when the instrument was genuine and the accused had obtained 
and altered it somehow, this was not strictly uttering. It could equally be forgery or 
false pretences. This is demonstrated in the case of John Hevey and Richard Beaty.660 
Hevey and Beaty conspired together to add a fictitious acceptor of a Bank of England 
note with intent to defraud a watchmaker out of goods. This offence united the 
forging of the note, the uttering of the forged note, and the pretences surrounding 
the passing off of this note, which in this case was highly elaborate. Hevey tried to 
pass off the note to the watchmaker who was reluctant to accept it. Hevey then 
suggested the two of them attend the closest compting-house where the note could 
be verified. Beaty, Hevey’s accomplice, walked out of the compting house just as the 
two arrived, making the watchmaker think he was a clerk at the compting-house. 
Beaty then proceeded to act as a knowledgeable and objective party, confirming that 
the forged note was in fact genuine. This led the watchmaker to give Hevey a watch 
and also the additional monies to make up the rest of the note. Without the false 
pretences of pretending to work at the compting-house, the watchmaker would 
never have accepted the false note. Fortunately, the shorthand writer saw fit to note 
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the lengthy address the court made regarding the indictment in this case and the 
drafting considerations in the indictment otherwise such details would be lost.  
Frauds that were carried out using financial instruments were the closest to the 
common view of fraud during this period. Certainly the historiography surrounding 
the nineteenth century makes much of the developing myriad of financial 
instruments and a deepening in the complexity of the economy, which lent itself to 
greater opportunities for fraud.661 However, the types of frauds being carried out 
through false instruments are far from sophisticated manipulation of the economy. 
Rather, these types of fraud are closer to the false servant type in that the accused 
would use notes pertaining to come from a master or potential customer in order to 
defraud tradespersons.  
It is unsurprising that financial instrument frauds were less commonly prosecuted at 
the assize than false servant cases. The threat of accepting a fraudulent financial 
instrument was well known to tradespersons during this period. Tradespersons often 
relied upon questioning the person attempting to pass off the instrument. However, 
this entailed placing a great deal of trust in how the person conducted themselves, 
how they dressed, and the general appearance of trustworthiness.662 There are few 
examples of false instrument types of fraud at the assize court. One explanation for 
this might be found in the fifth doctrine of fraud identified in this thesis, the 
requirement that the prosecutor demonstrate they had taken steps to protect 
themselves against the fraud. It is not possible to know of the cases which were not 
brought into the criminal justice system but prosecutors bringing accusations of 
fraud by financial instrument faced the additional hurdle of having to demonstrate 
that it was reasonable for them to have trusted the person using the instrument.663  
A central issue in determining the validity of a financial instrument was the 
handwriting on the instrument itself. This sounds extraordinary today, but 
tradespersons knew that paying attention to the handwriting of the masters sending 
                                                          
661 The historiography focused more upon forgery than fraud.  
662 Finn, Character of Credit, p.291 
663 This has been discussed at greater length in Chapter 3 
                                                                  Prosecuting Fraud in the Metropolis, 1760-1820 
 
171 
 
servants, or customers sending agents, was essential to commercial life.664 Financial 
instruments may have been increasingly used, but alongside pro-forma instruments, 
they tended to take the form of hand-written instruments, amounting to little more 
than an ‘IOU’.665  
Bank of England  
The Bank of England only appears as a complainant in 1.9 per cent of cases in which 
a complainant is identifiable. These cases have been separately categorised in order 
to answer wider questions within the current historiography and to contrast with the 
great number of offences the Bank was prosecuting during this period. Randall 
McGowen has conducted wide-ranging research on the activities of the Bank as both 
an investigative force and as a prosecuting agency.666 McGowen identified that the 
Bank of England began heavily prosecuting forgers after 1797, with as many as forty 
eight prosecutions at one assize in 1817.667 In identifying the number of prosecutions 
brought by the Bank of England for fraud cases, it can be demonstrated that the Bank 
of England was far more concerned with forgery than it was with fraud. This is 
perhaps not surprising as the forging of bank notes directly undermined the 
legitimacy of the Bank of England, whereas fraud offences often rested upon an 
additional dishonest or deceptive act of the fraudster and not solely upon the well-
replicated financial instrument. Moreover, as has been discussed in Chapter 5, the 
Bank of England proactively changed the laws of forgery so as to avoid the difficulties 
of navigating other, less applicable laws. Forgery was codified under a plethora of 
separate laws and the Bank acted to introduce more coherent and enforceable 
offences. Such tailored offences of forgery allowed the Bank to construct the laws it 
required in order to more easily bring prosecutions.  
This dearth of Bank of England prosecutions for fraud again supports the argument 
that where prosecutors had a choice between forgery and fraud offences, a forgery 
                                                          
664 Andrew and McGowen, The Perreaus p.18  
665 Ibid p.138 
666 In particular see: McGowen, Law and History Review, (2007) pp.241-282 and McGowen Past & 
Present (2005)  
667 McGowen , Past & Present, (1999) p. 105 
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indictment would be preferred. As explored in Chapter 4, choosing a felony over a 
misdemeanour meant that the prosecution would more likely be paid for by the 
state. Whereas, a prosecution for a misdemeanour would have to be paid for by the 
prosecutor. Again, such decision-making shines a light on the seemingly unusual 
choice by prosecutors of fraud to pursue their claim in the assize courts.  
Prosecutorial Actors: Complainants and Agents 
There has been a distinct lack of research conducted into the mechanics of the 
prosecution process and, in particular, who was bound over to prosecute cases. The 
recognizances attached to the Sessions Rolls provide some information in this area, 
although for only a limited number of cases under scrutiny. The Proceedings strongly 
suggest that the most relevant witness in prosecutions is the complainant. The most 
relevant witness is, in most instances, the first witness to give evidence. From this 
information it is possible to make some conclusions about who was bringing the case, 
or at least who was the most significant witness to the court. This person is not 
always the ‘victim’ of the offence, but often a servant or agent.  
Table 5.5: Prosecutorial Actors in Fraud Prosecutions at the Old Bailey 
Primary Actor Frequency Percentage Percentage 
Minus Unknown 
Actors 
Servant/Agent 159 34 51.5 
Complainant  150 32 48.5 
Total (of known) 309 65.9 100 
Unknown 160 34.1  
Overall Total 469 100  
 
Given the number of tradespersons bringing fraud cases, and the presence of the 
Navy, it is not surprising that it is servants who are at the center of these cases. There 
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is the possibility that the owner of the business was not in attendance when the fraud 
was carried out and it was naval employees, mostly pay masters or agents, who paid 
the monies to the swindler.  Further study into the use of servants in bringing 
prosecutions is needed, in particular whether prosecutors had servants bound over 
instead of themselves in order to reduce the onus of the prosecutorial process. 
Evidence from the Proceedings certainly suggests that servants of complainants 
played a pivotal role in bringing of prosecutions to court.  
Conclusion 
Those who use the law, shape the law. This chapter has revealed both the types of 
prosecutors bringing fraud cases to the Old Bailey, and the types of fraud they 
prosecuted. In identifying the occupations of prosecutors of fraud, better insight into 
the sectors of society pursuing expensive cases in the Old Bailey can be ascertained. 
Equally as significant, light can be shed on the backgrounds of prosecutors who are 
allowed by the criminal justice system to pursue these misdemeanours in the assize 
courts.668  
Analysis has revealed that the majority of fraud prosecutions were brought by 
tradespeople and the Navy. The very high presence of tradespeople further 
demonstrates the central argument of this thesis that the criminal justice system was 
operating in such a way as to promote the conditions of proto-capitalism. This is 
further supported by the types of fraud tradespeople prosecuted, frauds that deeply 
undermined trust within a financial system that relied upon credit and relationships 
based on trust. Frauds, such as those of the false servant and the financial 
instrument, directly attacked the trust in who one was dealing with and how people 
paid for goods in a time of very little circulating cash. Again, these offences were 
misdemeanours and could have been addressed at a fraction of the cost in the lower 
courts. However, these tradespeople chose to pursue these claims in the highest 
criminal court, thereby reflecting the severity with which they perceived these 
offences.669 These cases reflect an individual and a state pronouncement that fraud 
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offences were a significant threat to commercial and social values, and that such 
offences needed to be prosecuted using the most serious and punitive tools 
available.  
The imposition of a typology to the frauds heard at the Old Bailey allows for more 
contextualised analysis of how fraud was committed, and to a lesser extent, who was 
committing fraud.670 The high presence of the Navy as a prosecutor of fraud is also 
both surprising and revealing. It is not surprising that these types of fraud should be 
prosecuted at the assize level as they were capital felonies. However, it is very 
surprising that there should be such a presence in the Old Bailey of a public 
prosecutor, decades before the Bank of England, which has often been accepted as 
being the first example of a concerted public prosecutor. The types of fraud 
prosecuted by the Navy further reflect how similar these forms of fraud were to 
fraudulent misdemeanours. These similarities illustrate how the way in which frauds 
were committed were a long way from the sophisticated financial crimes often 
associated with fraud. Rather, the two most important requirements for committing 
fraud were some form of inside knowledge that could be exploited through a 
mechanism of deception, and the necessary bravado to carry off the ruse.  
The public forum of the Old Bailey, with such severe consequences for the accused 
was used as a declaratory medium by which the Navy could demonstrate to wider 
society that the fraudulent obtaining of prize monies would be prosecuted using the 
full force of the law. In both cases, for tradespersons and the Navy, this declaration 
served both to punish the individual transgressor, but more importantly to deter 
future fraudulent behaviour.  
These results reflect the way in which the criminal justice system operated and was 
used to punish frauds that undermined national and international commerce. In 
allowing tradespeople to pursue fraud misdemeanours at the highest level of the 
criminal court system, and thereby providing maximum public attention to these 
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fraud.  
                                                                  Prosecuting Fraud in the Metropolis, 1760-1820 
 
175 
 
crimes, the criminal justice system as a whole declared the seriousness of such crimes 
and the severity with which they would be punished. The high level of naval 
prosecutions further demonstrates the frauds that undermined international 
commerce and the expansion of the Empire would be even more seriously punished.  
This chapter has also revealed the types of fraud being prosecuted at the Old Bailey 
at this time. Given the dearth of archival information regarding those accused of 
fraud, this typology has gone some way to reveal the types of people being 
prosecuted for fraud at the Old Bailey. The most common method of fraud appears 
to have been committed through the abuse of some prior knowledge such as in the 
case of false servant frauds in which the accused pretended to be sent by a genuine 
customer to collect goods from a tradesperson. The next most common through 
pretending to be entitled to naval prize monies, and the next committing fraud using 
a written or financial instrument671. These methods of committing fraud rely upon 
the exploitation of some previously held information such as the name of a particular 
sailor and the ships on which he sailed, or upon some deception as to character such 
as dressing in a way so as to appear of a higher class in order to obtain credit672. These 
methods of committing fraud reflect how different in character eighteenth century 
prosecuted fraud were from nineteenth century forms of fraud which captured the 
public attention such as higher-level banking fraud673.  More significantly, the types 
of fraud prosecuted at the Old Bailey reflect that those committing fraud did not have 
to be of a higher class or be in a position of trust in order to commit fraud. It cannot 
clearly be concluded whether many of these prosecuted individuals were of a 
particular class674 but what is apparent is that there was certainly no requirement 
that a level of literacy or particular occupation was required to commit these frauds.  
Having established who was prosecuting fraud and what types of fraud were being 
heard at the Old Bailey, the following chapter will further question why these 
prosecutors were so frequently heard at the assize court by exploring the methods 
                                                          
671 See Table 5.3 
672 For examples of this see Finn, Character of Credit 
673 Examples include the 1856 prosecution of the Royal British Bank, see: Wilson, Origins; Taylor, 
English Historical Review; James Taylor, Historical Research (2005). 
674 Although those prosecuted for false servant fraud were mostly servants.  
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and mechanisms used by these prosecutors to bring these cases, and the steps 
required to be taken by the prosecutor when navigating their way through the 
criminal justice system. 
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Chapter Six The Role of Prosecutors and Tools of Prosecutions 
Previous chapters have explored the laws and doctrines of fraud, the choices of court 
and legal pathways available to those subject to fraud, and who prosecuted fraud at 
the assize court in London. This chapter will shed further light on prosecutions of 
fraud at the Old Bailey by exploring the methods and mechanisms by which 
prosecutions arrived at the assize court. First, the role of Old Bailey court officials in 
filtering and promoting fraud prosecution will be considered, with a particular focus 
upon the roles of clerks and the significance of their positions for influencing the 
preferred choice of indictment. Thus far, this thesis has focused upon the discretion 
and decision-making of the prosecutor. This chapter, along with the following 
chapter, will examine the significance of criminal justice officials upon the cases that 
arrived at the Old Bailey.  
The second focus of this chapter is the appearance and significance of policing agents 
in the prosecution of fraud. An examination of the Proceedings will reveal the extent 
to which policing agents appeared in fraud trials. The third influence upon 
prosecutors of fraud that is considered here is the role of prosecution associations, 
which were organisations designed to spread the cost of prosecution and give 
assistance to its members. To conclude, the presence of counsel at Old Bailey fraud 
trials will be investigated, especially their interdependence with prosecution 
associations. An in-depth analysis of the role of counsel in fraud trials will not only 
contribute to and challenge the wider literature on the development of counsel 
within trials, but will also explore the lengths to which prosecutors were willing to go 
in their pursuit of fraud accusations.   
Deciding the Offence 
The laws surrounding fraud were multiple and interconnecting. Chapters 3 and 4 
have revealed the breadth of choice available when prosecuting fraud, for both 
venue and offence. The focus of this thesis thus far has been upon the lay prosecutor 
and how prosecutors had wide discretion over the disposal of their cases, from 
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whether to report the crime, to consultation on sentencing.675 However, less is 
known about the level of discretion prosecutors had over the more detailed elements 
of the prosecution process. Given the intricacies and complexities of fraud laws, it 
seems unlikely that lay prosecutors would entirely control all elements of the 
prosecution process, including legally complex stages such as the choice of the 
indictment and its drafting. Rather, there is an expectation that other legally qualified 
actors must have influenced stages of the prosecution to a greater or lesser degree.  
It has been accepted that, to varying degrees, prosecutors played a role in the 
sentencing of prisoners.676 It has also been demonstrated that magistrates played a 
central role in filtering cases away from the more senior courts. This process may 
have been contrary to the will of the prosecutor, although there is no research on 
the presence, frequency or extent of such tension. Langbein has suggested that the 
discretion of the lay prosecutor was actually very limited, while King has provided 
quantitative data that supports this claim.677 However, it shall be demonstrated that 
prosecutors did not have full discretion when bringing a prosecution, particularly in 
cases of fraud that were often more complex than other criminal accusations. This 
chapter will therefore demonstrate the significance of magistrates and clerks in the 
disposal of fraud prosecutions. 
Clerks are an overlooked group of actors across the whole of the criminal justice 
system. However, clerks played a central role in providing advice to prosecutors for 
how best to pursue their cases. The Old Bailey clerk of assize would equally play a 
fundamental part in shaping the form and substance of the indictment. In his early 
work, Langbein made the bold claim that prosecutors had no control whatsoever 
over the nature, form, and details of the indictment once a felony was reported.678 
This claim is not strongly evidenced and, given the number of fraud indictments at 
the Old Bailey that were discontinued due to non-appearance of the prosecutor, it is 
apparent that judges tolerated the prosecutor’s decision to withdraw.679 The 
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majority of fraud cases were misdemeanours and, as such, they were not subject to 
the same regulation as felonies.680 Leaving aside the level of discretion of lay 
prosecutors in the drafting of indictments of felony, clerks would have ostensibly 
played an advisory role in the prosecution of misdemeanours.  
Did prosecutors always follow this advice and, more significantly, did the lay 
prosecutor genuinely have discretion to pursue a case as they wished? In examining 
a range of sources, including contemporary law treatises, magistrates’ office 
accounts, and miscellaneous lawyers’ papers, it is apparent that lay prosecutors did 
not have carte blanche to indict as they saw fit. Rather, magistrates clerks, clerks of 
assize, and lawyers involved in the drafting of indictments strongly directed 
prosecutors towards the offence that was pursued.  
The Role of Clerks 
The clerk is an erroneously commonly overlooked actor in the prosecution process. 
Within different courts there were a number of clerks and, in almost every instance, 
these clerks were legally trained, if not still practising as solicitors.681 In the 
magistrates courts there was often a clerk acting as a filter between the magistrates 
and the complainant. This position was enacted to provide initial legal advice and to 
direct the complainant as to which offence to pursue. In cases of assault or larceny 
this may have been more straightforward. However, in the case of fraud offences, 
the initial advice concerning the offence may have been subject to change during the 
various stages of the prosecution process. Due to the complexities and breadth of 
potential fraud prosecutions, clerks at different levels of the court system may have 
added to, or varied, the initial advice provided in the first instance.  
Within higher courts, arguably the most important clerk at assize level was that of 
the clerk of indictment. There is little archival evidence to reveal the nature and 
influence of the clerk of indictment. However, guidelines and advice for clerks and 
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681 John H Langbein, The Prosecutorial Origins of Defence Counsel in the Eighteenth Century: the 
appearance of solicitors. Cambridge Law Journal 58 (2) (July, 1999) pp.314-365. p.351 
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other lawyers, such as Chitty’s Practical Treatise of the Criminal Law682, as well as a 
collection of pro-forma indictments used within the Old Bailey itself, reveal that 
clerks of indictment had significant influence upon the type of offence prosecuted.  
Research that has been conducted into the process of indictment drafting has 
suggested that much of this process occurred within ‘a bureaucratic vacuum’ and 
without the input of evidence, or even the details recognizances.683 This appears 
unlikely however as the prosecutor would most likely be present when the 
indictment was drawn up, if only because the prosecutor had to pay for the 
service.684 Consequently, whilst there are no existing archives of the information 
used to draft the indictment, it is feasible that the prosecution provided such 
information verbally during the actual process of drafting the indictment. However, 
it can be surmised that the influence of the clerk and the scope within which they 
could alter the indictment depended upon the nature of the offence.685 Again fraud, 
which was a complex myriad of offences, overlapping with forgery and larceny, 
potentially gave the drafter of the indictment more choices.  
One method to ascertain the boundaries within which clerks of indictment operated 
is to return to the sources and materials lawyers would have used to assist them in 
the drafting process. Chitty wrote a number of treatises designed to guide practicing 
lawyers in how to negotiate the criminal justice system. His most extensive within 
the criminal law was his Practical Treatise of the Criminal Law. Comprising the 
Practice, Pleadings, and Evidence in four volumes.686 This treatise was published 
throughout the nineteenth century, producing several different editions in 1811, 
1826, 1832, and onwards. In light of the fundamental changes that were happening 
to the criminal trial and criminal evidence during this period, it is not surprising that 
new editions were required regularly.  
                                                          
682 J. Chitty, A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law Comprising the Practice, Pleadings, and Evidence 
Which Occur in the Course of Criminal Prosecutions, (A. J. Valpy, 1816) 
683 J.S Cockburn, Journal of the Society of Archivists, p.229 
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685 Gray, Crime, Prosecution and Social Relations, p.10.  
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As a practical guide, Chitty writes using examples of pleadings and indictments. What 
is immediately apparent is that a disproportionate number of these examples relate 
to fraud offences. Given the complexity and vagueness of the laws surrounding fraud, 
it is not surprising that Chitty returns time and again to the difficult examples of fraud 
offences, which lawyers of the day would have struggled. One particular warning that 
Chitty repeatedly gives is the need for specificity in drafting indictments. Again, Chitty 
uses a fraud offence, the obtaining of goods by false pretences, to illustrate how vital 
such precision is to ensure that indictments do not result in cases being dismissed.687 
Other advice for drafting indictments included the avoidance of complicated legal 
language and writing in such a way that all in the court could understand.688 
More specific advice in the drafting of indictments for fraud offences included 
techniques for drafting indictments for a cheat in which legal terms such as a ‘cheat’ 
were permitted due to the particular meaning of the term.689 Chitty also warns of 
forgetting to specify the mens rea of the offence and again, it is fraud to which Chitty 
refers.690  In particular, the drafter of the indictment is reminded to include the work 
‘knowingly’ in the indictment in order to ensure it does not fail at the first hurdle.  
Chitty provides a number of examples of accurately drafted indictments for obtaining 
goods by false pretences contrary to the 1757 Act.691 One of these is the common 
method for obtaining goods by false pretences, through pretending to be a servant 
to an unsuspecting shopkeeper.692 Another example is a more commercial ruse, 
whereby the pretence of being ‘merchants of fortune’ was used in order to obtain 
credit for goods.693 Chitty details a number of the more common methods to 
fraudulently obtain credit such as the giving of a fashionable, but false address that 
made the fraudster appear much wealthier than they were. Chitty also details frauds 
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against the Army and Navy to obtain pay and also the use of promissory notes to 
commit a fraud.694  
What is apparent from Chitty’s examples is that contemporaries were painfully aware 
of the plethora of offences falling under the umbrella of ‘fraud’. Perhaps the most 
aware were the individuals charged with identifying the most appropriate law to 
apply in the circumstances, who were, of course, the clerks of indictment. Such 
scrutiny of indictments has often been argued to be one of the safeguards against 
the Bloody Code; if the indictment did not fit the circumstances, the prisoner was 
given the benefit of the doubt and the entire case was likely to be dismissed.695 
Chitty concedes that often multiple indictments are required, particularly for more 
complex property offences in which the clerk has to apply both statute and common 
law.696 However, Chitty warns against adding unnecessary charges to an indictment 
as the Master (presumably of the Rolls) can fine clerks for unnecessarily complex or 
long indictments.697 This discretionary sanction was presumably introduced in order 
to ensure efficient drafting and also to save the court’s time, as well as to limit the 
number of cases that had to be dismissed before or during trial due to poor drafting. 
Before Chitty’s Treatise, the well-known Old Bailey barrister, William Garrow, 
reflected upon how judges were unsympathetic to the drafters of poor indictments: 
“I know there never was a judge went out of the way in order to cover the 
slovenliness of those who chuse [sic] to drawn indictments”.698  
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Drafting in Practice 
In addition to Chitty’s advice for the drafting of indictments, there survive a small 
cache of archives relating to the prosecution of fraud at the Old Bailey.699 The pre-
trial papers for the prosecution of William Gordon and Thomas Drewry at the City of 
London Sessions in 1777 contain all prosecution witness informations, details of 
costings, legal notes by counsel, warrants and, very usefully, instructions regarding 
the indictment.700 The case concerns the fraudulent selling of a certificate for the 
Freedom of the City to John Cole, a carpenter then working in Farringdon Without. 
This collection of papers is particularly illustrative as counsel appears to have taken 
a note of the potentially applicable law, including five statutes and reference to ‘Acts 
respecting mariners’, with another note detailing a further five relevant statutes. In 
light of this complexity of law, it is unsurprising that the instruction for indictment is 
comprehensively detailed and the brief for the Prosecution contains both a 
conspiracy offence and obtaining monies by false pretences. The detailed costings of 
the case reveal that there were further complications in the drafting of the 
indictment due to the draftsmen not attending one Sessions, and having to re-appear 
at the next Sessions. It is important to note that whilst William Gordon apparently 
appeared at the Old Bailey, this is not recorded in the Proceedings.701 This example 
reveals not only the complexity of fraud prosecutions, but also the options available 
to the prosecutor and the drafter of the indictment. It also reveals something of how 
conspiracy was added to indictments, presumably as an alternative offence should 
the false pretences indictment fail.  
Given the breadth of choices available and the procedural regulations regarding the 
drafting of indictments, it is increasingly clear that lay prosecutors did not have full 
control over the entire criminal procedure when prosecuting fraud. Clerks were 
answerable for their drafting, so it therefore stands to reason that such actors were 
                                                          
699 These can be found at the London Metropolitan Archive: ‘Papers re case against William Gordon 
and Thomas Drewry for a conspiracy and for obtaining money under false pretences’ 
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700 London Metropolitan Archives reference CLA/047/LJ/21/038 
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not merely the puppets of prosecutors. Likewise, it is likely that lay prosecutors 
would have been happy to follow the legal advice of the clerk when laying down the 
indictment. These services had to be paid for and it is reasonable to suggest that a 
prosecutor would rarely argue against a legally-trained clerk’s advice as to which 
offence to indict. A prosecution for a fraud brought to Marlborough Street 
Magistrates in 1805 is an revealing example of magistrates’ clerks undertaking 
prosecutions and by-passing lay prosecutors.702 Vincent Wright, Anne Fagan, and 
William Elson were brought before magistrates in 1805 for a bold scheme in which 
they rented a fashionable house near New Oxford Street, masqueraded as a lady and 
gentlemen and obtained credit by false pretences against a large number of 
shopkeepers and merchants in the area. Many, if not all of these shopkeepers, 
brought a united prosecution against the three accused and this caused great 
confusion in how the prosecution should be pursued. When the magistrates’ clerk 
attended to support the prosecutors he found: 
 [a] misunderstanding taking place between them and the clerk of 
indictments, on the misdemeanour side, they informed the sitting magistrate 
there of, whereupon they, and particularly Philip Neve Esq, one of the 
committing magistrates, ordered me to go down to the Sessions then holden, 
and endevour [sic] to get an indictment preffered [sic] and found the defs [sic] 
being such very notorious characters, he directed me to carry on with the 
prosecution for them. Instructions and authority to prosecute accordingly.703  
This clearly demonstrates that when the magistrate felt a particular prosecution 
should be brought, the lay prosecutor could be circumvented in pursuit of a 
successful outcome. It further suggests that lay prosecutors did not have full 
discretion in bringing their prosecutions. Sadly there are few records pertaining to 
the thought and decision-making process of court officials. However, some forms and 
precedents for fraud indictments exist within the Old Bailey from between 1786 and 
1800. It is significant that such precedents have not survived for other offences such 
                                                          
702 See records at The National Archive: T38/675 
703 T38/675 
                                                                  Prosecuting Fraud in the Metropolis, 1760-1820 
 
185 
 
as forgery or larceny. This could be purely due to the capricious nature of decisions 
to retain certain documents over others. However, given the complexity of fraud 
offences and the interconnectedness with other offences such as forgery, it is 
unsurprising that there was more support for the drafters of fraud indictments than 
for other offences.  
Prosecution Associations and Fraud 
Previous chapters have demonstrated that complainants of fraud had a number of 
choices when using the law to seek redress for fraud. These choices ranged from the 
civil to the criminal law, and within the criminal law, a possible range of indictments 
and courts. As has been detailed in Chapter 3, fraud offences ranged from 
misdemeanours to felonies and consequently, any of the criminal courts from the 
summary to the assize may have been used for respective prosecutions.  
This section of the chapter questions whether prosecutors of fraud were members 
of prosecution associations, and whether this had an effect on their choice to pursue 
their complaint of fraud criminally and in the most expensive criminal court. A brief 
overview of prosecution associations will be followed by consideration of a London 
prosecution association, The Society for the Protection of Trade against Swindler and 
Sharpers. Due to the nature of these associations, the focus will be upon 
prosecutions for non-naval frauds as such prosecutions are distinguishable by their 
quasi-official nature in that prosecutions were brought by state officials or agents.704 
Prosecution Associations: a Background 
Prosecution associations came into existence in the late-seventeenth century and 
continued in popularity until the mid-nineteenth century.705 Prosecution associations 
developed in order to make prosecutions cheaper for lay prosecutors by banding 
members together to form a type of insurance organisation that would cover the cost 
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of any future prosecution.706 These private institutions existed in ‘virtually every part 
of the country’707 and were generally made up of local property owners. The number 
of prosecution associations is not fully known, but they certainly numbered in the 
hundreds between the mid-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.708 In a time of 
private prosecutions, these associations ostensibly existed in order to reduce the cost 
and complications of securing justice through the criminal courts.  
The associations were designed to pool the resources of their members, so that, 
should a member be a victim of a crime, they could rely on the association to either 
pay for this process or provide compensation.  ‘Prosecution associations’ is a slightly 
misleading name as such associations often had wider and more nuanced purposes. 
Some associations merely provided compensation for the loss of the goods, rather 
than funding any legal action. Other associations only assisted the advertising of 
stolen property or only the partial funding of any legal action. Likewise, some 
associations acted as a hue and cry-type association and would actively seek out 
perpetrators of crime, sending agents to neighbouring areas to investigate and 
actively search for illegally obtained property.709 These associations also ranged in 
the scope of the offences they helped to prosecute. King highlights that most 
prosecution associations in the eighteenth century only applied to specific offences 
such as cattle theft, housebreaking or highway robbery.710 This trend changed during 
the nineteenth century. From the end of the eighteenth century, there are more 
examples of associations prosecuting crimes other than larceny and burglary, such as 
crimes by soldiers, bread riots, or embezzlement of yarn.711 However, these 
associations were very much ephemeral, with their existence depending upon the 
crises to which they were reacting.  
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Before turning to The Society for the Protection of Trade, it must be stressed that we 
cannot know how many of the 469 fraud indictments under scrutiny were brought 
by members of such organisations. The Proceedings make no reference to such 
associations in any of the relevant fraud cases, but this certainly does not mean that 
prosecutors were not members. With regard to the wider existence of prosecution 
associations, it is difficult to gauge their number or usage. Luckily there exists a cache 
of documentation relating to one particular prosecution association and this 
association was directly concerned with fraud. 
The Society for the Protection of Trade against Swindlers and Sharpers 
The Society for the Protection of Trade against Swindlers and Sharpers (henceforth 
referred to as ‘the Society’) was founded in London in 1776.712 There would have 
been other such trade associations during this period and, by 1866, these groups 
were amalgamated into the National Association of Trade Protection Societies.713 
Fortunately, there are surviving records of the Society from between 1825 and 1835, 
including a large number of the notices that were sent to members and 
correspondence both to and from the Society’s secretaries.714 The existing records 
provide insights into the Society, as well as invaluable information as to how its 
members fought the onslaught of fraud in the nineteenth century. Before analysing 
the details of the records surrounding the Society, it is perhaps first useful to outline 
the nature of these records and what they can tell us more generally about the 
Society.  
The Society published bi-monthly notices that it sent out to each of its members. 
These notices contained a range of information, predominantly listing people to 
whom credit had been extended by one of the Society’s members, who had then 
either disappeared or was found to be a swindler. The records also contain details of 
the proposed members to the Society, along with their professions. There are also 
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examples of the accounts of the Society that were sent to members and a small cache 
of correspondence both to and from the Society’s secretaries. 
As with any voluntary organisation during the time, the scope of the responsibilities 
of prosecution associations were limited to the constitution of that particular 
association and Consequently, it is appropriate to use one such association as a focus 
upon which to inform understandings of the role that particular association played 
in the criminal justice system. By studying this particular society, we can gain insight 
into the common practices that traders used to deter, detect, and prosecute 
potential swindles.  
The Society was highly organised and run by a strict set of rules. A recommended 
change in 1831 to ‘the 18th of the printed rules’ suggests that a constitution 
underpinned the running of the Society. Like many other such associations715, the 
Society employed a solicitor, Mr Thomas Miller of 22 Ely Place, Holborn. It is because 
of Mr Miller that the records survive. From its accounts, it is apparent that the Society 
had a full time secretary who was paid a very generous salary amounting to £628 
including expenses. The Society also had its own Treasurer, Messrs Veres, Ward & Co 
of Lombard Street. The Society had quarterly meetings in the George and Vulture 
tavern on Cornhill, but the notices would suggest that attendance at such meetings 
needed to be encouraged. The committee incentivised attendance at the meeting 
with a policy that the first nine members who arrived at quarterly meetings and 
remained for the duration received three shillings. The Society had such healthy 
finances that it also invested some of the subsidies in financial speculations. There 
are no details of these investments, but they returned a bi-annual dividend of the 
usual three per cent, so it might be concluded that these investments were safe 
options such as government bonds.  
Members 
Fortunately the quarterly meetings of the Society were well-recorded and the 
minutes sent to members. These minutes, in the form of notices, included a list of 
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the newly proposed members alongside their occupations and addresses. We know 
from the records that the Society was very large, receiving subscriptions from 
between 830 and 890 members, at an average of just over one pound per annum. 
Lists of proposed members suggest that both companies and individuals could be 
members. The occupations of all the members cannot be ascertained, as the records 
do not include a full list of members. However, the notices detail the occupation of 
proposed members, which gives a very good indication of the background of 
members.  
The Society membership appears diverse. Memberships of prosecution associations 
tended to be gentlemen, farmers, or tradesmen, depending upon the location and 
purpose of the association.716 The notices reflect that, as well as tradespeople, there 
were a large number of artisans such as brush makers, sack makers, hat makers, 
carpenters, and silversmiths. Overwhelmingly however, the members are 
tradespeople including a range of merchants, booksellers, drapers, and 
haberdashers. There is evidence of professional members such as land surveyors and 
solicitors, as well as a ‘gentleman’ member. Companies were also members of the 
Society. Of the 225 members recommended for election to the Society, 83 of these 
were companies. This is to be expected given the nature and purpose of the Society 
as a protection against threats to trade. 
As detailed in Chapter 5, we must be very careful not to make too broad conclusions 
regarding the social status of members according to their occupations. However, 
what we can see is that the Society has a wide range of members, from the smaller 
artisan to the international merchant. The membership of the Society largely 
correlates with the occupation of prosecutions of fraud within the Old Bailey, with 
the largest proportion of members coming from trade.717 What all members have in 
common is that they all had property to protect and they all worked in industries and 
occupations that heavily relied upon the use of credit, both receiving and extending. 
The diverse membership of the Society supports Schubert’s claim that membership 
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of such associations was not based on social standing718, as a ‘gentleman’ was a 
member alongside a bricklayer. 
As well as tradesmen, the board of the Society was also made up of aldermen, such 
as George Bridges Esq, who was Vice-President, and Richard Clark Esq, Chamberlain 
of London, who acted as President. Connections between magistrates and 
prosecution associations were well known. Sir John Fielding strongly advised all 
property owners to join such an association, perhaps because he believed this would 
encourage more people to engage with and utilise the criminal law. It is unknown 
how many associations Fielding played a role in establishing, but it is known that he 
directly advised the establishment of the ‘Society for Prosecuting Felons, Forgers etc’ 
in 1767.719 Fielding was also passionate about the need for prosecution associations 
in order to protect shopkeepers: 
As shopkeepers are more subject to the inroads of cheats and thieves than 
other persons…and as the expense and loss of time in prosecutions, added to 
the loss of their goods, deters many from bringing such offenders to justice, 
by which leniety (sic) they are encouraged to continue their villainous 
practices, to the injury of trade, it is apprehended that an association of 
tradesmen and shopkeepers, under the following restrictions, will, by 
rendering the detection and punishment of the said offenders more easy…and 
deter evil-disposed people from fixing on shopkeepers as the objects of their 
prey.720  
It is therefore unsurprising that City magistrates and officials would be senior 
members of the association. It is also not surprising that aldermen, often leading 
merchants within the City, would be members of an association designed to protect 
their business interests from fraud.  Schubert has noted a correlation between the 
existence of prosecution associations and the presence of active magistrates.721 The 
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role of aldermen in the committal of fraud cases to the Old Bailey will be explored in 
detail in the following chapter. What is significant in relation to the members of the 
Society however is that aldermen, who also sat as magistrates within the City of 
London, were actively involved in a large association devoted to prosecuting fraud. 
The significance of the presence of City aldermen is compounded by the location and 
operation of the Society.  
Most prosecution associations were locally focused, rather than nationally, with 
Schubert arguing that prosecution associations ‘tend[ed] their own gardens’.722 The 
geographical remit of the Society is not wholly clear, but the Society was certainly 
based in the Metropolis, if not the City. The quarterly meetings were held on 
Cornhill723, perhaps chosen because it was central to most members and easily 
reached, but could also suggest that more members were based in the City than in 
the rest of the Metropolis. Some further detail regarding the location can be gauged 
from the addresses of the new members that were circulated in the monthly 
newsletter. These addresses were referred to as the ‘residents’ of the new members 
but it is not clear whether this is the location of the business or the individual. One 
proposed member, James Careless, a gentleman, gave his residence as the New York 
Coffeehouse, presumably because this is where he had his post directed when he 
was in town. 
Most new members lived within the Metropolis, with approximately only eight per 
cent giving an address outside of the capital.724 There were members from as far 
away as Banbury, Manchester, Newcastle, and Liverpool. Of these members who 
lived outside of the Metropolis, forty-four percent were bankers, sixteen percent 
gentlemen or solicitors, and eleven percent merchants. The majority of members are 
London-based and joined a London-based association to protect their trade. Of the 
eight percent who reside outside of the Metropolis, it is highly likely that many of 
them conducted some of their business in London or spent enough time in the Capital 
to justify membership of an association should they fall foul of fraud when in London. 
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The increasingly mobile population and improved transportation links across the 
country resulted in swindles being carried out in more than one area at a time and 
there was a growing need to enforce laws across the country. This is reflected in the 
notices of the Society. For example, there is suggestion that legal action was taken 
by members outside of the Metropolis. In March 1831, it was circulated that a 
member had taken action in Birmingham and the case had been dismissed as the 
goods sought to be recovered were for less than £5 and thus, the member had 
started his action in too superior of a court. This is a very significant notice as it 
reflects not only that the Society’s dealings extended beyond the metropolis, but also 
that members were sharing legal experience in order to develop knowledge of the 
court system. This further demonstrates how membership of associations allowed 
for the pooling of knowledge, as well as the pooling of finances, and made such 
prosecutions far more formidable than the lone prosecutor.  
The Work and Focus of the Society 
The Society seems to have had a range of functions, not just the prosecution of 
swindlers. There is much evidence to suggest that the Society was more concerned 
with the prevention of fraud than the subsequent compensation of members. The 
Society also acted as insurance for its own members. In 1831, a motion passed to 
ensure that members not only had their costs paid for in failed prosecution cases, 
but that their legal fees when defending any legal action would also be paid. It is not 
clear what these ‘legal fees’ refer to as they are separately noted in the Society’s 
accounts to those of prosecutions. However, as shall be detailed below, there were 
a number of reasons the Society might have been embroiled in varying forms of 
litigation.  
From a detailed examination of the records, a selection of offences against members 
shall be considered, followed by the responses and reactions the Society employed 
to address such threats to their trades. The records detail some of the methods by 
which the associations caught and prosecuted swindlers, illustrating how 
associations used the full range of activities we would come to associate with the 
modern police: detection, prosecution, and deterrence.  
                                                                  Prosecuting Fraud in the Metropolis, 1760-1820 
 
193 
 
As illustrated throughout this thesis, there were a range of fraudulent offences and 
types of fraud being commonly carried out in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. The forms of fraud carried out against members of the Society resemble 
the types of fraud found at the Old Bailey during this time. Many swindles against 
members involved the fraudulent obtaining of credit. In a time when it was almost 
impossible to definitively check the identity or credentials of a person, tradespeople 
were often forced to rely on either the person’s demeanour, or the use of an 
introductory letter or character reference. Swindlers took advantage of this by 
imitating the more respectable classes, forging character references, or pretending 
to be acquaintances of mutually known third parties.725  It is these types of fraud that 
make-up over fifty percent of the fraud cases heard at the Old Bailey. These forms of 
fraud have been classified in this thesis as false servant fraud, financial instrument 
fraud, and consumer fraud.  
The swindles committed against members of the Society were variations of obtaining 
goods by false pretences, false personation, or the fraudulent use of a financial 
instrument. Some swindles were more elaborate or ingenious than others, but they 
were no more than variations of these three core types of fraud. Extending credit 
always came with risks of non-payment, whether this be due to fraudulent or non-
fraudulent motives of those to whom credit has been extended. However, the 
notices of the Society would suggest that the members had identified a number of 
recurring fraudulent threats to their commercial integrity. In looking at just one of 
the Society’s notices circulated to its members, we can see the range of frauds 
suffered by the members.726 A common threat to tradespeople was the fraudulent 
use of cheques in order to obtain goods. Mr D Page, keeper of a shop on the Mile 
End Road, was swindled by a man claiming to be a ‘G. Edwards’, who obtained goods 
using a cheque that, when presented at the payer’s bank, was rejected as the payer 
was not known to the bank. This type of offence was more likely to be pursued as a 
forgery, although additional indictments of fraud offences could have been added. 
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A further threat to members was the fraudulent ordering of goods by post. Such long-
distance trading posed an even greater risk for the traders as the usual methods 
available to assess creditworthiness, such as questioning the customer, gauging their 
social standing and credibility from their demeanour, accent, or dress, were not 
possible. There are many examples of such fraud within the notices. For example, a 
letter purporting to be from a Henry Jones & Co of Duke Street turned out to be 
fraudulent in that Henry Jones had not given permission for the letterhead to be used 
and knew nothing of the correspondence. A particularly bold fraud was circulated to 
the members of the Society in 1831. John Hamilton & Co advertised for the purchase 
of goods from ‘merchants, manufacturers, warehousemen, factors, shopkeepers, 
and others’ instructing them to send samples of their goods to an address on 
Bishopsgate Street in the City. The fraudsters requested that the first communication 
should contain ‘no personal applications in the first place’. Clearly this was an 
ingenuous fraud to obtain as many samples of goods and property in a short space 
of time before disappearing. 
A common threat to the members of the Society was organised fraud committed by 
groups of individuals. There was even an instance in which a member of the Society 
himself was part of an organised swindle heard at the King’s Bench that resulted in a 
one-year prison sentence. There are two groups of swindlers who appear in the 
notices a number of times. The Whittingham brothers appear in five notices, 
primarily in 1831, and it is apparent that the Society paid close attention to the 
brothers’ movements. The final reference to the Whittingham brothers in the 
Society’s notices details over twelve addresses at which the brothers had lived, which 
assumedly would allow members to cross-reference further applications for credit or 
other historic frauds.  
Another gang of fraudsters who plagued the Society was headed by Thomas Cornish 
Broad. Broad appears in the notices seven times between 1831 and 1835, wherein 
he was reported to have played several roles in frauds including the fraudulent giving 
of good character references in order to obtain credit. Newspaper reports following 
these notices reflect that the authorities were also aware of the web of criminal 
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activity involving Broad through which the tradesmen of London were terrorised. In 
1840, Isaac Godfrey was brought before Sir Peter Laurie at the Mansion House on a 
charge of forgery. During these proceedings it became apparent that Godfrey was a 
member ‘of a gang of fellows who have been extensively plundering tradesmen’.727 
Following much interrogation by Laurie, it was revealed that the person in charge of 
this ‘knot of swindlers’728 was none other than Thomas Cornish Broad. Laurie 
postponed the hearing, calling for other potential prosecutors or witnesses to come 
forward. A week later, ‘a great crowd of tradespeople’ appeared at the Mansion 
House revealing Broad’s organisation to be ‘a very extensive gang of swindlers [who] 
defrauded tradesmen of their goods’.729 The evidence given during the hearing paints 
Broad as a Moriarty figure at the centre of a gang of swindlers made up of at least 
fifty members. Laurie asked the throng of prosecutors and others in attendance 
whether Broad had attended the hearing in order to answer the accusations against 
him. Unsurprisingly this question was met by laughter. There is no evidence that 
Thomas Cornish Broad was ever brought to justice, or that Sir Peter Laurie was true 
to his word that ‘I shall not see the tradesmen of the metropolis plundered by gangs 
of villains’.730 It is apparent however that the Society paid close attention to the 
threat of organised crime and attempted to take action to protect their members.  
Prosecutions 
The Society employed a range of methods to protect its members from common 
frauds of the day, including the use of prosecution and formal engagement with the 
criminal justice system, which forms the focus of this thesis. The Society prosecuted 
fraud in the magistrates and at the King’s Bench, demonstrating that the Society 
engaged with the full range of criminal courts.  
The notices reference fourteen successful prosecutions; three at the Old Bailey, one 
in the King’s Bench, and the remaining ten in the magistrates’ court. However, the 
notices do not always detail which magistrates, so it is not possible to identify 
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whether the bulk of the prosecutions were carried out in the City or in Middlesex. Of 
the three Old Bailey cases, one was for forgery, one for conspiracy to defraud, and 
the other for obtaining goods by false pretences. The reporting of the prosecutions 
within the notices predictably only covers successful prosecutions. Nevertheless, 
they give an impression of merciless prosecutions, such as the prosecution of 
Frederick Smith for forgery in 1831, who was reportedly sentenced to death. What 
this notice excludes however is that the Society had asked the judge for mercy to 
avoid Smith being executed.731 The omission of this detail in the notice suggests that 
the notices acted partly as a deterrent for potential swindlers against the Society and 
its members. Moreover, the notices also provided an opportunity for the Society to 
demonstrate to its members that they were getting their money’s worth. Other Old 
Bailey prosecutions included that of John Robins, who was convicted of fraud by false 
pretences in 1827.732 Four other accused were successfully prosecuted at the Old 
Bailey in 1825 for cheating and defrauding several members of the Society. The 
notices also detail the sentences of the convicted fraudsters. For example, John 
Robins, alias John Horne, was convicted of fraudulently obtaining goods and was 
sentenced to seven years transportation.  
Whilst a number of complaints were pursued in higher courts, the bulk of 
prosecutions brought by the Society were disposed of at summary level. The majority 
of the indictments were for obtaining goods by false pretences, or the ubiquitous 
‘fraud’. All but one of the accused was male, while all but one was brought within the 
Metropolis.733 
These prosecutions were not actually undertaken to recover the lost goods per se.  
Goods could only be recovered for felony and not misdemeanour, such as the 
fraudulent obtaining goods by false pretences.734 One purpose of the prosecution 
may have been publicity. The Society was keen to advertise these prosecutions. 
Notices could have been published solely for the audience of the members in order 
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to justify their membership fees, but if the Society were to have considered 
deterrence part of their remit, it would have made more sense for them to publicise 
not only that they were willing to prosecute swindlers, but that such prosecutions 
had previously been successful.   
Deterrence  
The level of activity of a prosecution association should not be gauged by the number 
of successful prosecutions it brought, but rather by the level of security they offered 
their members.735 The Society’s responses to fraud were designed to deter potential 
swindlers from targeting members of the Society. As such, the existence of the 
Society may have acted as both a general and specific deterrence, with high-level and 
frequent prosecutions serving as a warning to would-be swindlers in the capital.736 
Moreover, membership of the Society may have lessened the likelihood of the 
individual members being targeted by swindlers, as they would be aware that the 
cost and complexity of prosecution would not prevent specific traders from 
undertaking criminal action against them. John Styles makes the argument that 
associations may have advertised lost goods or successful prosecutions in order to 
deter future swindlers.737 Of course, it is impossible to estimate the number of 
people who were deterred by such membership and consequently chose not to 
commit crime against specific members of an association.  
It is also not clear how general members of the public would know which traders 
were members of the association and which were not. King has suggested that 
prosecution associations circulated lists of its members in order to inform the public 
and also to deter fraudsters and would-be thieves from targeting their premises.738 
This explains why advertisement of the Society was so important. It is also 
conceivable that members displayed a sign in their shop windows, much like a 
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neighbourhood watch sign or that members posted the notices of the Society behind 
counters within view of the general public. Alongside the publication of successful 
prosecutions, it was also common for associations to put up posters evidencing the 
confession of the accused in lieu of prosecution.739 King’s argument relies on the 
assumption that those committing fraud were both informed and rational. Those 
committing fraud offences may have been better organised and planned their crimes 
more than in other offences that allowed for more opportunistic committal such as 
larceny. More significantly than whether being a member of a prosecution 
association deterred fraud is whether tradespeople believed that such publicity and 
membership of the Society would deter fraud against them. The extensive use of 
publicity would suggest that members believed it did reduce fraud against them.  
Alongside an agenda of deterrence, members of the Society may have had to 
demonstrate they were taking legal steps to recover property before their insurance 
companies would cover any loss. This argument, and the significance of insurance 
companies in the prosecution of fraud, appears more frequently with regard to the 
nineteenth century740, but it cannot be ruled out in relation to the eighteenth 
century.  
King has argued that, whilst prosecution associations were widespread, their impact 
was not felt in the higher criminal courts.741 King argues this was because the 
organisation of such associations was poor and the financial structures and general 
appetite of the members did not allow for more complex and expensive legal 
action.742 This argument is certainly not borne out by the records of the Association 
for the Protection of Trade, which not only had surplus funds at the end of every 
year, but also had an in-house solicitor and paid secretary employed that allowed for 
a well-organised and consistent association. Perhaps this level of organisation is what 
                                                          
739 Philips, Policing and Prosecution p.129 
740 For the significance of insurance companies on fraud complaints see Gregory Anderson, Victorian 
Clerks, (Manchester University Press, 1976) 
741 King, Policing and Prosecution p.202 
742 Ibid 
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permitted the Society to bring so many prosecutions against swindlers, both in the 
lower and the higher criminal courts.  
It cannot be known how many fraud indictments heard at the Old Bailey during this 
period were supported by prosecution associations. However, given the popularity 
of the associations and the frequent use with which they were used by shopkeepers 
and property owners, it can be concluded that some of the fraud cases would have 
been brought by members of such associations. The existence and widespread 
membership of such associations is particularly significant to the prosecution of fraud 
offences as it goes some way to explaining why so many misdemeanours were 
prosecuted within the expensive assize courts, when the quarter sessions or 
magistrates could have achieved a similar result for less expense. Membership of 
such organisations allowed shopkeepers and tradespeople to publicise the 
fraudulent crimes against them and other members of the organisation, and to very 
publically demonstrate that such offences would be prosecuted to the full extent of 
the law. Wilson argues that the existence of such dedicated associations reflects how 
fraud offences had gained wider social recognition.743 It further demonstrates the 
extent and development of traders’ organising and pooling resources in order to 
protect themselves against an ever expanding commercial society that brought with 
it ever more insidious and ingenious opportunities for fraud.  
Fraud and the Use of Policing and Magistrates’ Agents 
Prior to the establishment of the Metropolitan Police in 1829, it is anachronistic and 
misleading to refer to the ‘Police’. However, there did exist organisations and agents 
that played an ad hoc role in the enforcement of the criminal law.744 A formal, 
London-wide police force was not introduced until 1829.745 However, there was 
sporadic and localised police coverage across the capital, with Middlesex in particular 
having an increasingly active police presence in the form of the Bow Street 
                                                          
743 Wilson, British Journal of Criminology, p.1079 
744 For detailed explorations of the history of the police see: D. Hay and F. Snyder (eds), Policing and 
Prosecution; Durston, Burglars and Bobbies 
745 David Philips, Crime and Authority p.54 
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Runners.746 As returned to time and again in this thesis, the growth and 
establishment of commerce and the need for a secure environment within which 
commercial relations could be encouraged and maintained led to property laws and 
wider property protection being made paramount within the criminal justice system. 
The police played an essential role in this process.747 Magistrates also played an 
indispensable role in the protection of property and, in particular, with the attempt 
to increase confidence and trust in the market with the aim of growing 
commercialism and attracting further investment and commercial activity. Within 
London during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, quasi-police forces were 
emerging, connected to local magistrates such as Bow Street. As this chapter is 
seeking to understand the methods and tools used by prosecutors of fraud when 
bringing cases to the Old Bailey, the role of policing agents, where present, is 
potentially significant.  
Within the 469 fraud accusations under examination here, there is evidence of police 
involvement in approximately eleven percent of fraud indictments during the period. 
There has been little systematic research into the presence of police officers at Old 
Bailey trials and so, there are few comparisons with other offences to ascertain 
whether police involvement in fraud trials was average or otherwise. However, 
Beattie estimates that between 1770 and 1792, an average of eight or nine Bow 
Street Runners appear within each session.748 As Beattie was only focusing upon the 
Runners and not constables from other jurisdictions within the Capital, it may be 
suggested that there would have been more of a police presence than Beattie 
reveals. The presence of policing agents in fraud trials is consistent over the time 
period and, of the fifty-two fraud indictments in which policing agents played a role, 
there is no apparent clustering over time. The 1760s and the 1810s saw marginally 
more police agent involvement, but this is partly because these decades saw a 
number of joint enterprise fraud cases that were heard at the same time but have 
                                                          
746 For a detailed history of the Bow Street Runners see J. M Beattie, The First English Detectives 
(Oxford University Press, 2012) 
747 Steven Spitzer and Andrew T. Scull, ‘Privatization and Capitalist Development: the case of the 
private police’ Social Problems, Vol.25, No.1 (Oct, 1977) pp.18-29. 
748 John Beattie, ‘Garrow and the Detective: Lawyers and Policemen at the Old Bailey in the Late 
Eighteenth Century’ Crime, History & Societies, Vol.11. No.2 (2007) p.4 
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been counted separately.749 In these instances of joint enterprise, where a police 
agent is counted for one offender, the agent is counted for other offenders as well 
which gives the impression of greater police agent involvement.  
Ascertaining the number of police involved in fraud trials has significant 
methodological challenges. The role of policing agents was in flux during this period 
and their role within the trial could vary as to importance and level of authority. 
Beattie is confident that the Proceedings are the most useful source in gauging the 
extent of police presence in criminal trials.750 As detailed in Chapter 2, evidence 
gleaned from the Proceedings is generally thought to be accurate, but by no means 
complete. Consequently, when using the Proceedings to ascertain the frequency with 
which the police were involved in fraud prosecution, it may be assumed that whilst 
there is little mention of police presence, this does not mean that policing agents 
were not involved in cases.  It is very likely that police agents would have been 
present in other cases, but the Proceedings do not reveal this. Where there is police 
presence, this is clear from the court report and the police agent is generally referred 
to as ‘constable’, or later in the period, as ‘officer’.751  
With no similar research having been carried out with regard to other offences, it is 
not possible to conclude whether police involvement in eleven percent of Metropolis 
fraud prosecutions is unusual. However, there are some possible conclusions to be 
drawn regarding the impact of police presence upon conviction rates.  
 
 
 
                                                          
749 See Chapter 2 
750 Beattie, History & Societies. p.4 
751 At the turn of the nineteenth century, there is a change in lexicon from the term ‘constables’ to 
‘officers’. This move away from the lexicon associated with the traditional, night watch-style 
policing to the more formal title, invoking the clear association of duty to the new role of the 
modern force.  
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Table 6.1: Policing Presence and Verdicts 
 Guilty Not Guilty Special 
Verdict 
Total 
No Policing 
Agent 
271 145 1 417 
Policing Agent 49 3 0 52 
Total 320 148 1 469 
Of the fifty-two indictments in which police were involved, forty-nine of these 
resulted in conviction. This is a conviction rate of nearly ninety-five percent. Where 
police were not involved in prosecutions, just under sixty-five percent were 
convicted. This figure of course involves trials in which prosecutors did not appear or 
where the accused raised no defence, but the contrast with police-involved 
indictments is stark.  
Whilst the Proceedings provide some quantitative information regarding the 
presence of policing agents in the prosecution of fraud, little information about the 
depth and breadth of police involvement is revealed. There is no information 
regarding how or when the policing agents became embroiled in the particular 
accusation of fraud, or who employed them. However, glimpses of such information 
can be found in other sources. Bow Street Magistrates accounts submitted to the 
Treasury from the mid-eighteenth century indicate that Bow Street used constables 
and other personnel to great effect in the detection and prosecution of fraud.752 This 
use of constables was for cases such as preventing illegal gambling, but also included 
a three day pursuit of ‘two cheats’ by two constables across Bedfordshire and 
Hertfordshire at a cost of £7, 4 shillings and 10 pence.753 Such dedication of resources 
to the capture of swindlers not only reflects how seriously such misdemeanours were 
taken, but also provides some insight into the level of involvement magistrates had 
in the prosecution of fraud. There are clear examples when magistrates and their 
                                                          
752Treasury Department Accounts – John Fielding’s Accounts  at the National Archive reference 
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officers take over the detention and apprehension of fraud accused. This illustrates 
how the lay prosecutor of fraud was not entirely unsupported in their action. 
Moreover, in light of the discussion above regarding the lay prosecutor’s discretion 
in prosecuting for fraud, it would be astonishing if following such expenditure of 
resources the magistrates would not play a pivotal role in the next stage of the 
prosecution. This increased role in fraud prosecutions by magistrates evidences not 
only how much support lay prosecutors could receive from state actors, but also the 
beginnings of magistrates taking control of certain prosecutions. The significance of 
magistrates in the prosecution of fraud will be discussed in detail in the following 
chapter but it is significant that there were policing agents, who worked for 
magistrates, involved in fraud prosecutions and more significantly, that where they 
were involved, the conviction rates were remarkably high. 
A further development that extended the role of policing agents in the criminal 
justice system was the increased use of police agents by public authorities and large 
organisations such as the Royal Mint, the Post Office, and the Bank of England.754 This 
involvement was primarily in relation to forgery and coining offences. For example, 
Bow Street had a dedicated coining expert, John Clarke, who had previously worked 
for the Royal Mint.755 The police were particularly widely employed by the Bank of 
England to both detect and assist in the prosecution of forgery cases.756 McGowen 
has demonstrated that such police involvement led to better detection and 
prosecution of forgery cases. The success of prosecutions where policing agents were 
present is reflected in fraud trials at the Old Bailey. As stated above, in nearly ninety-
five percent of fraud indictments where there was a police presence, a conviction 
was achieved. However, whilst there appears to be a strong correlation between the 
presence of policing agents and convictions, a police presence was not the only factor 
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755 Ibid p.10 
756 Randall McGowen, ‘Managing the Gallows: the Bank of England and the Death Penalty, 1797-
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that contributed to prosecutorial success. Another essential factor was the presence 
and role of counsel.  
The Presence of Counsel in Fraud Trials 
The presence and role of counsel in the prosecution of fraud is pivotal to our 
understanding of how fraud was prosecuted, how these prosecutions impacted upon 
the substantive laws of fraud, and how they were prosecuted in future trials. As shall 
become apparent, the presence of both prosecution and defence counsel allowed 
for the laws of fraud to be better tested and argued, and allowed for legal points to 
be addressed by the appeal judges in Crown Case Reserved hearings. Additionally, 
the presence of counsel for either the prisoner or the prosecutor impacted upon the 
level of reporting of the case within the Proceedings.757  
There has been extensive and excellent research upon the growth in the number and 
role of counsel within the criminal trial.758 However, data derived from within these 
studies have, for the most part, been conducted through sampling the proceedings 
or through keyword searches.759 Sampling and keyword searches certainly give good 
estimations of the presence of counsel, but such keyword searches may of course 
miss examples when the words do not appear and also where counsel are referred 
to by name rather than as ‘counsel’.760 This study of fraud has allowed a detailed 
exploration of all fraud indictments761 during the period 1760-1820.  It therefore 
provides data about how many prosecution and defence counsel were present in 
these trials and contributes to on-going discussions in the field. 
                                                          
757 See Chapter 2 
758 John H. Langbein, "The Criminal Trial before the Lawyers," University of Chicago Law Review: Vol. 
45: Iss. 2, (1978); John H Langbein, Origins; John H. Langbein, The Origins of Public Prosecution at 
Common Law, American Journal of Legal History 17, 313 (1973); John Beattie, Crime and the 
Courts, 1660-1800 (Oxford University Press, 1986); John Beattie, Law and History Review (1991); 
Cairns, Advocacy; May, The Bar  
759 Robert Shoemaker, ‘Representing the Adversary Criminal Trial: Lawyers I the Old Bailey 
Proceedings, 1770-1800 in David Lemmings ed. Crime, Courtrooms and the Public Sphere in 
Britain, 1700-1850 (Ashgate, 2012)  
760 Shoemaker, Crime, Courtrooms and the Public p.89 
761 Barring the caveats as explored in Chapter 2 
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The use of prosecution counsel in fraud cases can reveal information about the 
prosecutor, such as the likelihood of being a member of a prosecution association, 
or being particularly wealthy and therefore willing to expend monies unrecoverable 
in the prosecution of a misdemeanour as was the case with fraud prosecutions. 
Additionally, by estimating the number of prosecution and defence counsel involved 
in fraud prosecutions, it may reveal something of how fraud offences were used 
within the prosecution system. Fraud is a particularly useful group of offences 
through which to measure the presence and influence of counsel as it includes both 
misdemeanours and felonies.762 Though this study focuses upon the role of 
prosecutors of fraud offences to gain a better understanding of how the laws 
surrounding fraud were developed and how these offences were tried, it is useful to 
also understand and explore the role of defence counsel.  
Whilst there is some debate as to when counsel began to play a role in the criminal 
trial, there was an increase in the presence of counsel from the mid-eighteenth 
century.763 This may be due to a number of reasons, most of which have been 
explored by Langbein and focus upon the deliberate acts of counsel to increase their 
influence and opportunity for increased legal fees.764 Brooks has persuasively argued 
that counsel also moved their practices from the civil courts to the criminal in the 
wake of the imposed taxes upon civil litigation, leading to its great decline in the mid-
eighteenth century.765 The effect of the influx of lawyers into the criminal process 
was to lead to the increased complexity of criminal procedure and evidence, and the 
growing passivity of the judiciary leading to our modern adversarial system.766 
                                                          
762 There has been little inquiry has been conducted into the presence of counsel in misdemeanour 
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Of the 469 fraud indictments identified at the Old Bailey between 1760 and 1820, 
the table below details how many of these involved counsel and whether this 
representation was for the prosecution, the defence, or both sides.  
Table 6.2: The Presence of Counsel in Fraud Trials at the Old Bailey 
Counsel Frequency Percentage 
Prosecution 55 11.7 
Prosecution and 
Defence767 
42 9.0 
Defence 28 6.0 
None 344 73.3 
Total 469 100.0 
During this period, it is clear that counsel were still a rarity at the Old Bailey. Estimates 
in the general number of counsel present at assize trials vary, but there is some 
similarity in the findings. Beattie has claimed that between 1740 and 1800, no more 
than three per cent of assize trials involved prosecution counsel, and no more than 
ten per cent defence counsel. Shoemaker, using a keyword search, estimates that in 
the 1770s, counsel were present in between five and ten per cent of Old Bailey 
trials.768 Allyson May has made even bolder conclusions regarding the presence of 
counsel within the Old Bailey, estimating that by 1800, twenty-one percent of 
prosecutors instructed counsel, and twenty-eight percent of prisoners also had 
counsel.769 However, May claims that very rarely did counsel appear on both sides at 
the same time and estimates that in less than ten per cent of cases did Old Bailey 
trials see direct contest between counsel.  
The timeframe under consideration is very sensitive. Certainly counsel for the 
defences began to be seen at the Old Bailey in the 1730s770, and by the start of the 
nineteenth century this presence was increasing. During the earlier stages of his 
                                                          
767 This number of combined counsel is in addition to the separate defence and prosecution figures.  
768 Shoemaker, Crime, Courtrooms and the Public, p.77 
769 May, The Bar, p.34 
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research, Langbein posited the hypothesis that defence counsel were only allowed 
into the felony trial due to the high number of prosecution counsel.771 Judges felt 
that the felony trial was too harshly stacked against the prisoner and consequently 
allowed some minimal assistance from counsel in examining witnesses. However, 
this hypothesis has been undermined by quantitative studies on the presence of 
counsel. Beattie, May, and even Langbein himself agree that defence counsel were 
more prevalent in felony trials at the Old Bailey than they were for the prosecution.772  
The presence of counsel in fraud cases clearly contradict the findings of May, Beattie 
and Langbein, and rather, support Langbein’s earlier hypothesis that prosecution 
counsel were more prevalent than counsel for the prisoner.773 In fraud indictments, 
counsel are almost twice as likely to appear for the prosecution as for the defence 
and overall counsel appeared in nearly twenty-seven percent of indictments. The 
reasons for this discrepancy are myriad and will be explored by first considering the 
high presence of prosecution counsel, then the relatively low presence of defence 
counsel, before considering the relatively high number of fraud cases that were 
contested by counsel on both sides. 
Prosecution Counsel 
Prosecution counsel was permitted in all cases, whether felony or misdemeanour, 
and were permitted to address the jury, as well as examining witnesses and making 
legal pleadings.774 It is therefore understandable that lay prosecutors may have 
engaged the services of an advocate to present their case in court. Moreover, in 
hiring an advocate to represent them, lay prosecutors had the opportunity, through 
counsel, to speak directly to the jury, as lay prosecutors did not have rights of 
audience to address the jury.775 In his earlier work, Langbein argued that prosecutors 
frequently hired counsel to argue their cause and it was for this reason that defence 
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counsel were unofficially permitted by judges from as early as the 1730s.776 Following 
more detailed sampling of the Proceedings, Langbein later changed his view, 
acknowledging that actually, defence counsel was far more prevalent than 
prosecution counsel in the Old Bailey in the eighteenth century.777 
As is apparent from the prosecution of fraud, prosecutors instructed counsel far 
more frequently than did the accused. One reason for this discrepancy can be found 
in the presence of public authority prosecutors.778 Solicitors and counsel appeared 
more frequently in cases brought by the Treasury, the Bank of England, the Post 
Office, and the Mint.779 What is clear from research into fraud is that another 
frequent prosecutor of fraud is the Navy.780 
Table 6.3: Public Authority Prosecutors and the Presence of Counsel 
 Public Authority 
Prosecution 
Non-Public 
Authority 
Prosecution 
Total 
Prosecution 
Counsel 
31 24 56 
Defence Counsel 8 20 28 
Prosecution and 
Defence Counsel 
11 31 42 
No Counsel 32 312 344 
Total 82 387 469 
Of the eighty-two indictments heard at the Old Bailey in which a public authority 
conducted the prosecution, counsel appeared for the prosecution in forty-two 
instances. In fact, of the ninety-eight instances in which prosecution counsel was 
involved in fraud prosecutions, forty-three percent were public authority led 
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778 As discussed in Chapter 5 
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prosecutions. Given the rarity of counsel at the time, this figure initially appears 
greatly significant. However, these were largely prosecutions brought for felony781 in 
which costs of prosecution could often be recovered. They were also capital felonies 
and, as highlighted in Chapter 5, there were significant policy reasons driving these 
prosecutions, particularly emanating from the Navy. Consequently, it is not surprising 
that prosecutors would instruct counsel in order to increase their chances of a 
successful prosecution for fraudulently obtaining naval prize monies.  Such use of 
counsel by the government may have influenced wealthier prosecutors to instruct 
counsel in lay prosecutions.782 This partially explains why so many prosecutors of 
naval fraud employed counsel. 
Table 5.4, below, details the presence of counsel in relation to the type of prosecutor 
bringing the case. The high rate of counsel employment by the Navy is unsurprising 
in light of the above arguments. However, with regard to other prosecutors, defence 
counsel were generally more prevalent.  
Table 6.4: Occupation of Prosecutor and the Presence of Counsel783  
 Prosecution Defence Prosecution 
and 
Defence 
No Counsel 
Tradespeople 8 14 14 134 
Naval 28 4 8 27 
Artisan 2 1 7 25 
Public Official 3 3 1 9 
Bank of England 1 1 3 1 
Clerk 2 0 1 1 
Servant 0 2 0 2 
Other 0 0 1 1 
Total 44 25 35 200 
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782 May, The Bar, p.24  
783 It is not possible to identify the prosecutor in the case of 147 indictments. 
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The higher level of defence counsel is likely to be because other prosecutors were 
pursuing misdemeanours and these allowed for defence counsel as of right. The 
prosecution of fraud was particularly significant for the developing role of counsel in 
the criminal courts. Prior to 1836784, the role of counsel within the criminal trial was 
not clear. Prosecution counsel was permitted in all instances, but defence counsel 
was only permitted in cases of misdemeanour and treason.785 Even within these 
trials, counsel was not permitted to put forward a clear narrative defence by 
addressing the jury, but rather, were limited to the examination and cross-
examination of witnesses and to speak to any matter of law that might arise.786 In 
the case of felony, it was not until the Prisoners’ Counsels Act of 1836 that defence 
counsel were allowed by right to examine witnesses; the role of defence counsel in 
felony was purely to speak to any matters of law or procedure. From the mid-
eighteenth century onwards, there was a growing number of counsel appearing in 
felony cases for the defence, but this was at the discretion of the judge rather than 
being of right. As illustrated in Chapter 3, fraud offences included both 
misdemeanours and felonies. Because of this, we might expect to see varying levels 
of defence counsel across the 469 indictments. More importantly though, we would 
expect a greater presence of defence counsel as they were permitted by right.  
Fifteen per cent of prisoners accused of fraud offences employed counsel. This 
initially looks like a relatively high figure compared with estimates of counsel supplied 
by other researchers. However, the status of fraud misdemeanours gave counsel 
ample opportunity to gain more business at the Old Bailey. Counsel, such as 
Adolphus, Silvester, Garrow, and Fielding (William), were present in fraud trials time 
and time again.787 Misdemeanour trials allowed counsel to play a more active role 
within the court and to gain more publicity for their skills. This publicity, in turn, may 
have led to more clients instructing them and would also bring them more public 
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attention in general. This opportunity for more advocacy would have been very 
attractive to counsel who were so often in the criminal rather than the civil courts.  
With the exception of naval prosecutions, the relatively low number of prosecution 
counsel in relation to defence counsel may be explained by the already great cost of 
prosecution of misdemeanours. With no hope of recovering costs or losses, 
prosecutors may have attempted to limit their losses by conducting their own 
prosecutions. Moreover, should tradespeople have also been members of 
prosecution associations, such as The Society for the Protection of Trade, they would 
have access to a solicitor who could instruct the tradesman how to conduct the case 
without the additional expense of counsel. 
Conclusion  
Lay prosecutors used a variety of methods to ensure their prosecutions for fraud 
were successful. A key method was the use of prosecution associations that were 
prevalent in London, particularly with regard to tradespeople and merchants. Given 
the popularity of prosecution associations, particularly those concerned with 
protecting trade, it is highly likely that a number of the prosecutors of the 469 
indictments under consideration were members of such associations. This would 
shed some light on why fraud misdemeanours were being prosecuted at such an 
expensive court when there was no hope of the recovery of goods or expenses.  
This chapter has also provided some insight into the use of policing agents in the 
prosecution of fraud. As a quantitative approach to policing in the eighteenth century 
is yet to be taken up by many researchers, these particular findings are difficult to 
situate within wider research. However policing agents were certainly used in some 
instances of fraud prosecution, though it is unclear at this stage how commonly 
police were used in fraud cases in comparison with other offences. One stark finding 
that does emerge though is that where a policing agent was involved with a fraud 
prosecution, it was almost certain that there would be a guilty verdict. 
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With regard to the use of the legal profession, it is apparent that prosecutors were 
more likely to use counsel in naval fraud prosecution. Defence counsel were more 
likely to be utilised than in other offences, which is  unsurprising given that the 
majority of fraud offences were misdemeanours and counsel was available to the 
prisoner. These findings compliment the more recent work of John Langbein and 
others, who have otherwise found that defence counsel were far more prevalent 
than prosecution counsel in the eighteenth century.  
One essential conclusion of this chapter is the significance of clerks of indictment in 
determining what form an accusation of fraud might take, and to which offence the 
accusation would refer. Clerks of indictment were often the only legally trained court 
official with whom the lay prosecutor would converse with before the accusation 
entered the criminal justice system. Consequently, the advice of the magistrates’ 
clerk had great significance to the next steps taken by the lay prosecutor. Equally as 
significant was that the clerk of indictment was personally liable for the form the 
indictment took. Whilst the lay prosecutor paid for the indictment788, it was the clerk 
who could be fined should the indictment be deemed sufficiently erroneous. It is 
therefore misleading to argue that lay prosecutors had full discretion when bringing 
an accusation of fraud. In fact, it is likely that lay prosecutors followed the advice of 
legally trained clerks without question.  
Having explored the various methods and mechanisms utilised by prosecutors of 
fraud in their journey to the Old Bailey, the final question this thesis seeks to answer 
follows on from the conclusions of this chapter. In particular, this chapter has 
illustrated that lay prosecutors did not have full discretion in bringing their cases to 
the Old Bailey. This question can be further explored through consideration of the 
role and discretion of magistrates, to which this thesis now turns.  
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Chapter 7 Fraud Trials within the Old Bailey 
Having considered the most commonly prosecuted fraud offences, the most 
prevalent prosecutors of these offences, and the methods through which these 
prosecutions were brought789, this chapter will now demonstrate why these 
particular prosecutions came to be within the Old Bailey. In exploring why these 
cases were heard at the assize level, particular attention will be paid to the 
jurisdictional origins of the complaint, why these cases were disposed of at the assize 
level and not heard in the lower courts, and which juries were empanelled to adjudge 
fraud offences.  
It will become clear that the City jury of the Old Bailey heard disproportionately high 
levels of fraud cases. In explaining why the City jury was hearing such a high level of 
fraud cases, this chapter will consider in greater depth how cases of fraud came to 
be heard at the Old Bailey, particularly how magistrates within the City and the rest 
of the capital disposed of fraud-based complaints. The potential variation in socio-
economic conditions of Middlesex and the City will be explored to ascertain whether 
the citizens of the City of London experienced more fraud than their counterparts in 
Middlesex. The major focus of the chapter will examine the Magistrates courts and 
the magisterial and jurisdictional personalities of Middlesex and the City.  
Having demonstrated how City magistrates were committing more fraud offences to 
the assize level and the Middlesex magistrates were disposing of them elsewhere, 
this chapter will then question whether Middlesex cases were assigned to City juries 
within the Old Bailey by way of a previously unacknowledged system of specialised 
juries.  
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Table 7.1: Fraud Juries in the Old Bailey 
Jury790 Frequency Percentage 
City 428 91.3 
Middlesex 38 8.1 
Westminster 3 0.6 
Total 469 100.0 
 
At every sitting, the Old Bailey empanelled at least two juries, one made up of City 
citizens and the other, Middlesex and Westminster citizens. It has long been accepted 
that these juries would hear the cases committed to the Old Bailey by their respective 
jurisdictions.791 Moreover, if a crime was committed in Middlesex, prosecutors would 
be strongly encouraged to report this crime to the Middlesex magistrates, and vice 
versa should a crime be committed in the City. There are summary court records from 
the City of London that strongly suggest that if cases were reported in the wrong 
jurisdiction, they would be referred back. For example, in 1781, Mary Evans was 
brought before Alderman Hart on a charge of committing fraud by false pretences 
and was promptly handed over to Middlesex, as Hart identified that the incident had 
occurred in Middlesex.792  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
790 After approximately 1780, the Proceedings note the jury which heard the case at the end of the 
report. For the case reports missing jury details in the Proceedings, the remaining case juries 
were identified using the City of London gaol delivery records found at CLA/047/LJ. 
791 John Langbein, ‘The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers’, The University of Chicago Law Review, 
Vol.45, No.2 (Winter, 1978) p.274 
792 Smith, Summary Justice in the City. 
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Image 7.1: London’s Boundaries 
 
Available at: https://www.londonlives.org/static/WestminsterLocalGovernment.jsp 
In light of this practice, the data regarding juries in fraud trials would strongly suggest 
that City magistrates were far more inclined to commit fraud offences to the assize 
court, whereas Middlesex magistrates were far more likely to dispose of such cases 
elsewhere. There is also the potential argument that fraud offences were committed 
and/or reported more frequently in the City than in Middlesex. It is very difficult to 
estimate crime and reporting rates during this period, but as demonstrated in 
Chapter 4, there is supporting evidence from the quarter sessions records that fraud 
offences were disposed of differently by City and Middlesex officials, with Middlesex 
hearing fewer fraud offences at the quarter sessions than the City. 
However, we must be very careful not to make assumptions regarding this data, as 
other possibilities must be considered, including cases where the prosecutor 
bypassed the magistrate, bringing that case directly to the Grand Jury at the Old 
Bailey. The other possibility is that fraud cases were indeed committed by Middlesex 
magistrates, but at trial, these cases were heard by a City jury for reasons of 
expediency or, expertise.  
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In evidencing these considerations, there are significant methodological challenges 
due to the dearth of archival evidence. However, by piecing together summary court 
and magistrate records from both the City and Middlesex, we can gain some insight 
into the prevalence of fraud complaints and also why the City magistrates would have 
been more inclined to commit these cases to the Old Bailey.  
Before exploring this extraordinary division of juries in fraud offences, it must first be 
established whether fraud offences were more likely to be committed in the City than 
Middlesex. And perhaps more accurately, whether fraud offences were more likely 
to be reported in the City rather than in Middlesex.  
Fraud in the City and Middlesex 
A number of factors would have contributed to the proportion of cases emanating 
from either jurisdiction within London. Before estimating what proportion of fraud 
cases were committed by the City or Middlesex, it is necessary to give some context. 
The most important of these contributing factors were: the respective population of 
each jurisdiction; the prevalence of crime and use of the magistrates’ courts; and the 
likelihood of fraud offences being committed in these areas. 
There was an enormous growth in the population of London throughout the 
eighteenth century and with this came a numerical growth in crime. However, this 
growth in population and crime across London occurred not in the City, but in 
Middlesex793. At the turn of the eighteenth century, less than a quarter of the 
Metropolis lived in the City of London.794 By the end of the eighteenth century 
though, this figure had fallen to less than a sixth.795 The population of the City for the 
whole of the eighteenth century varied between 125,000 and 150,000.796 In light of 
such a small proportion of the population of the capital, it might be expected that a 
sixth of the crime ought to originate from within the City and thus, an approximate 
proportion should be expected to be reflected in the cases heard at the Old Bailey. 
                                                          
793 John Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Trial (Oxford University Press, 2003) p.108 
794 https://www.londonlives.org/static/Pretrial.jsp (accessed 13th August 2016) 
795 https://www.londonlives.org/static/CityLocalGovernment.jsp (accessed 13th August 2016) 
796 Ibid 
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However, it cannot be concluded that, as the City held a sixth of the Capital’s citizens, 
a sixth of all fraud offences were committed or reported within the City. 
This period pre-dates the advent of national crime statistics making even the simplest 
of claims to the prevalence of fraud offending problematic. We can estimate the 
number of fraud cases heard at the assize level, but the number of fraud trials at the 
Old Bailey give us a very limited picture as these trials represent only a fraction of 
frauds that were prosecuted to the highest level. As highlighted throughout this 
thesis, the most common fraud offences, including obtaining goods by false 
pretences, false personation, and common law cheats, were misdemeanours and as 
such, were rarely found in the assize courts.  
In order to estimate the frequency with which such offences were reported in the 
summary courts, we must now turn to the magistrates records. In light of this, and in 
order to estimate the prevalence of fraud offence complaints, the records of lower 
courts will also be analysed. 
Fraud in the Magistrates’ Courts 
Magistrates’ courts were courts of no record and because of this, little evidence 
exists of who used them and for what purpose. There are no systematic records of 
the types of offences tried or the outcomes, in either the City or in Middlesex. 
However, some records do exist that at least give a flavour of the fraud-based 
offences heard in the summary courts across London.797 
As considered in Chapter 4, there is little evidence to suggest that the City summary 
courts were hearing large numbers of fraud offences. Even though in the City, 
summary justice was booming, with the Guildhall and Mansion House collectively 
hearing approximately 180 cases per week798, there is no suggestion from the 
summary court records that the City was hearing large numbers of fraud offences. Of 
these cases, the majority were disposed of at the initial summary hearing or, at a 
                                                          
797 These records have partly been discussed in Chapter 2 
798 Gray, Crime, Prosecution and Social Relations, p.20 
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later hearing within the Magistrates’ court.799 However, a quarter of the trials heard 
in the City justice rooms were committed to the assize court to be heard by the 
London jury at the Old Bailey.800  
Samples of the Minute books from both the Guildhall and Mansion House suggest 
that there were regular, though not remarkably high, numbers of fraud complaints. 
As expected, the majority of these complaints were in relation to the fraudulent 
obtaining of goods and most were brought by prosecutors who were occupied within 
trade. Due to fire, very few comparable records exist for the Middlesex and 
Westminster Magistrates’ offices. However, inferring retrospectively using the 
Proceedings, it may be suggested that the City magistrates committed more fraud 
offences to the Old Bailey than the Middlesex justices. 
Decision-making in the Magistrates’ Courts 
The first significant area to explore when explaining the disproportionate use of City 
juries in fraud trials in the Old Bailey is the decision-making of the magistrates. This 
section will consider the factors that contributed to the City magistrates committing 
fraud offences to the Old Bailey, and the factors that prevented the Middlesex 
magistrates from utilising the assize court for fraud offences. These factors can 
loosely be categorised as social and demographic, institutional socio- and economic-
political ends, individual ends, and administrative culture of the summary courts in 
the respective metropolis jurisdictions.  
Society and Demography 
To fully understand the workings and decision-making of the summary courts, the 
social context within which they operated must be considered. The wealth and 
occupational structure of London differed from the rest of the country in so much as 
there were greater concentrations of wealthier tradespersons, merchants, 
professionals, and manufacturers.801 The Metropolis was not only very different to 
                                                          
799 Gray, Crime, Prosecution and Social Relations p.27 
800 Ibid p.91 
801 Weatherill, Consumer Behaviour p.47 
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the rest of the country, but had significant internal differences, particularly between 
the City and Middlesex.  
The eighteenth century saw a dramatic shift in both political economy and the 
markets throughout the country.802 An increased preoccupation with commercialism 
was further propagated by the resultant increase of persons earning their living from, 
and within, the commercial sector. There were a growing number of shopkeepers 
across Georgian England and these shopkeepers were gaining increasingly influential 
positions within their communities.803 This was true across the entire country, but 
greater concentrations can be found in the metropolis. 
Within the metropolis there were local variations in social and economic makeup. 
The City was a ‘disproportionately wealthy conclave of Georgian England’ and as 
such, the social make-up of the City and the types of business carried out within its 
jurisdiction differed from the rest of the Metropolis.804 The population of the City 
ranked amongst the richest and most influential, both politically and economically, 
in the country.805 Not only was the general populace of the City wealthier, but also 
the nature of business carried out in the City was also different to the rest of the 
capital. Due to the commercial nature of the City, it is perhaps not surprising that 
magistrates’ records reflect a large number of cases that were essentially debt 
recovery.806  
However, the City was not populated purely by the wealthy and it is estimated that 
seventeen to twenty percent of litigants who used the City magistrates’ courts were 
the labouring poor or servants.807 This is significant when comparing the types of lay 
prosecutors found at the Old Bailey. There is evidence that either less wealthy 
                                                          
802 See Chapter 5 
803 Weatherill, Consumer Behaviour, p.14 
804 Gray, Crime, Prosecution and Social Relations p. 1 
805 Faramerz Dabhoiwala, Summary Justice in Early Modern London, The English Historical Review 
(2006) CXXI (492): pp.796-822. p.798 
806 Gray, Crime, Prosecution and Social Relations p.84 
807 https://www.londonlives.org/static/ProsecutorsLitigants.jsp (accessed 18th August 2016) 
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prosecutors were filtered out at an early stage of the justice system, or that poorer 
people did not prosecute fraud offences.  
Middlesex and Westminster were also centres of industry and commerce, though in 
less concentrated form to the City. However, there were still increasing numbers of 
shops and artisans throughout the whole of the metropolis. For example, the most 
significant occupations within Westminster were victuallers, carpenters, chandlers, 
shopkeepers, bakers, and butchers.808 When recalling the types of fraud appearing 
at the Old Bailey, it cannot be concluded that fraud, which rested upon commercial 
interactions, could only have been carried out in the City. Middlesex and 
Westminster may have had less concentrated commercial activity but there was still 
an abundance of shops and persons providing their skills. The typology of fraud 
explored in Chapter 5 reflects that the majority of fraud offences were committed 
through the methods of false servant, fraudulent financial instruments, or through 
an abuse of a consumer relationship.809 The opportunities to commit these offences 
were abundantly present in Middlesex and Westminster and consequently, we 
cannot conclude that the City committed more fraud offences for trial at the Old 
Bailey purely because these offences happened overwhelmingly more frequently in 
the City. 
Institutional socio- and economic-political ends  
The respective political ends of the magistrates’ offices within the City and Middlesex 
go a long way in explaining the radically different treatment of fraud offences in the 
summary courts of these two jurisdictions. Each of these areas will be considered in 
turn and it shall be revealed how the City Aldermen and Mayor were using the 
summary courts to bring attention to what they saw as the social and economic 
significance of fraud to the City. Likewise, the individual approach of Middlesex 
magistrates to fraud complaints reflects a different, but no less vigorously pursued 
agenda of criminal justice. 
                                                          
808 Weatherill, Consumer Behaviour, p.48 
809 Naval frauds will be considered separately below.  
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Prior to the middle of the eighteenth century, the City of London had long held 
significant political influence both locally and nationally. This influence had included 
wider criminal justice policy. For example, the Transportation Act of 1718 was 
introduced into Parliament by a group of MPs that included two City Aldermen who 
were trying to introduce alternative sentencing options.810 The City of London 
authorities, including the Lord Mayor and Aldermen, also had far greater control over 
the events within their borders than state officials in other jurisdictions, including 
Middlesex or Westminster. For example, the City authorities could control who 
practised a retail trade811 and within the City, there existed a parliament writ small, 
which allowed for the passing of bylaws and other locally applicable regulations.812 
In light of this extensive control, it is understandable that the Aldermen and Lord 
Mayor would take a proactive role, beyond the limitations of the administration of 
justice, to further political, economic, and as shall be seen later, personal 
endeavours. City officials were accustomed to having wide-ranging powers over their 
jurisdiction and they were confident in governing, as well as administering justice.  
As repeatedly demonstrated throughout this thesis, and in particular in Chapter 5, 
the prosecution of fraud offences within the Old Bailey reflect the increasing onus 
upon the protection of values and circumstances vital to the maintenance and 
development of commerce. This was no less true in the City of London. The primary 
objective of the Lord Mayor and the Aldermen of the City of London was to promote 
the success of the City. In a City that was fuelled by commerce, it was the interests 
of commerce and capitalism that reigned supreme. As a place of trade, the City 
authorities had an interest in ensuring trade proceeded smoothly813, both in order to 
maintain its reputation as a safe place to conduct business, and also in order to 
attract future investment from around the world. Arguably, this bolstering of 
commercialism was a motivation for all magistrates from the middle of the 
                                                          
810 John Beattie ‘London Crime and the Making of the ‘Bloody Code, 1689-1718’ in Lee Davison et al 
(eds) Stilling the Grumbling Hive: The Response to Social and Economic Problems in England, 
1689-1750. (Palgrave Macmillan, 1992) p.58 
811 Gray, Crime, Prosecution and Social Relations, p.14 
812 https://www.londonlives.org/static/CityLocalGovernment.jsp (accessed 13th August 2016) 
813 Gray, Crime, Prosecution and Social Relations, p.91 
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eighteenth century onwards814, but none more so than in an area that symbolised 
and thrived upon the development of commerce. 
Again, the significance of trust, both in the market and in the character with whom 
one was dealing, was at the heart of commercialism in the City. The City justices were 
concerned with issues impacting upon trust within their jurisdiction and this included 
trust of character, as well as credit. This is well illustrated by the petition put before 
Parliament by the Lord Mayor and Aldermen at the beginning of the eighteenth 
century for a registration of servants that would allow employers to have a better 
idea of the people they were employing and letting into their homes.815 This was by 
no means an original request and, as has been shown in Chapter 5, Sir John Fielding 
in Middlesex was equally concerned with the need to identify, locate, and verify the 
character of servants. However, it does demonstrate the priorities of the City justices 
in securing and promoting commercial trust within the City.  
The Lord Mayor and Aldermen of the City used their role within the criminal justice 
system to ensure that fraudulent offences, particularly against the tradespeople of 
the City, would not be tolerated. More so, the justices acted to deter fraud within 
the City through the prosecution of such offences at the highest and most public 
court, the Old Bailey. It is for this reason, more than any other, that the City of London 
justices were far more ready to commit fraud complaints to the Old Bailey. It also 
explains why the City jury at the Old Bailey heard considerably more fraud complaints 
than the Middlesex jury. 
Middlesex 
In contrast to the City, it can be concluded that Middlesex and Westminster justices 
referred very few fraud complaints to the Old Bailey. This act of disposing of fraud at 
a summary level, away from the additional public gaze of the Old Bailey, was very 
much deliberate. To understand the political and economic motivations of the 
Middlesex justices from the mid-eighteenth century, we must turn our attention to 
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Bow Street. Whilst there were a number of magistrates throughout Middlesex and 
Westminster, the Bow Street model was rolled out by the government in earnest 
from 1792.816 However, for thirty years preceding this, the Bow Street office was at 
the forefront of changing the nature of summary justice in the metropolis and acted 
as a blueprint for other magistrates’ offices.  
Much has been written about the Fieldings that does not need to be reproduced 
here.817 However, John Fielding in particular was extremely successful in changing 
the nature and remit of the role of magistrate. Unlike the other Middlesex 
magistrates, Bow Street received a government stipend, and it was the retention and 
extension of this stipend that drove many of Fielding’s innovations and changes in 
policy. Fielding was very successful in his endeavours and he achieved this success 
through a series of policies that can broadly be categorised as: public promotion of 
the office resulting in more business for Bow Street; the Prevention Plan; and his 
policies to eradicate fraud.  The first category acted to increase Bow Street and 
Fielding’s popularity with the citizens of London, while the second two served to 
enamour his policies to the government and wider authorities in order to receive 
greater powers and financial support.  
Public Promotion 
John Fielding was possibly the greatest self-publicist of his age. Fielding vociferously 
encouraged reporting of the activities at Bow Street in both local and national 
newspapers, publishing directly from Bow Street, as well as providing a desk and 
materials for journalists in his court.818 This promotion however was less about 
Fielding himself, than it was to promote his vision of justice across the country.819 
Both Henry and John Fielding were extremely proactive magistrates and shared a 
vision of their office becoming a seat of crime detection, resolution, and 
                                                          
816 J. M Beattie, English Detectives, p.9 
817 See for example: David J. Cox, ‘A Certain Share of Low Cunning’: A History of the Bow Street 
Runners, 1792-1839 2nd edition (Routledge, 2012) and Beattie, English Detectives 
818 Beattie, English Detectives p.96 
819 John Styles, ‘Sir John Fielding and the Problem of Criminal Investigation in Eighteenth-Century 
England’ Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Vol.33 (1982) pp.127-149. p.128 
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consequently, prevention. The significance of John Fielding’s reputation as a 
magistrate who could not only detect crime, but also eradicate it, was fundamental 
to the success, mythical or otherwise, of Bow Street. Fielding took steps to establish 
his reputation as the most effective magistrate in London, most notably through his 
Prevention Plan.  
The Prevention Plan 
The central theme of Fielding’s vision for summary justice is best illustrated by the 
‘Preventative Plan’.820 Fielding wrote to his benefactor, the Duke of Newcastle, laying 
out what he saw as the greatest criminal threats to society at that time. He included 
crimes such as robbery, housebreaking, shop-lifting, pickpockets, gamblers and 
common cheats ‘which were likewise very numerous’.821 Both Fieldings believed 
lower-level frauds to be a serious problem in the metropolis. As described in Chapter 
3, it was John Fielding who lobbied for and drafted the 1757 Act that codified the 
laws relating to obtaining goods by false pretences and so, it is clear that fraud was a 
major focus of Fielding’s clamp-down on crime in Middlesex and Westminster. In 
light of this, we may ask why it was that Middlesex and Westminster were not 
referring these cases to the Old Bailey in the same way that the City justices were, 
who also felt that fraud offences were a scourge on society?  
The reason lies in the myth of success that Fielding wove around Bow Street. During 
the 1740s, violent crime had been rife and it was this that Fielding used as leverage 
to gain more financial support from the government. Fielding asserted that in return 
for a government stipend, he could identify and prosecute highway and street 
robbery, and in a short time period, eradicate violent property crime. Fielding’s 
efforts included the use of mounted Bow Street Runners who pursued robbers on 
their way out of the Metropolis. Fielding’s efforts were indeed successful, but this 
success was greatly assisted by the outbreak of the Seven Years War.  
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The War, as often happened, led to a dramatic reduction in violent crime, thereby 
giving the impression that Fielding had significantly reduced crime in Middlesex. With 
the War continuing and Fielding’s raison d’etre rapidly diminishing, he moved his 
attention to other offences and wider regulation of behaviour, such as drinking and 
gambling.822 Fielding equated gambling with other relatedly dishonest criminal 
offences, such as fraud823, and was particularly concerned with ‘dishonest practice’, 
which he viewed as a great threat to the thriving commercial society.824  
Fielding relied upon the government stipend that paid for his office. It was therefore 
crucial that he could demonstrate how his methods garnered results. Consequently, 
when Fielding very publically claimed through his open letter to the Duke of 
Newcastle in 1757 that he had fraud offences in his sights, he put himself in a position 
where he had to deliver the same result as he ostensibly had for highway robbery. 
This result was not the high-level prosecution of such offences, but the dramatic 
reduction, if not eradication of these offences. Because of this ultimate aim, Fielding 
disposed of fraud cases very differently from the City and in a manner that did not 
necessarily draw public or official attention.  
Fielding was keen to address criminal accusations, particularly fraud complaints, 
through a range of negotiations, mediations, and lesser punishments. This is not to 
say that Fielding did not strongly encourage the reporting of crime to his office. For 
example, in 1755, he published a pamphlet encouraging men of property to subscribe 
to prosecution associations.825 Fielding most certainly wanted to continue attracting 
business to the Bow Street office. However, it was not just the reporting of fraud that 
would have demonstrated the success of his methods, which he so assiduously 
claimed. Rather, while Fielding wanted to attract the business that would result from 
complaints of fraud, his primary objective was to dispose of these cases in a less 
formal manner in order to give the impression that fraud levels were significantly 
improved by his policies.  
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While it is difficult to confirm due to a dearth of detailed record, it may be concluded 
that Fielding achieved his aim of ostensibly reducing the amount of fraud in 
Middlesex using a number of methods. One such method was the siphoning of young 
male offenders away from the criminal justice system and into the Navy. During the 
120 years between 1695 and 1815, England was at war for sixty-three years.826 Filling 
the regiments and ships was a constant worry, but it was a problem that could be 
partly addressed by the criminal justice system. In every war of the eighteenth 
century, the government used varying forms of conscription. These included enlisting 
accused persons before the magistrates either through a volunteer-style system, or 
by using more proactive encouragement such as the threat of criminal 
punishment.827 Magistrates were very successful in contributing ‘volunteers’ to the 
Navy and crime rates Consequently fell during times of war, largely because the 
magistrates used conflicts to punish offenders by sending them into the armed 
forces.828   
This policy of recruiting boys into the Navy from the magistrates’ courts was not 
limited to any one part of the capital. The City, Middlesex, and Westminster justices 
were all involved with societies, such as the Marine Society, that acted to recruit 
poorer boys into the Navy. Henry Fielding was heavily involved with and supportive 
of the Marine Society, and in 1753, he agreed to supply The Barfleur with thirty 
boys.829 Sir John Fielding was also an enthusiastic supporter of the Marine Society to 
the extent that he appealed to the Duke of Newcastle to secure further funding for 
his office in order to better carry out the conscription of boys and men from those 
appearing before him.830 John Fielding’s motivations for conscripting these young 
offenders into the Navy rather than into prisons or more serious courts are complex. 
One reason was certainly to further demonstrate how useful his office was to the 
government, which simultaneously served to emphasise how important the 
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continuation of the government stipend was for his work. It has been suggested that 
Fielding was not an ardent believer in the use of prisons for the young. Rather, his 
approach to ‘saving boys’ from pestilential cells was to deliver them into a ‘useful 
life’ in the Navy.831 A further motivation may have been to bolster the magistrate’s 
civic position, with both Fieldings extremely aware of their reputations. The Marine 
Society was often referred to as being a ‘patriotic institution’ that was both 
‘charitable and benevolent’.832 Both Fieldings would therefore have been 
enthusiastic to be associated with such popular organisations.  
Fielding could not however dispose of juveniles into the Navy at will. There is much 
evidence to suggest that the Navy was deeply reluctant to accept any criminals onto 
ships, apart from minor debtors and smugglers.833 In 1759, a City magistrate had 
attempted to have all members of a notorious pick-pocketing gang, the Black Boy 
Alley Gang, sent away to sea, but the Navy refused to accept such criminals.834 In fact, 
impressment of any type was extremely unpopular and enforced far less frequently 
than popular culture would suggest.835 This was not due to the abhorrence of taking 
an individual’s liberty to supply the Navy, but rather, the Navy only wanted qualified 
and able men. Petty thieves and young boys would require too much training and 
were considered especially unreliable.  
Political Strategies: the extension of power and influence of individual magistrates 
The motivations of John Fielding will be explored in more detail throughout this 
chapter. This will provide insight into the reasons why Fielding disposed of fraud 
complaints in ways other than referring to the Old Bailey. These reasons were a 
combination of both the interests of Bow Street and the interests of Fielding himself; 
undoubtedly the success of Bow Street reflected the success of Fielding. However, 
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this symbiosis between office and individual is not as clearly established in the case 
of the justices within the City.  
The City  
Unlike other parts of the country, the City of London justices of the peace were also 
political figures, making up what was the upper legislative chamber in a distinct 
jurisdiction administered by a bi-cameral system.836  
In determining the individual motivations of City Justices, it is illuminating to see their 
occupations as stated when elected as Alderman. A detailed study of the Aldermen 
in place during the period of 1760 to 1820 reveals a broad range of occupations for 
Aldermen. It has been suggested that the Aldermen of London were, for the most 
part, hard-nosed businessmen from the same background as the ‘middle sorts’, and 
certainly were not aristocrats.837 Aldermen were certainly rooted in occupations 
associated with trade and industry. Rogers has suggested that sixty-three percent of 
Aldermen serving between 1738 and 1762 were bankers, financiers and 
merchants.838 Rogers’ study of Aldermen found that over half of office holders also 
had significant investments in international trade.839  A study of the occupations of 
Aldermen during the period of this thesis, reflects how the majority of alderman 
increasingly came from, and pursued occupations, based in trade and industry. 
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Table 7.2: Occupations of Aldermen, 1760-1820 
Occupation840 Number Percentage 
Tradesman841 63 48.5 
Artisan842 57 43.8 
Other843 10 7.7 
Total 130 100.0 
As with prosecutors of fraud at the Old Bailey, there is a prevalence of tradesmen 
elected as City Aldermen during this time. A large number of artisans are also 
present, far more than is the case with Old Bailey prosecutors. As discussed in 
Chapter 5, Thompson made the important observation that the imposition of 
nineteenth century concepts of class upon the eighteenth century should be avoided.  
A significant reason for this avoidance is that in the eighteenth century, people did 
not think of themselves as belonging to a class per se, as laid down by horizontal 
relationships with other people of different occupations.844 Rather, Thompson 
argues that relationships between groups were vertical in that people associated 
themselves with those of the same trade, much as they had under the old guild 
system.845  Consequently, whilst the modern observer would think of the Aldermen 
as being a similar class to the well-to-do merchant, albeit in a much higher class than 
the average City shopkeeper, the eighteenth century observer would see a keen 
affinity between these occupational groups.  
Likewise, the guild system was still deeply influential with regard to skilled artisanal 
occupations, such as the goldsmith.846 Putting aside the specifics of occupations, it 
can be concluded that in order to be an Alderman, these men were required to be 
                                                          
840 Information extracted from Alfred B. Beaven, The Aldermen of The City of London (Eden Fisher & 
Company, 1908) 
841 Those occupied in trade were of similar job titles to those of prosecutors: grocers, haberdashers, 
and victuallers.  
842 These tended to be goldsmiths, joiners, and carpenters. 
843 Such as a cook, a scrivener, and three musicians.  
844 Thompson, Social History, p.135 
845 E. P Thompson ‘Patrician Society, Plebeian Culture’ Journal of Social History, Vol.7 No.4 (Summer, 
1974) pp.382-405. p.396 
846 Of the fifty seven aldermen occupied as artisans, thirteen were goldsmiths.  
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wealthy. The duties involved in this office cost Aldermen a great deal of money. A 
large part of their role, as today, was to attend and host formal dinners and events 
that required purchasing extremely expensive clothes, wines, and other necessary 
luxuries.847 Being an Alderman may well have furthered the individual’s business 
interests, but the office itself was costly. As Rogers succinctly states: ‘No Alderman 
could rely on making a fortune in civic office; he had to have one before he 
started’.848 Clearly, many Aldermen had modest sounding occupations, but these 
conceal what must have been a well-earning enterprise, whether through trade or 
manufacturing.  
The affinity with which Aldermen may have associated themselves with other 
merchants and retailers provides context for the justices’ prioritisation of fraud 
committed against tradespeople. However, alongside these interests, the City 
justices continued to be motivated by wider commercial considerations, as Gray 
explains: ‘City interests, predominantly trade and finance, must have informed 
decision-making at Guildhall and Mansion House’.849 As with the superior courts, 
summary justices were not adverse to disseminating propaganda through their 
courts.850 As such, the City of London Justices sought to maintain their political 
significance, whilst promoting their commercial agenda and furthering agendas of 
personal power and influence.  
The desire for greater political influence certainly appears to be a factor in the careers 
of many City Aldermen. Between 1770 and 1809, nearly twenty percent of City 
Aldermen served as Members of Parliament.851 These men of commerce did not 
become Aldermen directly for financial gain852, but rather for power and influence. It 
was common practice during this period for long-serving Aldermen to be knighted, 
or more commonly, made baronets. Such a title required at least a decade of service, 
although long service did necessarily guarantee a title. Nathaniel Newnham Jr. was 
                                                          
847 Rogers, Social History, p.439 
848 Ibid 
849 Gray, Crime, Prosecution and Social Relations, p.32 
850 Norma Landau, The Justice of the Peace, p.47 
851 Gray, Crime, Prosecution and Social Relations, p.31 
852 The office of Alderman actually cost the holder rather than supplying a lucrative income. See 
Rogers Social History, p.439 
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Alderman for Vintry Ward for thirty-five years, between 1774 and 1809, and despite 
such long service and acting as Lord Mayor from 1782 to 1783, he was never given a 
knighthood.853  
In a time of continuing ‘Old Corruption’, the emerging groups of bankers and 
merchants that made up the Aldermen of the City were gaining power through 
means other than direct political involvement.854 Whilst a number of Aldermen 
sought to enter Parliament, others were indirectly ensuring the promotion of their 
business interests, whether trade or finance, through their application of the law. In 
committing fraud offences to the Old Bailey, these Aldermen were demonstrating a 
prioritisation of the protection of trade and commercial transactions in an effort to 
increase trust in the City, thereby establishing it as a place within which to invest and 
trade. By bolstering the reputation of the City for commerce, these Aldermen were 
successfully both assuring their political success and their individual success.  
Administrative Culture: Clerks 
The role of the court clerk is so often over-looked and yet, clerks were essential to 
the administration of justice in the Metropolis. The significance of the clerk of 
indictment has been explored in Chapter 6. Here the significance of the day-to-day 
activities of the magistrates’ clerk will be considered. Magistrates’ clerks had four 
main roles: as adviser to the magistrates; as adviser to the lay prosecutors; to provide 
administrative and bureaucratic consistency for the overall office; and in a quasi-
official role as either prosecuting solicitor, or representative of the magistrate at 
other courts.  
Clerks were often the only legally trained people involved in the summary justice 
system and acted therefore as legal and procedural adviser to the magistrate, who 
was likely not to have any formal grounding in law.855 We must be careful not to 
overstate the influence of clerks on magistrates’ individual decision-making as it is 
                                                          
853 Beaven, Aldermen  
854 Nicholas Rogers, Social History. p.439 
855 John Langbein ‘The Prosecutorial Origins of Defence Counsel in the Eighteenth Century: The 
Appearance of Solicitors’ Cambridge Law Journal 58(2) (July, 1999) pp.314-365. p.352 
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unclear whether clerks were seen as legal advisers, or more as servants to the 
magistrates.856 However, clerks were employed to advise Justices on the more 
complex and procedural matters before them and assumedly, this advice was 
frequently followed. In an area of law with inherent ontological and substantive 
complexities, such as fraud, the role of the magistrates’ clerk would have been 
greater than for more straightforward offences such as larceny.857 It cannot be 
known if magistrates were more inclined to follow the opinion of clerks in matters of 
greater legal complexity, but the role of clerks was certainly highly valued, in 
monetary terms at least. Archives relating to the accounts of Middlesex Magistrates’ 
offices will be considered in more depth below, but it is apparent from these records 
that the three clerks at Bow Street at the turn of the nineteenth century were paid a 
salary of between £100 and £160. The two junior justices in the office were paid a 
£500 salary.858 At the Hatton Garden Magistrates’ Offices, the justices were paid a 
smaller salary of £400, but the chief clerk was still paid £150, and the junior clerk 
£100.859 There is a suggestion that clerks across Middlesex Justices’ Offices had a set 
wage, as the senior clerk and junior clerk at the Great Marlborough Street Office were 
also paid £150 and £100 respectively.860 This is a significant difference, but it does 
reflect that the role of clerk was not seen purely as an administrative assistant 
position, but enough to warrant an enviable salary. 
There is evidence to suggest that in some offices, clerks assumed additional 
important roles that would further support the impression that clerks were seen as 
more than humble servants to the magistrates. Well into the nineteenth century, the 
chief clerk of Bow Street Magistrates’, John Stafford, was paid an additional £15 on 
top of his salary to act as editor-in-chief of the offices’ publication, The Hue and Cry. 
It is unclear whether Stafford had overall editorial authority to decide which cases 
and which notices to put into The Hue and Cry. Certainly when John Fielding had been 
                                                          
856 Landau, The Justice of the Peace p.229 
857 For an in-depth discussion on the laws of larceny see G. Fletcher, The Harvard Law Review.  
858 Treasury Department Accounts – Accounts of divers offices at the National Archive reference 
T38/672 
859 Treasury Department Accounts – Hatton Garden – Police Office at National Archive –reference 
T38/676 
860 Treasury Department Accounts – Great Marlborough Street – Police Office at The National 
Archive reference T38/675 
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alive thirty-five years earlier, it was Fielding who dictated the content of the 
publication. However, by the nineteenth century, it is unknowable whether Stafford 
held such influence over the public face of Bow Street Magistrates’, which would 
have included the prioritisation of certain offences over others.861 Nevertheless, this 
duty was highly influential and defined the business of the office that was revealed 
to the wider public. Again, such responsibility would be unlikely to be given to any 
low-level servant, which further suggests that clerks such as Stafford were well-
trained professionals who were given a great deal of responsibility by the 
Magistrates.  
The second role of the clerk was to advise the lay prosecutor. When bringing 
information to the magistrate, it is likely that the first person the complainant would 
encounter would be the clerk. As discussed earlier, the clerks would fulfil a number 
of functions including the drafting of indictments.862 However, their role was far 
broader than this. Lay prosecutors had to be heavily advised as to the options 
available for warrants or indictments, so in practice, clerks led the prosecution 
process. Again, it is unknowable whether a lay prosecutor would follow the advice of 
the clerk, but it is highly probable that, when faced with the majesty and the inherent 
chaos of the criminal justice system, the lay prosecutor would be happy, if not 
grateful, to follow advice from a court official. Consequently, clerks could greatly 
influence the outcome of a complaint of fraud from the very beginning of the 
process. This influence could result in the complainant not pursuing the matter any 
further, or deciding to pursue a particular offence over another, such as obtaining 
goods by false pretences rather than forgery, or vice versa.  
This extensively influential role of the clerk was not purely to assist the magistrates, 
but rather, as Sidney and Beatrice Webb claimed, to protect the defendant against 
the magistrates through application of the rule of law.863 This argument can be 
                                                          
861 Further research into the Hue and Cry and other publications during the turn of the century 
would need to be carried out to better gauge the types of offences prioritised by the Bow Street 
office. 
862 Gray, Crime, Prosecution and Social Relations, p.79 
863 Cited in Douglas Hay ‘Dread of the Crown office: the English Magistracy and King’s Bench, 1740-
1800’, Law, Crime and English Society, 1600-1830. Ed Norma Landau (Cambridge University 
Press, 2002) p.22  
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equally applied to the lay prosecutor who was just as likely to be at the mercy of an 
opinionated magistrate as the defendant. Even in the cases of possible felonies, 
magistrates had been known to dispose of cases at the summary level, thereby 
dramatically altering the outcome of the complaint, quite possibly against the wishes 
of the prosecutor. There was no appeal for this circumstance beyond bringing a case 
against the Magistrate in the King’s Bench, which would be expensive and very likely 
to fail.864 The presence of the clerk may have acted to curb the capriciousness of an 
individual magistrate and allow space within the initial hearing for the wishes of the 
complainant to be at least heard, if not acted upon. This may have affected the 
disposal of fraud complaints in either way, whether to treat the complaint more 
seriously than strictly required and have it committed to the assize court to go before 
the Grand Jury, or to treat it less seriously and dispose of it at the summary level or 
quarter sessions.  
Again, it should be remembered that the most commonly prosecuted fraud offence 
was obtaining goods by false pretences, a misdemeanour capable of being tried in 
any of the criminal justice courts, from summary to assize. As such, given the limited 
capacity of the assize court, it continues to be surprising that these cases appear at 
the Old Bailey at all. In light of the legal advisory role of the magistrates’ clerks, it is 
likely that these men had enormous influence as to where these fraud cases were 
heard. 
The third role of the clerks was more subtle, but partially explains the consistency 
with which magistrates disposed of fraud complaints. Clerks provided consistency 
and stability to an otherwise changeable system of justice. A system that gave almost 
carte blanch discretion to magistrates to dispose of misdemeanours as they saw fit 
may be expected to have resulted in a justice system characterised by irregularity, 
inconsistency and individual whim. However, the distribution of fraud offences 
amongst Old Bailey juries would strongly suggest that far more cases were appearing 
at the Old Bailey from the City of London over a sixty-year period. These committals 
were consistent, not only during the office of certain magistrates, but across two 
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generations of magistrates. Given the turnover of justices in both Middlesex and the 
City, this regularity is extraordinary, unless there are factors that ensured a 
consistent approach to the treatment of fraud.  
There were a number of summary courts in Middlesex and Westminster865, and 
summary justice in the City was conducted by the Lord Mayor in Mansion House, and 
the Aldermen in Guildhall. Clerks in Guildhall in particular provided a consistency to 
summary justice that could not be achieved in a rotational system. With different 
justices sitting from week to week, and being a court of no official record, the rulings 
meted out at the Guildhall could easily become wholly arbitrary and unpredictable. 
There are limited records regarding the clerks within the City, but the rough Minute 
Books they kept suggest that individual clerks remained in office for years rather than 
months.866 From the financial accounts kept by some of the Middlesex magistrates, 
a clearer picture of the clerks posted at the offices becomes available. These records 
reflect how clerks, certainly within some of the Middlesex Magistrates’ offices, were 
not only highly paid, but also stayed in office for many years, often dying in office.867 
The clerks, particularly chief clerks, were the ‘touchstone for institutional 
definition’.868 The clerks were also the principal actors involved in communication 
between quarter and petty sessions, acting to unite many levels of dispersed 
administration.869 This knowledge of the inner workings of the different levels of the 
criminal court system placed the clerks in an ideal position to communicate with their 
respective colleagues in upper courts, which may have paved the way for particular 
cases to be committed upward.  
The fourth function of the magistrates’ clerk was to, on occasion, represent the 
magistrate at later hearings in superior courts and also to take the lead on 
prosecutions when required. Clerks often undertook the role of prosecuting 
solicitor.870 They were also representatives of the justices they served and often 
                                                          
865 These offices were: Bow Street, Great Marlborough Street, Hatton Garden, Queen’s Square, 
Worship Street, Whitechapel, Lambeth Street, Shadwell,  
866 This assertion is based upon analysis of the handwriting within the Minute Books.  
867 Such as William Upton of Hatton Garden Magistrates’ office who died in office, 1796: T38/676 
868 Landau, The Justice of the Peace p.232 
869 Ibid p.229 
870 Langbein, Cambridge Law Journal p.338 
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attended quarter and assize sessions on behalf of the justices. The City in particular 
had a tradition of taking responsibility for prosecutions and from the 1730s the City 
of London solicitor was prosecuting various felonies.871  
Magistrates taking a prosecutorial lead was not unheard of in Middlesex and 
Westminster. In fact, due to the extension of the nature of summary justice by the 
Fieldings, the Bow Street office had a sizeable clerical staff that were heavily involved 
not only in the administration of the hearing themselves, but also with the wider 
investigative process.872 By the 1790s, this developing role of the magistrates’ clerk 
could be found across Middlesex and Westminster. One such example in which the 
magistrates’ clerk was instructed to undertake the prosecution at the higher court is 
that of the 1805 prosecution, R v Vincent Wright, Anne Fagan and William Elson.873 
The initial complaint of conspiracy and fraud had been presented to Great 
Marlborough Street Magistrates’ Office by six separate complainants. The 
prosecutors claimed that the accused had taken a house at Woodstock Street off 
Oxford Street and 'feigned characters of merchants' in order to  have 'cheated and 
defrauded divers tradesman, and others out of their goods'. Having been committed 
to Newgate, there was a 'misunderstanding taking place between them [the 
prosecutors] and the clerk of indictments, on the misdemeanor [sic] side, they 
informed the sitting magistrate … one of the committing magistrates, ordered me 
[the clerk] to go down to the Sessions…carry on with the prosecution for them’.874 
Such an example is illustrative of the increasing influence of clerks over not just the 
summary proceedings, but within the higher courts as well. 
The Naval Exception  
As identified in Chapters 3 and 5, a large number of fraud offences heard at the Old 
Bailey concerned the fraudulent obtaining of naval prize monies.  These offences 
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have been left until now as they have to be understood in the context of felony rather 
than misdemeanour.  
In the case of misdemeanour, magistrates had far more flexibility in how to dispose 
of cases. However, as has been explored in Chapter 4, there were significant 
restrictions on the prosecution of felony. Magistrates’ roles in the prosecution of 
felony were limited to the gathering of sufficient evidence, binding over prosecutors, 
and in some cases, executing warrants against the accused before committing these 
complaints to a superior court. There were undoubtedly occasions when magistrates 
went beyond their jurisdiction and disposed of felonies at the summary level, even if 
only to dismiss the prime facie weak complaints. However, there is no evidence to 
suggest that magistrates disposed of cases of the fraudulent obtaining of prize money 
at a summary level. This is to be expected given the severity with which such an 
offence was punished and given the high profile nature of such cases.875  
Table 7.3: Naval Cases and the Old Bailey Juries 
Jury No. Naval Cases Percentage 
City 56 84.8 
Middlesex 10 15.2 
Total 66 100.0 
        
Again, the disproportionate number of naval cases being heard in the Old Bailey by 
the City jury demands attention. As outlined in Chapter 5, the naval pay system 
oscillated between order and chaos. Many sailors upon disembarkation would have 
attended the Naval Office in order to be paid, but there were a number of other 
arrangements by which sailors could collect their pay and prize money.876 However, 
whilst a number of Naval Offices were to be found in Westminster, the Clerk of the 
Acts and the Treasurer of the Navy (more commonly known as the Pay Office) were 
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based within the heart of the City of London.877 Given the flexibility of the naval pay 
system, it was possible that sailors would receive their pay once they had been 
discharged from the ship. As such, they would not be reimbursed at the Naval Office, 
but in one of the London docks, primarily within the City. The majority of these 
locations providing opportunities for naval fraud were therefore within the City of 
London.  
The remaining small number of naval frauds heard by the Middlesex jury at the Old 
Bailey can be explained by the chaotic nature of the naval pay system. On a number 
of occasions, sailors may have sought to be paid outside of the City. When a ship had 
docked further east than the City and pay agents had set up in a tavern within 
Middlesex, it may have created an opportunity for fraud outside of the City. Likewise, 
after 1756, sailors who required admittance to hospital immediately upon 
disembarkation could be given a pay ticket immediately upon leaving the ship to be 
paid at a later time and place.878 A further opportunity for prize money fraud was 
created by the 1728 Navy Act that allowed family members to collect wages at six 
monthly intervals.879 Such pay systems allowed ‘false sailors’, as well as ‘false family 
members’, the opportunity to commit naval fraud. These opportunities could be 
carried out against a naval agent anywhere within the capital. Frauds involving false 
family members were also more likely to be conducted in Middlesex, as widows and 
other family members were expected to apply for their family member’s wages at 
the Naval Office in Westminster, rather than at the Pay Office. Consequently, any 
fraudulent applications for deceased sailor’s pay discovered in that office would be 
pursued within that jurisdiction, which ultimately meant the Middlesex jury would 
hear the cases.  
The Old Bailey and the Specialised Jury 
Evidence would suggest that the majority of fraud complaints heard at the Old Bailey 
came through the City of London magistrates’ offices. However, given the paucity of 
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the summary court records, and also the possibility that complaints could be brought 
directly to the assize court, it cannot be shown conclusively that all cases heard by 
the City jury had been referred by a City justice. In light of this possibility, there may 
have been occasions in which the City jury heard cases that, according to accepted 
Old Bailey practice as understood in the historiography, should have been heard by 
the Middlesex jury. If this is the case, there are two possible explanations. First, the 
disproportionate weight of cases on the Middlesex jury led to some cases being 
heard by the London jury. And second, that this is evidence of the informal use of 
special juries within the Old Bailey.  
The first explanation is understandable given that Middlesex and Westminster were 
substantially larger than the City and were growing at a rate that far out-stripped the 
City. Consequently, assuming that crime rates rose in relation to the population 
growth, the Middlesex jury would hear far more cases than the City jury. We may 
therefore ask whether this imbalance was addressed by some Middlesex cases being 
heard by the City jury. It would seem not.  It was common for there to be two juries 
per jurisdiction operating within each session at the Old Bailey so that deliberation 
time would not slowdown the day’s business.880 However, there is evidence within 
the Proceedings that there was a third and, even on occasion, a fourth Middlesex jury 
attending sessions at the Old Bailey.881 It would seem therefore that this was the 
method adopted to address the greater number of cases heard by Middlesex.  This 
solution does appear more long-term as the number of Middlesex cases would be 
higher, even if it was assumed that the crime rate was consistent across the capital. 
Had the City jury been used to systematically support the Middlesex jury, this would 
have been identified previously within the historiography. Whilst fraud offences 
were deeply significant for all the reasons explored in this thesis, fraud offences were 
numerically a very small part of the business being conducted within the Old Bailey. 
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If the City jury was taking Middlesex cases for the purpose of alleviating numerical 
pressure, this would be more apparent in studies of other offences.  
Given that fraud was such a niche set of offences, if the City jury were hearing all 
fraud offences within the capital, this would suggest a deliberate decision by the Old 
Bailey bench to allocate fraud offences to the City jury. This may have been for wider 
practical purposes, such as the alleviation of pressure on the Middlesex jury, but if 
such a decision were made, it was far more likely to be due to the nature of fraud 
offences. As explained in depth in Chapter 3, fraud offences sat in the margins of 
criminal law and overlapped considerably with civil law. Fundamentally, fraud 
offences could have been construed as breaches of contract, although this would 
have been out of step with the everyday routine matters ordinarily heard at the Old 
Bailey. The trying of these offences arguably required some specialist insight into 
commercial relationships and workings. It is possible that the Old Bailey bench 
believed that fraud offences needed juries made up of more commercially-minded 
men who would understand the subtle and opaque world of commerce and 
commercial morality. 
Within nineteenth century criminal trials for fraud, there was much judicial 
commentary on the interconnectedness of the civil and the criminal, as well as the 
need to have an understanding of the commercial world in order to find guilt in 
criminal matters. These comments were primarily made during the high-profile 
banking and company frauds that came to light following the explosion of joint-stock 
banking and public involvement in new companies and investment. There were 
examples of judges being baffled by the intricacies of the financial world and in their 
doubt, prompting juries to find against a charge of fraud. An example of one of these 
cases was the 1869 prosecution of Overend, Gurney and Company. Following the 
collapse of a bank, the directors were prosecuted on a charge of fraudulently making 
false statements in the prospectus to new shareholders, knowing the bank to be in 
financial peril. The judge struggled with the concept of criminality in such an instance 
and instructed the jury to return a verdict of not guilty. Judicial reluctance to find 
criminal fault by company directors and promoters can best be reflected by the 
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judgment of Lord Justice Brett in Wilson v Church882, in which he held: “I must confess 
to such an abhorrence of fraud in business that I am always most unwilling to come 
to the conclusion that a fraud has been committed”. As discussed in Chapter 4, such 
attitudes are ascribed to the nineteenth century, but in fact there is evidence of such 
mentalities permeating fraud in the eighteenth century. Examples of Old Bailey fraud 
cases being dismissed because the judge ruled they ought to have been pursued in 
civil courts have been explored in earlier chapters.883 Even in this early-modern 
period, there is a suggestion that the criminal benches were sensitive to the 
interconnectedness of civil and criminal fraud trials. 
As has been stressed throughout this analysis, the bench of the Old Bailey was partly 
made up of the ‘Twelve Judges’ who sat in civil as well as criminal courts. This is highly 
significant in light of the deepening discourse surrounding the expert jury in 
commercial matters. From the thirteenth century, tradesmen and merchants had 
contrived to establish commercial courts where commercial matters could be 
arbitrated in a way they saw as more efficient and incorporating of the nuances of 
commercial activity.884 By the seventeenth century, this call for commercial 
arbitration had become more widespread and was taken up by influential actors such 
as John Locke, and later, Lord Mansfield.885 Arbitration in the civil courts was 
becoming ubiquitous by the middle of the eighteenth century886 and such 
fundamental changes within the civil law courts would have influenced the 
jurisprudence within the criminal courts.  
Chapter 4 explored the litigation options of fraud complainants and as illustrated, 
litigation costs were increasing to such an extent in the eighteenth century that 
litigants were seeking alternative forms of redress. The increased use of arbitration 
in commercial disputes gained popular support from litigants and the wider 
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commercial community, a fact that cannot have escaped the attention of those 
sitting on the Old Bailey bench, primarily because they themselves were part of this 
commercial community. All judges within England and Wales occasionally sat on the 
Old Bailey bench, including the Attorney General, Lord Mansfield, who sat at the Old 
Bailey on numerous occasions between 1757 and 1768.887 
Mansfield believed the law needed to reflect contemporary trade and had included 
elements of civil law into the King’s Bench in an attempt to include commercial 
realities into criminal trials.888 Mansfield was particularly keen on the use of special 
juries in commercial disputes that would require members of this jury to be from a 
commercial background.889 Lord Mansfield’s vociferous attempts to introduce 
special juries in commercial disputes may well have influenced his sittings on the Old 
Bailey bench. If the disproportionate use of the City jury to hear fraud cases is to be 
partly explained by case allocation with the Old Bailey itself, the influence of an 
Attorney General, for whom the most pressing policy change of the time was the 
introduction of commercial juries, would certainly have explained such a decision. 
Discussions regarding alternative dispute avenues for commercial litigation were 
roughly separated into a dialectic between the creation of specialised commercial 
courts and the use of informed, expert commercial juries within the existing court 
system.890 
Juries were made up of men who met a minimum financial income.891 This 
requirement ensured that only men of a certain social standing could adjudge in 
criminal matters. Grand Juries were formed by men of a higher class, while the petty 
juries sitting within the trials at the Old Bailey were formed by sufficiently financially 
secure men, but certainly not gentlemen or gentry.892 These men would be drawn 
from the financially successful classes within the metropolis and would broadly 
reflect the upper-middle class demographic. In the case of the City, this demographic 
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would have been overwhelmingly occupied by tradesmen. The Middlesex jury 
however would have been more demographically diverse due to Middlesex being a 
mix of both urban and rural areas.893 The Middlesex jury would be comprised of some 
tradesmen, but also farmers and, as industry grew throughout the century, artisans 
and those working in manufacturing. If the Old Bailey bench had been seeking a petty 
jury with practical knowledge of the commercial world, they had the country’s most 
commercially knowledgeable jury at hand and sitting at every sessions in the form of 
the City jury.   
Conclusion 
In assessing which juries heard fraud complaints within the Old Bailey, it is clear that 
the City of London played a leading role, both in the committal of fraud cases to the 
highest criminal court and in judging these matters through the over-whelming use 
of the City jury in fraud trials. This can be explained by magisterial policing agents 
and the use of discretion to further the macro and micro ends of City and Middlesex 
magistrates. City of London magistrates prioritised the commercial condition of the 
reputation of the City as a trusted commercial centre and used the criminal justice 
system to further this end. By committing all breaches of commercial trust within the 
City to the assize court, and thereby furthering the will of tradespeople, the City 
magistrates were making a very public declaration that commerce and the conditions 
of trust required in a commercial centre were at the centre of City administration.  
Middlesex justices, on the other hand, wanted to reflect the successes of their 
policies, such as the Prevention Plan, in order to illustrate their public value within 
the justice system as a mechanism to filter cases away from the over-burdened assize 
court. The Middlesex Magistrates decision to dispose of fraud accusations below the 
level of assize further demonstrates how the priorities of such justices were not 
nearly so wedded to commerce as their City counterparts.  
                                                          
893 Shoemaker, Prosecution  
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The remarkable distribution of fraud complaints between the two Old Bailey juries 
suggests the informal, and as yet unrecognised, use of specialist commercial juries in 
criminal matters. There is such a dearth of archival evidence regarding the selection 
and allocation of juries and cases within the Old Bailey that this cannot be 
conclusively argued. However, by identifying the relevant juries, it is clear that the 
City jury was hearing disproportionately more fraud accusations than Middlesex and 
should future archives be discovered, this anomaly may become clearer. 
Nevertheless, it does demonstrate that future problematizing of the allocation of 
juries within the Old Bailey is required.  
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Chapter Eight Conclusion 
Fraud Offences 
This thesis has answered three fundamental questions: what offences made up ‘fraud’ by 
the early nineteenth century? – Who was prosecuting these offences? – and, how 
was fraud being prosecuted at this time? This thesis has, for the first time in legal 
and historical literature, traced the major offences of fraud from the Tudor period 
through to the early nineteenth century. This identification and critique of the laws 
of fraud have not been limited to the criminal law and rather, have explored the 
interaction between the criminal and the civil law. Whilst this approach has been 
undertaken by legal historians in some instances894, crime historians have continued 
to view property offences in a criminal law vacuum. This thesis has explored the 
interconnection between the civil and the criminal laws of fraud to better 
contextualise the law and also to explain the changes in the laws up to this period.  
The first step in assessing the prosecution of fraud was the identification of fraud 
itself. Fraud offences up to the turn of the nineteenth century have largely been 
ignored by academics, or conflated with forgery offences. Equally as significantly, 
fraud offences have primarily been identified as misdemeanours, which may explain 
why so little research has been conducted in this field. This thesis has identified both 
the misdemeanours and the felonious forms of fraud. By exploring the legislation and 
case law surrounding all aspects of fraud, this thesis has taken some steps in 
explaining the complexities of fraud laws rather than glossing over the details of 
these offences.  
What was most apparent from this exploration of fraud offences, is the underlying 
doctrines that shaped the definition and prosecution of these offences. By identifying 
the five central doctrines of fraud, this thesis provides an original framework through 
which to understand how fraud offences developed and why they developed in the 
way they did. This framework provides a better understanding of the ontologies of 
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fraud as well as providing a framework to understand and critique the jurisprudential 
arguments surrounding fraud, particularly in the eighteenth century. This thesis not 
only provided a thorough identification of the laws of fraud, it has also provided an 
explanation for the changes these laws saw throughout the eighteenth century. 
Again, using the five doctrines of fraud, the shifting attitudes to the role of the courts 
in assigning blame in fraudulent commercial dealings has been exposed.  
It has been demonstrated, particularly in Chapter 3, that there was a clear 
jurisprudential shift during the eighteenth century in both the criminal laws of fraud, 
and the approach towards fraudulent misrepresentation at contract law. In an 
increasingly commercialised society, with the influence of pro-commercial judges 
such as Lord Mansfield, there was a move away from more paternalistic thinking in 
contract law towards a greater reliance and use of doctrines such as caveat emptor. 
This doctrinal development better reflected the reinforcement of the liberal 
tradition, particularly within contract law895, placing responsibility increasingly upon 
the individual contractor. In contrast to this, the criminal law was more readily finding 
fraud within commercial dealings through the reduction in the use of narrowing 
doctrines such as that the law would not act to protect a fool, and that fraud needed 
to have some public harm to be criminal.  
Consequently, the later-eighteenth century saw the recourse for fraud and 
fraudulent misrepresentation move from the civil into the criminal courts. This thesis 
has argued that this transfer into the criminal courts can be explained by the actions 
of a growing and increasingly influential commercial class. Such a class, largely made 
up of tradesmen and merchants, as well as prominent local politicians, recognised 
fraud as an invidious blight on commercial activity. This blight undermined systems 
and relationships of credit and trust which were essential at a time of proto-
Capitalism, when Britain, and particularly the City of London was trying to establish 
itself as the world’s commercial centre. Because of this, any crime, particularly fraud, 
was prosecuted in the most senior and public criminal court. The use of the criminal 
court and the option for bodily punishment declared to the public that fraudulent 
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dealings in the Metropolis would not be tolerated, and went against the central 
values of the capital, the most significant being the trust underpinning all commercial 
activity.  
From a strongly liberal position, relying upon caveat emptor and the doctrines of the 
law not protecting a fool, instead requiring that the individual take steps to protect 
themselves, the courts moved to a more protectionist stance. Sympathy for the 
credulous was extended and the definition of a ‘public harm’ was widened. This shift 
allowed for far more accusations of fraud to appear in the criminal courts. This thesis 
has argued that in utilising the criminal justice system to pursue claims of fraud, the 
legal system was making a declaratory statement that such acts were an attack on 
the community itself, and would not be tolerated. The reason for such a declaration 
was the increasing awareness of the need for trust in commercial dealings, 
particularly in a time of greatly extending commerce and trade, what this thesis has 
called ‘Proto-Capitalism’; a time when Capitalism was embryonic and the Industrial 
Revolution was gathering momentum.  Consequently, seemingly minor frauds that 
could have been disposed of at a lower court were propelled into the Old Bailey, the 
work of which was the most publicized in the country.  
In creating a typology of fraud to better understand the nuances of how fraud was 
committed, this thesis reveals that the most common methods of carrying out fraud 
did not entail the breach of a trust but rather, the exploitation of some inside 
information. The false servant form of fraud was most common and required little 
more than knowing the names of the wealthier families in the area of the tradesman 
they wished to defraud. The social and economic background of the perpetrators of 
fraud cannot be discerned from the Proceedings or other records. However, it is 
apparent from the circumstances within which fraud were committed that many of 
the accused were either servants or pretending to be servants. This reiterates a key 
finding of this thesis, that fraud offences were not the preserve of the middle classes. 
Again, one is struck by the everyday nature of fraud and reminded that these frauds 
were misdemeanours, capable of being disposed of in a lower and much cheaper 
court. Again, this thesis has revealed a paradox in the prosecution of fraud which can 
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only be explained by reference to a wider theoretical understanding of the changing 
purpose of the criminal justice system of this time. The protectionism placed around 
the need for trust in commercial relationships, was at the foundation of the 
developing proto-capitalism spreading from the City of London across the country, 
including the use of the criminal law.  
The second most common type of fraud at the Old Bailey was that committed against 
the Navy and their agents. Naval fraud has been largely ignored by legal and crime 
historians as well as by naval historians. This thesis has not only shone a light on this 
important area of fraud, but also reveals how common was fraud against the navy at 
a time when the navy was increasingly modernising and expanding. To truly 
understand why the law was being enforced in the way it was, this thesis also 
explored who was prosecuting these cases, and how they were doing so.  
Prosecutors of Fraud 
The second question at the heart of this thesis – who prosecuted fraud – has been 
answered through a detailed analysis of the Old Bailey Proceedings. This thesis has 
revealed the prevalence of tradespeople as prosecutors of fraud during this period. 
This is unsurprising given that the most common methods by which fraud prosecuted 
at the Old Bailey was committed were through pretending to be a servant or have 
authority to collect goods. What is notable however, is that it was tradespeople who 
were bringing their cases of fraud to the Old Bailey, rather than pursuing the matter 
at a lower court. By identifying the occupations of those bringing fraud prosecutions, 
this thesis has illustrated not only how keen tradespeople were to demonstrate a no-
tolerance approach to frauds against them, but also the allowance of the justice 
system for these prosecutors to bring so many misdemeanours into the assize court.   
A key finding of this thesis regards the presence of public authority prosecutors 
routinely appearing at the Old Bailey from the middle of the eighteenth century. This 
is significant as it reflects the early stages of the state acting as public prosecutor. As 
discussed in detail in Chapters 4, 5, and 7, the presence of public authority 
prosecutors during this time of lay prosecution is unexpected, particularly in relation 
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to Randall McGowen’s work on the Bank of England896. McGowen puts this change 
in prosecutorial policy around 1820. Existing research on the development of public 
prosecutions has identified fraud cases as a catalyst for state involvement in 
prosecutions but this research has focused upon the banking fraud scandals of the 
nineteenth century897.  This thesis has revealed that fraud offences were being 
identified as requiring public prosecution as early as 1760, over a hundred years 
before banking and corporate fraud resulted in the establishment of the Director of 
Public Prosecutions.  
The presence of naval agents prosecuting fraud in the Old Bailey for the fraudulent 
obtaining of prize monies and wages, demonstrates the presence of state actors in 
the criminal justice system.  The consistent and numerically significant presence of 
naval agents as public prosecutors of fraud at the Old Bailey challenges McGowen’s 
thesis that the Bank of England was unusual in its organising and bringing of 
prosecutions and more significantly demonstrates how the state was actively 
involved in prosecutions two generations before previously appreciated.  
Methods of Fraud Prosecution 
The final of the research questions of this thesis referred to the methods and 
mechanisms of fraud prosecution. The question of how frauds were prosecuted has 
taken the analysis of the prosecution of fraud beyond the assize court. The in-depth 
exploration of the process of indictment drafting has allowed for the painting of a far 
more detailed illustration of the role of clerks, both magistrates’ and within the assize 
court. This analysis of a largely overlooked group of actors has revealed the extent of 
their influence and challenged perceptions of the lay prosecutor within criminal 
justice system as having full discretion in the prosecution process. Furthermore, it 
contributes to other research which has suggested that discretion lay in the hands of 
certain actors within the criminal justice system.898 This thesis has highlighted that 
the clerks of any of the courts should not be ignored when considering which actors 
                                                          
896 As discussed in Chapter 5. See also McGowen, Law and History Review 
897 Wiener, Reconstructing the Criminal, p.261 
898 Though very little research exists regarding the significance of the role of the clerk. 
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had discretion within the criminal justice system, and also that there is scope for 
further research into the role of the court clerk.  
In considering the role of prosecution associations in the prosecution of fraud, this 
thesis has analysed a previously un-researched archive relating to The Society for the 
Protection of Trade against Sharpers and Swindlers. Prosecution associations have 
never been fully considered in relation to the prosecution of fraud, and this particular 
archive, has never before been analysed in any depth. The analysis within this thesis 
has uncovered how widespread and organised this particular association was with 
nearly 900 members and an annual budget most companies of the day would envy. 
Sadly, it has not been possible to trace the prosecutors of fraud at the Old Bailey 
during the time period as the records do not begin until ten years later. However, 
given the great numbers of members, and the location of the association within the 
City of London, it has been concluded that some prosecutors of fraud during this 
period must have been members of such organisations. The consequence of such a 
finding is to demonstrate something of the mechanisms by which tradespeople 
funded and organised prosecutions. In being members of collectives which provided 
legal advice and financial support for prosecutions, it is more understandable that 
tradespeople would bring expensive prosecutions for misdemeanours. As stated 
throughout this thesis, such prosecutions were propelled into the highest and most 
publicized court due to the belief that fraud was an insidious group of offences which 
threatened the commercial trust and investment that was essential in this time of 
growing commercialism and proto-capitalism. The existence of such prosecution 
associations, which spread the cost of prosecution, further explains why individuals 
were willing to fund such highly publicised prosecutions.  
Whilst data regarding the presence and use of policing agents has been gathered 
within this thesis, without comparable studies, it is difficult to place these findings in 
a wider context. However, the significance of the data collected should not be over-
looked. First, policing agents were present in over ten percent of fraud indictments 
heard at the Old Bailey. Given that during this period there was no professional police 
force and policing agents were attached to magistrates’ offices in an informal 
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manner, the presence of policing agents in so many fraud trials is notable. The 
presence of policing agents is particularly significant when viewed as agents of 
magistrates, who were organs of the state. This is a further example of how fraud 
was being prosecuted, or prosecutions of fraud were being supported, by the state. 
A further sub-question addressed within the wider question of how fraud was 
prosecuted within the Old Bailey relates to the presence of counsel. It has been 
demonstrated that counsel were often present in fraud cases. A central finding of 
this thesis challenges the claim by Langbein that counsel were more commonly 
representing the defence. In instances of fraud prosecution, trials were sometimes 
contested on both side, and more often prosecution counsel were present than 
defence. This is surprising as the majority of cases were misdemeanours and therefor 
counsel were allowed by right. Also, it has widely been agreed that in cases of capital 
felony, defence counsel were allowed, if not encouraged by the judge. However, 
fraud offences, whether misdemeanours or capital felonies, saw more prosecution 
than defence counsel. This reinforces the hypothesis that prosecutors of fraud were 
likely to be members of prosecution associations and would thereby have financial 
support in their cases, allowing for the hiring of counsel.  
Perhaps the biggest finding when questioning the manner in which fraud was 
pursued at the Old Bailey comes from the identification of the juries hearing fraud 
cases. As discussed at length in Chapter 7, it is very surprising that one group of 
offences should be so greatly emanating from one jurisdiction within the Metropolis, 
in this case, the City of London. The methodology undertaken for this thesis, carrying 
out a close-reading upon one offence within the Old Bailey, has allowed for analysis 
of the petty juries in a way not before undertaken. By using the Old Bailey jury as a 
starting point to work backwards through the criminal justice system, this thesis has 
not only thoroughly analysed fraud within the Old Bailey, but also within the 
Magistrates courts.  
By starting with the conclusion that over ninety percent of fraud indictments heard 
at the Old Bailey were before the City jury, this thesis allowed for a detailed study of 
the processes of summary justice with regard to fraud offences. Again, this has never 
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been undertaken before and by comparing Middlesex with the City of London, it is 
clear that the different systems and jurisdictions of summary justice had very 
different agendas. Middlesex, led by the Fieldings at Bow Street, was actively trying 
to change the role and reputation of Magistrates by influencing policy and 
demonstrating a reduction in certain types of crime, including fraud. Where such 
crimes were still reported, Middlesex justices were demonstrating that they could 
dispose of these cases at the summary level, thereby bolstering their year-on-year 
claim for more funding.  
The City of London however did not rely upon central government for funding and 
rather, had a very different agenda. Increasingly the City was becoming not only the 
commercial centre of Britain, but also of an ever-growing empire. As a commercial 
centre, the City relied upon the conditions required for commerce, by far the most 
significant being trust; trust that debt would be paid, trust that the person one was 
dealing with was who they said they were, and trust that the goods one bought were 
of the quality and measure agreed upon. The Aldermen, the Magistrates and 
politicians of the City of London could not eradicate fraud, but they could 
demonstrate that any fraud, no matter how small, would be prosecuted and 
punished to the full extent of the law. Rather than quietly disposing of these cases 
within their own courts, the Aldermen propelled cases of fraud into the most public 
and senior criminal court in the country, the Old Bailey. This demonstrated that the 
City was a safe place to do business, even if that meant using the justice system, and 
was essential to the development of the conditions of commerce which allowed for 
the development of this period of proto-capitalism. Such detailed analysis of the 
workings of the summary courts in the Metropolis contributes not only to the scant 
literature surrounding the petty jury within the Old Bailey, but also to our 
understanding of summary justice in the capital.  
Detailed analysis of the petty juries within the Old Bailey has also raised the question 
of specialist juries at trial of first instance. This argument has not been fully explored 
in this thesis as it deserves more attention and requires far more archival work. 
However, the use of the City of London jury to hear over ninety percent of fraud 
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indictments at the Old Bailey, at a time when prominent judges were trying to 
introduce specialist juries in commercial matters, does beg the question whether 
these initiatives were being utilised in the criminal courts.  
Concluding Thoughts and Future Research 
The prosecution of fraud during this period exposes the extent to which the criminal 
justice system operated in such a way as to promote the interests of commerce and 
members of the commercial classes. This period in particular reveals how even 
relatively minor instances of fraud against tradespeople were propelled into the 
assize court in order to bring publicity to the trial and punishment of such crimes. 
Partly this reflects a desire to deter future frauds, but mostly this was calculated to 
publically declare how seriously London, in particular the City of London, saw any 
threat to the conditions required for a growing commercial market.  
Fraud is an ideal offence through which to analyse the mechanisms of the criminal 
justice system. As a collection of offences which unites misdemeanour with felony, 
and which sits at the interface between the criminal and the civil law, fraud provides 
a lens through which to assess the social groups using the criminal law, and the 
priorities of the criminal justice system. This thesis demonstrates that the criminal 
justice system in the eighteenth century was operating to protect the conditions of 
commercialism and proto-capitalism by moving fraud out of the civil courts and 
prosecuting fraud within the most public and senior criminal court in the country. 
This declaration of zero-tolerance of an offence which undermined commercial 
activity acted not only to develop proto-capitalism, but also to strengthen the system 
by which merchants and tradespeople profited. Douglas Hay and Alan Norrie were 
both correct in their assertions that the criminal justice system prioritised the 
protection of property. This thesis has demonstrated one of the ways in which this 
was achieved, through the aggressive criminalisation of fraud and enforcement of 
activity that threatened the business of the ever-influential commercial classes. 
This thesis began by asking whether the modern day prosecution and regulation of 
fraud and financial crime can be explained by the historical prosecution of fraud. One 
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great confusion in the modern day prosecution of fraud rests in the multiple 
organisations undertaking these cases. A direct comparison with the eighteenth 
century on this matter would be futile given the period of lay prosecution. However, 
the prosecution of naval frauds by agents of the Navy, and using legislation specified 
to that particular offence, was certainly successful in the eighteenth century. A lesson 
that may be learned from this is the need for more clearly delineated areas of fraud 
and more clearly established lines of jurisdiction and expertise between modern-day 
prosecution agencies.  
Another lesson that can be learned from the eighteenth century prosecution of 
fraud, is the perspective that the criminal justice system will operate to protect 
commercialism and the now-established conditions of capitalism, as defined by those 
who most prosper from this. The eighteenth century, like today, had perfectly 
effective fraud laws which would apply to the majority of instances of fraudulent 
activity. The frauds which were propelled into the highest courts were those which 
threatened the interests of a growing social strata of merchants and tradesmen. This 
thesis does not seek to make any wide-reaching critique or political statement 
regarding the modern enforcement of financial regulation but it does aim to hold up 
a mirror to modern-day fraud prosecution in an attempt to demonstrate that when 
considering the effectiveness of fraud laws, we should look less to the substantive 
law, and more to the actors involved in the criminal justice system.899  
This thesis has answered three fundamental questions: what offences made up ‘fraud’ by 
the early nineteenth century? – Who was prosecuting these offences? – and, how 
was fraud being prosecuted at this time? The answers to these questions have 
provided a comprehensive exploration of the prosecution of fraud in the eighteenth 
century and have provided a platform from which to explore other aspects of fraud 
in and the criminal justice system. This thesis has told a vital part of the story of the 
prosecution of fraud, the essential first steps identifying the ontology of fraud 
offences and who prosecuted such offences. But this story has the potential to 
                                                          
899 For an extension of this argument in regard to Victorian fraud see James Taylor, Why Have no 
Bankers Gone to Jail? History and Policy (14 November, 2013) 
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continue, in particular to ask questions surrounding the sentencing of fraud offences 
and how those convicted for fraud were treated within the criminal justice system 
and beyond. This thesis has raised other significant questions which open up 
potential future research. One in particular relates to the construction of petty juries 
within the Old Bailey, and the question of whether such juries were acting as 
specialist commercial tribunals.   
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2016) 
http://www.oldbaileyonline.org (version 6.0, 17 April 2011), 
http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/static/Project.jsp 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldhansrd/vo050622/text/50622-
04.htm (accessed 2nd January 2016) 
https://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/things-to-do/london-metropolitan-
archives/Pages/default.aspx 
https://www.cps.gov.uk/your_cps/our_organisation/sfd.html  
https://www.digitalpanopticon.org/ 
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/competition-and-markets-
authority 
https://www.londonlives.org/static/CityLocalGovernment.jsp (accessed 13th August 
2016) 
https://www.londonlives.org/static/Pretrial.jsp (accessed 13th August 2016) 
https://www.sfo.gov.uk/; https://www.fca.org.uk/  
 
 
Old Bailey Cases 
OBP, February 1760, trial of Toussaint Felix Urvoy (t17600227-34) 
OBP, April 1760, trial of Elizabeth Rufley (t17600416-38) 
OBP, July 1760, trial of John Carver (t17600709-19) 
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OBP, January 1761, trial of Thomas Davis (t17610401-31) 
OBP, Oct 1761, trial of Darby Kerwick (t17611021-26) 
OBP, April 1763, trial of John Williams (t17630413-36) 
OBP, July 1763, trial of Richard Potter (t17630706-34)  
OBP, September 1765, trial of John Spragg (t17650918-77) 
OBP, October 1766, trial of Stephen Willoughby (t17661022-58) 
OBP, September 1769, trial of Thomas Scott (t17690906-106) 
OBP, October 1769, trial of William Barns (t17691018-50)  
OBP, December 1769, trial of Roger Prate (t17691206-47)  
OBP, January 1770, trial of Thomas Hastell (t17700117-46) 
OBP, July 1770, trial of Walter Harris (t17700711-64) 
OBP, February 1771, trial of Roger Johnson (t17710220-83) 
OBP, February 1773, trial of John Forrest (t17730217-72) 
OBP, February 1773, trial of John O’Conner and John Alsibrook (t17730217-74) 
OBP, September 1774, trial of Charles Nangle and Mark Love (t17740907-66).  
OBP, December 1775, trial of Thomas Trotman (t17751206-86) 
OBP, September 1777, trial of Barnard Christian De Nassau Deitz (t17770910-101) 
OBP, September 1778, trial of Daniel Murphy (t17780916-79) 
OBP, May 1779, trial of Daniel Dempster (t17790519-44) 
OBP, May 1779, trial of John Williams (t17790519-46) 
OBP, February 1782, trial of John Hevey and Richard Beaty (t17820220-63) 
OBP, February 1783, trial of Mary Tuff (t17830226-86) 
OBP, September 1783, trial of Andrew Roman (t17830910-70) 
OBP, Jul 1784, trial of Matthew James Everingham (t17840707-116) 
OBP, January 1785, trial of Ann Jones (t17850112-50) 
OBP, April 1785, trial of John Foster (t17850406-105) 
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OBP, May 1785, trial of Thomas Field (t17850511-76) 
OBP, June 1785, trial of Jervis Bradbury (t17850629-122) 
OBP, September 1785, trial of Alexander Lauder (t18190915-217) 
OBP, Apr 1786, trial of Hannah Mullens (t17860426-10) 
OBP, Oct 1789, trial of Ann Birt (t17891028-96) 
OBP, April 1791, trial of Reuben Thomas Craven (t17910413-66) 
OBP, September 1793, trial of James Stone (t17930911-124) 
OBP, February 1795, trial of Thomas Smith (t17950218-45) 
OBP, September 1795, trial of Matthew Swift (t17950916-99) 
OBP, September 1796, trial of George Dallaway (t17960914-111) 
OBP, September 1796, trial of Joseph Marks (t17960914-110) 
OBP, January 1798, trial of Joseph Lemaire (t17980110-78) 
OBP, May 1800, trial of Charles Wilts (t18000528-137) 
OBP, May 1800, trial of John Burley (t18000528-136) 
OBP, April 1801, trial of Lemon Caseby (t18010415-143) 
OBP, April 1802, trial of Daniel Moore (t18020428-153) 
OBP, November 1803, trial of John Edwards (t18031130-59) 
OBP, April 1805, trial of Thomas-Joseph Charles (t18050424-139) 
OBP, October 1805, trial of Esther-Jane Jenner (t18051030-69) 
OBP, September 1809, trial of Robert Streeter (t18090920-186) 
OBP, January 1813, trial of Margeret Laidler (t18130113-108) 
OBP, April 1813, trial of John Wolley Lesingham (t18130407-170) 
OBP, April 1813, trial of William Hodges (t18130407-169)  
OBP, April 1816, trial of Maxwell Hume (t18160403-102) 
OBP, May 1816, trial of Mary Ann King (t18160529-83) 
OBP, September 1816, trial of William Ashlyn (t18160918-118) 
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OBP, September 1819, trial of Richard Custins (t17850914-186) 
OBP, December 1820, trial of John Dawson and Joseph Clerk (t18201206-140) 
OBP, April 1827, trial of John Robins (t18270405-86) 
OBP, January 1831, trial of Frederick Smith (t18310106-4) 
 
 
